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Valley Development and Valley Administration in the Missouri Basin <i>Henry C. Hart</i>	1
Joint College-Federal Service Council <i>Charles H. Weitz</i>	12
A Review of the Controversy over County Executives <i>Edward W. Weidner</i>	18
Community Action for Veterans' Housing <i>H. Dewayne Kreager</i>	29
Corporative Occupational Organization and Democracy in Germany . . . <i>John B. Holt</i>	34
Can Work Measurement Be Applied to the Personnel Office? <i>Herbert H. Rosenberg</i>	41
Reviews of Books and Documents	
The Utility of the Future in the Present <i>R. G. Tugwell</i>	49
<i>The Process and Organization of Government Planning</i> , by John D. Millett; <i>Central Planning and Control in War and Peace</i> , by Sir Oliver Franks	
A Closer View of Organization <i>Fritz Morstein Marx</i>	60
<i>Administrative Behavior</i> , by Herbert A. Simon	
Fielder's Choice <i>John D. Millett</i>	65
<i>Methods and Approaches for Improving Field Coordination within the Federal Security Agency</i> ; <i>The Federal Field Service: An Analysis with Suggestions for Research</i> , by Earl Latham and others; <i>Field Organization and Administration of the War Production Board and Predecessor Agencies</i> , by Carroll K. Shaw; <i>Field Administration of Wartime Rationing</i> , by Emmette S. Redford	
Municipal Utilities Management <i>William Sherman</i>	69
<i>Financial Administration of Municipal Utilities</i> , by Irving Tenner	
The Government and Research <i>Dael Wolfe</i>	71
<i>Administration for Research: volume three of Science and Public Policy. A Report to the President</i> , by John R. Steelman	
News of the Society	75

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IN THIS NUMBER

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Valley Development and Valley Administration in the Missouri Basin

By HENRY C. HART

THE concept of the Tennessee Valley Authority and experience—that a new form of public administration is needed to achieve a new level of resource use—confronts in the Missouri Basin its first operating competitor.¹ The Missouri River and its related resources have been under development for three years by the very method which the TVA was created to supplant—augmentation of existing federal departmental assignments in the area. There is already some evidence concerning the effectiveness of this approach, and since its success hinges partly on ability to get started toward solution of such keenly felt needs as flood control, it would seem worth while to compare at this early stage the Missouri Valley method with that of the Tennessee Valley Authority.²

I

THE Missouri Valley will put administrative method to a keener test than either the Columbia or the Tennessee. It is a big valley—a sixth of the United States, twice as large as Texas, thirteen times the size of the Tennessee Valley. Yet there is relatively little water in it; the mean flow of the 2,500-mile Missouri is less than that of the 650-mile Tennessee.³ This com-

bination of features means that measures of water control must be applied a thousand miles away from the area they benefit. In a democracy, it is essential that these measures be understood and accepted throughout the area. The politically powerful motive of competition for scarce water, which is traditional from the 100th meridian west to the Cascades, is introduced in a basin whose eastern population does not appreciate its reality. There is a sheer physical problem of maintaining adequate regional headquarters in a basin in which St. Louis, Missouri, is closer to Washington, D. C. than it is to Billings, Montana. Some of the water use problems themselves are confined to a part of the valley: the Northern Great Plains has its own problems of drought cycles, wind erosion, and grasshoppers, distinct enough to call into being a Northern Great Plains Agricultural Advisory Council.⁴ The floods to which comprehensive river control must be directed are confined to the lower quarter of the Missouri—the area from Sioux City, Iowa, to St. Louis. Contrast the Tennessee, where major flood benefits accrue to Chattanooga, slightly over 100 miles from the river's source. Economic functions of the east-

¹ In the Columbia Valley there is a huge basin of plentiful water like the Tennessee, but with some of the contrasts of the Missouri. There, the departmental method has given way at important points to the valley authority method. The Secretary of the Interior stated in an address to the Washington Public Ownership League in Seattle, October 12, 1946, that a "regional autonomous organization" is needed to carry the project further.

² The proposed Missouri Valley Authority is the specific issue around which centers the valuable symposium on regional planning in 32 *Iowa Law Review* 193-406 (1947).

³ For physical characteristics of the basin see S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d sess. *Conservation, Control, and*

Use of Water Resources of the Missouri River Basin in Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, and Missouri (1944), the "Sloan Plan"; H. Doc. No. 238, 73d Cong. 2d sess., *Missouri River* (1935) which is the compendium of the Army Engineers' data; and National Resources Planning Board, *Drainage Basin Problems and Programs, The Missouri Basin*, in three parts (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936).

⁴ The President's Great Plains Committee, *The Future of the Great Plains* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1936); Northern Great Plains Agricultural Advisory Council, *The Use of Water Resources for Agriculture in the Northern Great Plains*, Proceedings of Council meeting, Aug. 7-9, 1945, Custer, S. Dak. (mimeographed).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

ern and western parts of the Missouri Valley differ sharply. All the western area is rural and extractive; the big cities with their processing and commercial functions and their concentrations of population, wealth, media of information, transportation, and other industrial services are located along the lower quarter of the river. The exception, Denver, plays a role of greater significance to the Great Basin and the Far West than to the Missouri Valley.⁵

Nevertheless, there is more than the physical necessity of systematic river control to call for a basin approach to the development of Missouri Valley resources. All parts of the watershed share a relatively primitive stage of industrial development as compared with New England, the Middle West, and, more recently, the Pacific Coast. With the "colonial" economy go shortages of power, transportation, capital, technical skills, and representation in the industrial affairs of the national government which tend to perpetuate the condition. Moreover, the entire valley, with the exception of fringes in the Rockies and Ozarks, is a phenomenally rich agricultural area. It is conscious of its role as the "breadbasket of the Nation." Its farms are large, mechanized, highly capitalized. They color the thinking of the whole valley, for the cities service them and depend on them. But Missouri Valley farms are going through the same decline of population which is characteristic of agricultural areas throughout the nation, and this decline is superimposed on the exodus of dust-bowl years. It is the fact that the Missouri Valley states had 52 congressmen in 1914 and 40 today that constitutes the most direct challenge to this region of settlers' sons and daughters. While the valley contains some notable exceptions, the student of administration must not overlook the paradoxical western psychology which Bernard DeVoto characterized in "The West Against Itself."⁶ Only in the light of the distinctive features of the Missouri Basin can a comparison be made to TVA experience.

⁵ Mississippi Valley Committee of the P.W.A., *Report* (U. S. Government Printing Office, 1943) pp. 163-79.

⁶ *Harpers Magazine*, 193:481-91 and 194:1-13 (Dec., 1946, and Jan., 1947).

II

THE present development of the Missouri Valley is based on congressional authorization in scattered statutes, but the administrative method and the main outlines of the program were laid down in the Flood Control Act of 1944.⁷ The program is called "comprehensive" and rightly so to the extent that it touches upon a wide range of water uses and certain derivatives of water conservation. It subordinates nonengineering aspects, however, and some closely related problems of conservation are entirely neglected.

In the Flood Control Act Congress explicitly assigns flood control storage and local protective works and the storage and channeling of water for irrigation, and these aspects are fully represented in the planning and contemplated operation of the development. The navigation program has been well supported and is represented in the conception of the plan, at least as far as the Army Corps of Engineers is concerned, but it is authorized in a separate statute⁸ and its relationship to the congressional priority of water for irrigation purposes is thus confused. Publicly, at least, there has not been a meeting of minds as to the benefits and costs of navigation and its proper upstream terminus.⁹ The Flood Control Act authorizes soil erosion control as part of the program, but it has been carried on to date on a test-tube basis in one tributary basin¹⁰ in a program wholly out of scale with the river works and the economic need to conserve topsoil or even the physical need to keep it out of reservoirs. The recreation by-products of reservoir storage are the statutory responsibility of the Corps of Engineers and the Department of the Interior in their respective reservoirs,¹¹ but for professional skills the Engineers must rely almost entirely on the National Park Service of the Department of the Interior. Power development is assigned three ways in the Flood Control Act: the Engineers and Bureau of Reclama-

⁷ Public Law 534, 78th Cong., 2d sess. (58 Stat. 665).

⁸ Rivers and Harbors Act of March 2, 1945.

⁹ Missouri River States Committee, *Report of the Engineering Subcommittee*, May 25, 1944, mimeographed, p. 6.

¹⁰ The Little Sioux watershed in Iowa and Minnesota. H. Doc. No. 268, 78th Cong. 1st sess.

¹¹ By a revision of the original act in Public Law 526, 79th Cong., 2d sess.

tion generate power at their respective dams, the bureau transmits and sells power, and the Federal Power Commission recommends generating provisions, approves electric rates, and surveys the power markets. The Flood Control Act contains no provision for developing wider use of electricity, a responsibility that Congress specifically assigned to the TVA, and comments to the Bureau of the Budget indicated that the Corps of Engineers in their part of the proposal neglected much of the basin's power potential.¹² Under the increasingly evident power shortage and the insistence of the Federal Power Commission, however, the provision of abundant electricity is taking a more important role in the development.¹³

Activities of a second type, which form vital links in the comprehensive TVA pattern of development, are not authorized in the Missouri development. These are the research and demonstration activities which TVA experience suggests might concern freight rates, soil fertility, contribution of electricity to farming and small industries, health and sanitation as related to water use, community planning and provision of opportunities for an agricultural population to train itself in industrial skills. Apparently miscellaneous, these activities have two principal purposes: (1) research to keep abreast of the effects of changes on the valley and to point new directions of development, and (2) the invention of mechanical and administrative devices to relate conservation to the need of individuals to earn a livelihood and to take part in normal community services.

The thesis that "the river touches and gives life to all forms of human concerns," which has been the guiding concept of the TVA, is nowhere found in the authorization or organization of the Missouri development. This thesis has been misunderstood by a few devotees as well as by doubters. It does not mean that the watersheds of rivers are the areas into which nature has divided the earth's crust for man's ultimate conservative use.¹⁴ Hence it does not look toward valley authori-

ties carving up all federal field functions. On the other hand, it cannot be reconciled with the view that works in the rivers, however breath taking, will accomplish a regional development.

What it does mean is clear from the TVA example. There are many bases on which regions may be defined geographically, but the river basin has two great advantages. It is the area of a full and long-established federal power over navigable streams,¹⁵ and the technical means of its development are of a scope and nature peculiarly adaptable to governmental enterprise. By (1) harnessing the river, (2) planning and arranging through contracts for the basin-wise use of other resources, and (3) keeping a continual watch of potentialities for and obstacles to full development, the TVA has demonstrated that, without any attempt to be exclusive, the river valley approach can yield increases in income and economic enterprise, satisfaction with life in the basin, and revitalized participation in community and governmental activities. It is evident that the Missouri development differs from the Tennessee not merely in doing the same things in a different way, but in doing only the first category of the TVA-type activities, with a very small start on the second in the program of soil erosion control.

III

POLITICAL choices are related to administrative method not only in the sense that a program requires appropriate administrative execution, but in the corollary sense that a decision of administrative means sets limits on the type of policy which can be assigned. The key to the present method of the Missouri program is that it is *departmental*. Not only is responsibility divided among departments, but their internal patterns of administration range widely. Particularly interesting is the comparison of basin-organized and function-organized departments in terms of their responsiveness

¹² House Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong. 2d sess., pp. viii, 6-7.

¹³ Lester C. Walker, *Description of Work of the Federal Power Commission's River Basin Division in the Missouri River Basin in Cooperation with Other Federal Agencies*, mimeographed, Chicago, 1947.

¹⁴ National Resources Committee, *Regional Factors in National Planning* (U. S. Government Printing Office,

1935), p. 145; Richard Hartshorne, *The Nature of Geography* (American Association of Geographers, 1940) p. 284.

¹⁵ The Denison Dam case, *Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co.*, 313 U.S. 508 (1941) is the modern expression of the federal power of commerce in navigation, demand for which at the Annapolis Convention in 1786 led to the Constitutional Convention.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

to the potentialities of the Missouri development.

The Department of Agriculture is assigned the watershed protection phase of the program in the 1944 act, as it has been in all flood control acts since 1936. It has assigned the protective work in the Missouri Basin to the Soil Conservation Service, except for the wooded margins along the Rockies and in the state of Missouri, which are the responsibility of the Forest Service. Neither agency has a basin region. Obviously the Forest Service is much more efficiently organized in terms of the great timber areas; its basin activities are directed from Missoula, Denver, and Milwaukee. The Soil Conservation Service has a regional office at Lincoln, Nebraska, which was set up to serve the Great Plains, a logical soil use region. The eastern states of the basin (Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri) are in its Milwaukee region. Other bureaus and agencies of the Department of Agriculture are regionalized around crop areas, credit centers, and the like; none is organized on basin lines. The task of representing the department on interagency matters in the basin and of keeping the agencies abreast of basin developments is assigned to a single representative of the Secretary of Agriculture.

In contrast, the Department of the Interior has taken a whole series of administrative steps to coordinate all of its activities in the Missouri Basin. These are many. The Bureau of Reclamation and the Geological Survey have direct engineering responsibilities in the river. The Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Office of Indian Affairs, the Bureau of Mines, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Smithsonian Institution all carry on activities in the basin. The Secretary outlined the purpose and methods of coordination in a memorandum issued to the staff in 1945. Since that time, monthly progress reports have been compiled of the achievements of each bureau or agency with budgeted assignments for the basin. A Missouri Basin reports staff thus keeps the Secretary informed of the condition of basin programs and circulates information received from Interior and other agencies. The regional heads of the Interior agencies meet monthly as the Missouri Basin Field Committee, among other purposes to instruct and

hear reports from the Interior representative on the federal interagency committee for the Missouri development. The chairman of the Interior committee, W. G. Sloan, is the full-time representative of the department on the interagency committee; it was he who compiled the original Reclamation proposal for comprehensive river development. Basin organization is reflected in the regional structure of the newly established Bureau of Land Management.

There can be no doubt that these arrangements (which fall short of creating a Department of Interior in the basin) have already overcome some of the natural resistance of bureaus to a reframing of their responsibilities. There has developed a tendency to think of problems in terms of Interior's Missouri Basin tasks. The key to this progress is the availability of lump sum appropriations to the Bureau of Reclamation which can be allocated to the other bureaus and agencies to do basin work. Thus, there is within the Department of the Interior a counterpart of the TVA provision for supporting and tying in with the obvious engineering phases of river development those aspects whose interrelations are only uncovered by research and demonstration and which therefore can be sustained only as part of the construction of reservoirs and the physical works of the basin. The contrast between Interior and Agriculture in this respect is dramatic. Compare the size of the current year's allocation of \$2,121,000 from Reclamation funds to the Geological Survey for collection of engineering data in the basin with the \$329,000 available in the Department of Agriculture for its investigations of watershed protection projects. The latter, of course, have direct bearing on the planning of reservoirs, but suffer from an artificial divorce of river engineering and valley development.

The Federal Power Commission conducts those of its activities which concern the Missouri development through its Chicago regional office. The Chicago region extends to several states east of the basin in accordance with the pattern of utilities with which the commission is concerned. But this is not a handicap, since, for the purposes of studying hydraulic power potentials and power markets, the Federal Power Commission provides

a single point of contact for other interested agencies.

The Corps of Engineers, having river channel functions, is organized with the basin as the territory of its Missouri River division. The division engineer at Omaha, though administratively responsible to the chief of Army Engineers in Washington, and through him to the Secretary of War, has a degree of initiative in and direct responsibility to the region not possessed by any other federal official engaged on the program. This combination of advantages gives natural leadership to the division engineer, General Lewis A. Pick, who, by reason of his expertise in public relations, administrative ability, and sense of timing, has made the most of his opportunities. In June, 1947, he was unanimously chosen for the third year as chairman of the interagency committee for the development.

IV

THE Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee has been in existence for almost three years, but its function is still widely misunderstood. It was created in 1945 as a subsidiary of the Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee in Washington. Its charter confines it to:

providing a means through which the field representatives of the participating Federal agencies may effectively interchange information and coordinate their activities among themselves and with those of the States in the preparation of reports and in the planning and execution of works for the control and use of the waters of the Missouri River Basin.¹⁶

The committee has no authority in law or in the administrative lines of the respective departments. Secretaries of the departments still answer for the success or failure of their respective phases of the work along the Missouri. The committee has no staff; a busy civilian engineer in the division engineer's office serves as its secretary.¹⁷ Remaining doubts as to the meaning of the word "coordinate" are resolved by instructions to the members to act only with unanimous consent, and in the event of a

¹⁶ Federal Inter-Agency River Basin Committee, resolution of March 29, 1945.

¹⁷ Minutes of the committee are circulated in mimeographed form by the office of the division engineer in Omaha.

dissent to refer the question to their departmental chiefs in Washington.

The governors of the ten Missouri Basin states appoint five of their number to represent them on the Missouri Basin Inter-Agency Committee. Originally invited as fraternal delegates, they have long since become de facto members on a par with the departmental representatives. It is the state representatives who, having comprehensive interests in development, and being free from suspicion of bureaucratic wrangling which would embarrass one federal member in publicly cross-examining another, have precipitated the resolution of situations where agencies were working at cross purposes.

The leading illustration is the present joint survey of the sub-watershed of the Osage River in Missouri. Governor Donnelly of Missouri, attending his second committee meeting, pointedly asked whether proposed storage of run-off in the state of Missouri could not be accomplished by farm reservoirs and soil treatment rather than by the construction of five large reservoirs to which affected farm interests in his state objected. The upshot of the question was a conference at his capital of the Soil Conservation Service, the Corps of Engineers, the Dean of the State College of Agriculture, and the state conservation engineer. The participants agreed to collaborate on a survey of water resource plans for the Osage, including an assessment of the contribution of soil conservation measures. The survey is now in progress, with indications that the plans of the Corps of Engineers and the state's objections thereto will be tested on the basis of mutually accepted facts.¹⁸

The publicity given to the committee meetings serves an important educational function. Activities at sessions are front-page news all over the valley. The public is coming to realize that water use problems are basinwide, and

¹⁸ Two points may be noted. Opposition to the dams by a Missouri congressman had already put them on the shelf as far as appropriations were concerned. Much earlier resolution of the issue would have been desirable. Second, the constructive solution was achieved not in the Inter-Agency Committee, with its newspaper reporters, but as an outgrowth of it in an executive session of the interested agencies. Committee minutes, January 16, 1947. St. Louis *Globe-Democrat* January 17, and February 15, 1947.

that remedies may have to be found in parts of the valley remote from the benefits. There is not enough appreciation of this contribution of the committee. Both its friends and its critics have done it a disservice by claiming for it the function of deciding interagency issues.¹⁹

The committee has had spotty success in drawing agency attention to conflicts and gaps in the program. To date the major accomplishments in this direction have concerned physical plans for reservoirs; there has not been consultation on policies in advance of adoption. Such consultation is desperately needed in matters relating to navigation, electric rates, the development of irrigation farms, tempo of construction and priority of projects, and watershed protection through improved farming practices.

Systematic consultation on these broad questions and a clearer understanding of the fact that the committee does not constitute a second line of administrative authority might be encouraged by securing the establishment of the committee through federal statute as an advisory body made up of the basin representatives of participating departments and governors representing the ten valley states. Unwillingness to label the committee plainly as advisory undoubtedly stems from the general lack of understanding of the contribution which consultative bodies can, and increasingly must, make to "big democracy." From a practical point of view, state and local officials would find their influence greater if their advice could reach Congress through an established channel at the planning stage.

V

THE role of the states in the Missouri development has been remarkable. Three years ago they were expressing an attitude of states' rights that was all that could be expected from an area of water scarcity, dissimilar problems, and remoteness from Washington. Since 1944 they have worked together, first in a committee of the ten governors and two additional representatives from each state, and more recently in the Inter-Agency Com-

¹⁹ Protagonists for the Committee have called it "a kind of board of directors" for the Pick-Sloan development. On the same premise, the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* attacked the Committee as a "fake MVA."

mittee described above. The early committee was effective in bringing about the famous reconciliation of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers in November, 1944. The ten governors have been active in resolving conflicts within their borders as to reservoir plans—a welcome contribution to any federal agency whose work must inevitably dislocate certain sections of a state's population. The growth of a sense of basin responsibility is abundantly illustrated in the attitude of the present chairman of the governors' committee, Governor Sam Ford of Montana. In 1944 he claimed for Montana "prior right to the waters arising in or passing through the state for domestic use, irrigation, power development, and other beneficial uses."²⁰ In June, 1947, he called a special meeting of the governors' committee to consider action to meet the emergency of floods in the lower valley states, a meeting which would certainly generate support for the use of Montana reservoirs for flood protection 1,500 miles downstream.

The present active role of the states is due to a combination of circumstances completely unlike the situation in the Tennessee Valley. Each of the ten states has been conducting its own program of water conservation and agricultural development for years; some states anticipated the corresponding federal programs. The issue of public power has been fought out, not always to the same conclusion. Nebraska, for example, is the one state in the Union which has no private electric utility. Each of the states, except Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri on the eastern side, has evolved statutory or constitutional methods of allocating water rights, appropriate administrative instrumentalities, and a body of common law by which individual and social rights have been balanced in the face of insufficient water supply.

From an administrative point of view, the important consideration is to give the states the prominent part in the development to which their exercise of responsibility entitles them. This is already done in the legislative area by the provision of the Flood Control Act of 1944 that plans of the Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation must be submitted to

²⁰ Missouri River States Committee, *The Future Development of the Missouri Valley* (Council of State Governments, 1944), p. 24.

Congress along with the favorable or unfavorable recommendations of the governors of the states involved. The same advisory role should be established for the governors in the administrative area, and certainly full advantage should be taken of the present practice of securing basin-wide consultation of the states through their designation of five representatives. Such representation is much more valuable, in that it is responsible, than the advisory machinery proposed by Senator Murray in both of his MVA bills whereby the President would appoint representatives of agricultural, commerce, and labor interests (the current bill adds wildlife and recreation as a fourth interest) to membership on an advisory board.²¹

The greatest obstacle to larger participation by the states is the embarrassment of federal officials in laying matters of inter-agency disagreement before them. The fruitful state-federal collaboration which is possible via a single point of federal contact for comprehensive planning is revealed by the productiveness of the Missouri Basin conferences arranged by the late National Resources Planning Board, and the research activities of this agency.

VI

ALARMISTS notwithstanding, the United States still appears to have a government of laws to the extent that comprehensive administration awaits comprehensive legislation. The latter has not been achieved in the Missouri development. The difficulty is not so much the authorization of various phases of the program in separate statutes, but the perennial consideration of progress and the hammering out of appropriations by special-purpose committees which compartmentalize the knowledge of Congress and its contacts with the public.

Projects for irrigation and for the distribution and sale of power are considered by public lands committees of the House and Senate and are paid for from appropriations of the Department of the Interior. Agriculture committees hear evidence on the watershed protection program, which is financed by appropriations of the Department of Agriculture. Industrial development and river transportation are the concern of the commerce committees. The public works committees consider authoriza-

tions for navigation and flood control, but appropriations are further divided into a rivers and harbors and a flood control act. There was some optimism that the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 would permit more integrated congressional committee work on basin problems. The only committee consolidations have served to align committees more clearly with departments. Subcommittees, of course, continue to hold hearings on the same segments of the plans as before. The centrifugal influence of special-purpose committees is a familiar story.²² It has been dramatized in the Missouri development by the use of committees to carry onto the floor of Congress the interagency disputes regarding the height of Garrison Reservoir²³ and the assignment as between the Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Reclamation of land preparation and settlement and the extension of agricultural research on federally irrigated farms.²⁴ As Mr. Bashore, the commissioner of reclamation, since retired, concluded in testimony on this point in 1945, "Congress is entitled to have a better overall presentation of any particular problem that affects a region."²⁵

The effect of special committee work on a comprehensive program is not only to discourage collaboration on the part of departments and to deprive the entire Congress of hearings and legislative staff work on issues as a whole, but to create on the part of members of Congress powerful vested interests, enhanced by the seniority system, in the ascendancy of the particular philosophies or programs of their counterpart administrative agencies. This tendency, natural to overworked members of Congress who must have confidence in some source of factual information and some technical approach, is heightened by the identification of special-purpose interests within the basin with

²¹ Amazingly contemporary is the 1888 account by Albert Bushnell Hart, "Autobiography of a Rivers and Harbors Bill," *3 Proceedings of the American Historical Society*, 180-97 (1888).

²² Statement of Representative Lemke, Associated Press dispatches of Dec. 13, 1945, and Feb. 4, 1946, in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*.

²³ House Committee of Public Lands, 80th Cong. 1st sess., *Hearings before a Subcommittee on Irrigation and Reclamation* (Feb. 1947).

²⁴ Senate Committee on Commerce, 79th Cong. 1st sess., *Hearings before a Subcommittee on S.353 to Establish a Missouri Valley Authority* (1945), p. 161.

²⁵ S.1156, 80th Cong., 1st sess.

the sectional interests (extending far outside the basin) of powerful committee members. Thus, Senator Overton from the harbor and levee state of Louisiana, and Senator O'Mahoney from the arid state of Wyoming, provided leadership to the navigation and flood control interests and the reclamation interests respectively in the consideration of plans for the Missouri. From an administrative point of view, it appears as certain as observations based on political events can be that no comprehensive basin development can result from this consideration by separate special-purpose committees of Congress.

Congress as a whole must make the decision to develop a region and determine the means of development. This is a task for legislative leadership on a plane not attained in the Missouri Basin authorization. It means a fight, probably a long hard one, in which the American public makes up its mind that investment in a region and maximum use of governmental powers and facilities therein will be in the national interest. This was the fight carried on by Senator Norris from 1918 to 1933 in behalf of the Tennessee Valley development—a fight during which there was continual growth of the legislative proposal extending almost to the moment of its introduction in 1933.²⁶ Congress has not made this sort of decision regarding the Missouri Basin. What it did, if one is to judge from the hearings, and from the statement of the President in approving the 1944 Flood Control Act, was to decide that the Pick-Sloan physical plan offered the quickest way of getting on with a job of postwar public works and urgent flood control.

There is the feeling in Congress, and probably on the part of many people in the valley, that conflicts on technical points can be disposed of by laws emerging from this segmental committee work. Thus the present "decision" concerning the height of Garrison Reservoir was made on the floor of Congress and in conference committee following conflicting recommendations by House and Senate appropriations subcommittees. It is embodied in a limitation of the War Department Civil Appropriation Act of 1946 preventing operation of

²⁶ As recounted among the very interesting remarks of Morris L. Cooke, "Plain Talk About a Missouri Valley Authority," 32 *Iowa Law Review* 367-390 (1947).

the reservoir at an elevation above 1,830 feet, although the dam is authorized, and is now being constructed, for a pool at 1,850 feet.²⁷ Perhaps on the basis of such experiences, the proposal that an administrative agency consider conflicting demands upon a reservoir and present a single technical recommendation to Congress is widely regarded as a limitation upon the legislative function. But it is now abundantly clear that only unification of congressional committee work for the basin will prevent each department from carrying out its version of a compromise law concerning which there has never been a showdown on the technical facts.

The same type of fallacy has appeared in the thinking about the business methods of accounting which legislation of the valley authority type would entail. Actually, it is not an issue between close legislative supervision of expenditures in the present system and loose controls under an authority. At present appropriations of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers allot lump sums to projects and give wide latitude for expenditure through other public agencies. An authority would make possible a system-wide allocation of costs and a type of operational accounting which would permit comparison with parallel activities of private businesses. As the Missouri development proceeds, the lack of such accounting will be felt in the matters of navigation costs, tax equivalents in electricity operations, allocation of flood control benefits in Reclamation dams, and comparability of generating costs in Reclamation and Engineers dams.

VII

IN CRITICIZING the preoccupation of Congress with administrative decisions made in committee, it is only fair to add that the situation has come about in a vacuum of executive leadership. The Flood Control Act of 1944 enacts engineering plans which were submitted to the respective committees of Congress by the Secretaries of War and Interior without the approval or disapproval of the President. The Bureau of the Budget elicited and transmitted the comments of other affected agencies on these plans. Congress did not receive the Presi-

²⁷ Public Law 374, 79th Cong., 2d sess., chap. 247.

dent's recommendation on legislation for the Missouri development until five months after it had received these specific requests for authorization, nor did the President transmit any detailed administrative plan or comment on the engineering scheme.²⁸ After President Roosevelt stated in signing the Flood Control Act of 1944 that he did not thereby approve the administrative approach provided in it but continued to favor the creation of a valley authority, the Missouri development proceeded virtually without executive leadership.

Students of administration are properly concerned with the difficulties which an overburdened President must encounter in attempting to give direction to a basin program outside the executive departments. Aside from the question of administrative logic, there is the danger that a valley authority excluded from the immediate executive family may be deprived of executive support for a program which, despite its business aspects, still constitutes a considerable political salient.

Those who, like C. Herman Pritchett, have seriously probed this question, have recognized that both consolidation of water resource programs in a reorganized federal department and more systematic horizontal relations between this and other departments in the field are prerequisites to the degree of departmental coordination which would be necessary to ease the President's task. At the moment, such reforms are conceded to be visionary.²⁹ Meanwhile it is apparent from the Missouri Basin experience that conflicts among departments, to which the precedents established in this vast development loom as jurisdictional boundaries reaching far into the future, present thornier and more obscure problems for presidential decision than any likely inter-authority disputes or schisms in authority boards. In view of the impact of the TVA experience and of the public controversy over a Missouri Valley Authority toward a rethinking of federal departmental organization, one cannot dismiss the possibility that the coming of age of valley authorities in a few of the great basins of the

nation might be the strongest stimulus toward a more logical federal departmentalization. Until the prior question is answered—whether comprehensive development of our river valleys is public policy—the President will in any case have a political fight on his hands. Under the departmental pattern of administration, administrative questions, too, are spilling over into the political arena even during the honeymoon period when all interests seek decisive appropriations from Congress. The valley authority would provide the President with programs for the solution of these problems which by virtue of technical preparation and consolidation of all possible public participation in the basin would afford him opportunities for executive leadership.

A second question which has been raised by Charles McKinley is the effect of the overlapping of a series of valley authorities on the existing or potential field programs of the many departments or executive agencies which are working in related fields.³⁰ The point we are apt to miss is that any valley development, if it is to be effective, must transform the existing programs which are merged in it. The TVA did so, and to an amazing degree later developments are impelled to do so, not only by the political competition of the TVA idea, but by the raised sights of many administrators and other professional groups who have been reconsidering the relation of water to natural and economic resources during the past decade. The transformation is expressed in a new level of federal investment, a new comprehensiveness leading to new relations with parallel programs, a new flexibility of management, and new methods of effectuating programs by contractual relations with going agencies in the basin.

To illustrate: the present authorization for the Missouri Basin includes an area of federally irrigated farms larger than the Interior Department's present nationwide total. We have noted how far the dynamics of the situation have permitted a vigorous Secretary of the Interior to go in internal reorganization. But the pace has not been matched by other members of the team. The Department of Agriculture, for instance, with ample willingness to keep

²⁸ Message to Congress of September 21, 1944. The President lacked engineering staff assistance at the executive level in lieu of a National Resources Planning Board.

²⁹ "The Transplantability of the TVA," 32 *Iowa Law Review* 335-8 (1947).

³⁰ "Federal Field Integration and the Valley Authority," 6 *Public Administration Review* 380 (1946).

up, and with some of the most inventive and experienced directors of watershed programs in its staff, is rigidly confined to nationwide tempos of operation and to a variety of regional responsibilities not basin-centered. The result is a failure of articulation, most evident between the reservoir-building agencies with their ample funds and basin focus and the by-product or watershed agencies with their more comprehensive but less dramatic purposes and their meager funds for basin purposes. Solution has been sought through the growing use of contracts by the Interior Department to enlist other departments and state agencies in its expanded program, and interestingly enough, in the creation of an overlapping staff by the Bureau of Reclamation where such agreement cannot be reached in the field of irrigated agriculture.

It is the valley development, not the valley authority, which calls for a considerable re-staffing and reorganization of existing federal field programs. To the extent that such a re-orientation can be effected within the departments, a valley authority could perform much of its work through them. It would, in fact, have important advantages in "contracting out" its program which the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers do not have when they seek to do the same thing: it would have clearer statutory authority and would be less suspect of "buying off" another agency to do a special-purpose rather than a comprehensive job.

VIII

ONE of the problems raised in considering the strengthening of the regional roots of democratic administration is the preservation of the national interest. It would be a heavy price to pay for valley consciousness if it were to overshadow national consciousness.

One cannot squarely face this issue without making up his mind in what sense he conceives of the Missouri Valley as a region. Is it "the region?" Or is it superimposed upon a shelterbelt region stretching from Canada to Mexico, the Great Plains agricultural region, or the Northwest region of its electricity transmission radius? Is it not a region for a particular purpose: the natural cycle of water in its effect on land and livelihood? Geography and administration have not improved upon

the concept of President Franklin Roosevelt, stated ten years ago as follows:

The area most suitable as a region for the carrying out of an integrated program designed to prevent floods is the basin including the watersheds of a pivotal region. But other problems dependent on other combinations of natural economic and social factors may require a somewhat different area to permit the most effective functional program.²¹

The greater practical advance of river valley developments should not lead to the conclusion that the valley approach closes the door to other patterns of regional development. Certainly it appears likely that the federal government's relation with the great metropolitan regions is destined to greater prominence. While such overlapping of regions may not make for neat charts, there is less to fear of irresponsibility to a national legislature and public under this more complex and pragmatic forecast.

But there is another more immediate protector of the national interest. It is the great national investment upon which the development of a water region is based. The danger of what Howard Odum labels sectionalism (the public attitude that a region exists for its own sake) is stronger in the log-rolling method of distributing federal largesse than in a decision by the nation to enhance its strength and wealth by invigorating one after another of its member regions. Sectionalism in Odum's sense conceives of the nation and the region as separate, competing entities. The valley authority approach recognizes the nation's responsibility to conserve the full potential of its regions (defined by the particular resource chosen as core) in the interest of the whole. Hence it is that the impetus for valley authorities came in the case of the TVA largely from national, not valley, leaders. It should not be surprising to see the Missouri development profit from the wider sources of legislative and administrative pioneering.

No one can follow the history of TVA's response to national interests, notably to the emerging defense needs as early as 1939, without assessing a heightened regional stake in national safety and prosperity. The development of such responsiveness (initiative beyond the mere execution of statutes) in the Missouri

²¹ Message to Congress, June 3, 1937.

is being hampered by the need on the part of administrators, who lack the means of developing valley consciousness, to appeal to a few provincial interests in the valley. The prerequisite to a cure is effective responsibility through the national Executive to the Congress as a whole. This is a type of responsibility which goes to the method of performance as well as the execution of authorized programs. It makes the difference, for instance, between the absence of a labor relations program in the Missouri development and an agreement between the TVA and its employees which specifies "the public interest in an

undertaking such as the TVA always being paramount."³² It was the nation's trust in high level performance of national policy by regional administration which the President expressed in the words

If we are successful here we can march on, step by step, in a like development of other great natural territorial units within our borders.³³

³² "General Agreement between the Tennessee Valley Trades and Labor Council and the Tennessee Valley Authority, Effective August 6, 1940," in the *Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1940* (Government Printing Office, 1940) pp. 99-103.

³³ Message to Congress, April 10, 1935.

Joint College-Federal Service Council

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HISTORICALLY the federal government has not distinguished itself by progressive personnel administration. Through the inadequacies of law and the difficulties of building sound and continuing programs on the shifting sands of annual appropriations and congressional favor, the government has been handicapped in promoting progressive personnel techniques. Under the impetus of the war and faced with the necessity of improvement, some agencies have made significant advances. Refinements of personnel administration in such areas as recruitment techniques, induction and orientation programs, career system organization, incentive promotional programs, employee relation policies and programs, and in-service training facilities have not, however, received the careful consideration that would seem desirable and the quality of such programs varies widely among the different departments and establishments.

Of the many unsolved problems an attempt is made here to deal with only one, namely, the relation between the colleges and universities and the federal service. This problem, as seen from the Thirteenth United States Civil Service Region,¹ is (1) lack of liaison between the colleges and universities as the trainers of a great number of potential federal employees and the federal government as potential employer; (2) lack of integration of program in terms of the objectives sought by the educational institutions and the recruitment, orientation, and employment policies of the government; and (3) lack of a working plan whereby a recognition of the necessary relationship between the higher educational institutions and the federal government can be effected for their mutual benefit.

¹This region includes the states of Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming.

The regional committee on administrative personnel of the United States Civil Service Commission first suggested to the director of Region 13 the need for taking steps to effect closer cooperation between the federal agencies and the colleges and universities in the preparation of young men and women for the federal service. There followed in March, 1946, a meeting of representatives of various federal agencies in the region and a representative of the regional committee on administrative personnel to discuss means of integrating programs so that the federal service might attract superior recruits. It was the unanimous decision of the group to call a conference the following month, to include representatives of the federal departments, agencies, and independent establishments and the colleges and universities in the four-state area. Accordingly, seventy representatives met in April, 1946, to (1) acquaint colleges and universities with the work of the federal agencies; (2) suggest deficiencies in collegiate preparation for federal service; (3) explore the weaknesses in the federal career service that make it less desirable than other employment in the eyes of many graduating students; (4) discuss problems of possible employment training; and (5) discuss methods of improving the relationship between the colleges and universities and the federal government.

It was the sense of the conference that, although many of the deficiencies and suggestions for correction were known, the entire field was so broad that it required further concentrated attention to develop a program and proposals to correct the obvious deficiencies. It was the further view of the group that to give adequate recognition to the various occupational areas there should be established three working committees: (1) biological sci-

ences, (2) physical sciences, and (3) social sciences. The conference appointed a committee on committees to select the personnel for these working committees.

Meeting in May, 1946, the committee on committees decided it would be necessary to have a supervisory or coordinating committee to direct the work of the study. It also determined the size of the working committees, recommended the federal agency membership thereon, and requested the presidents of the colleges and universities in the areas to select three representatives each, one to serve on each working committee. The newly created coordinating committee was directed to meet as soon as these university representatives had been designated.

The coordinating committee held an organization meeting in July, 1946, discussed various problems, and assigned occupational groupings to the various working committees.² It recommended that, because of possible overlap, the committees cooperate to minimize duplicate study. The following outline was provided for guiding the work of the three

² The following Civil Service Commission occupational groupings were assigned to the working committees:

Biological Sciences

- Agriculture and biological sciences
- Dentistry, veterinary, and medicine
- Hospital and public health services
- Forestry
- Psychology

Physical Sciences

- Engineering
- Geology
- Chemistry
- Physics

Social Sciences

- Economics and political science
- Education
- Legal
- Library and archives
- Personnel
- Information
- Administrative
- Procurement and supply
- Transportation
- Accounting, auditing, and fiscal
- Investigative and law enforcement
- Business specialists
- Statistical
- Marketing

committees: (1) consideration of the personnel needs of federal agencies with respect to fields of training, number of persons required, and qualifications desired; (2) recommendations to the Civil Service Commission with respect to recruitment and examinations (including determination of qualification standards and evaluation of qualifications of applicants); (3) recommendations to the colleges with respect to need for curricula study, additional courses, and cooperative educational work programs; and (4) recommendations to the federal agencies with respect to need for in-service training and for better personnel utilization and development.

Each committee was guided by this outline in considering its phase of the problem.

Biological Sciences Committee

FEDERAL representatives of the biological sciences committee met with college and university representatives at three locations in the civil service region. A draft report was then prepared and mailed to all committee members. Members made suggestions for changes to the chairman of the committee and a final report was then prepared for the coordinating committee and the council.

The committee brought forth a number of proposals. It suggested that the colleges make a continuing study of their biological sciences curricula to the end of insuring professional competence. It was felt that technical graduates in the biological sciences are too narrowly prepared and need to develop proficiency in the skills of communication and human relations. It was strongly felt that training in one of the biological sciences is not sufficient if the individual cannot write about and discuss his field. Similarly, a lack of appreciation for the broader aspects of organization and of economic activity may seriously limit the effectiveness of the technically trained scientist as a positive force in society. In view of these needs there was some discussion of the desirability of extending the undergraduate college years from four to five, but it was felt that no recommendation to this effect could be made without further study. Also, since civil service examinations often have not tested the applicant's abilities other than in the purely technical areas, the committee pointed out the need

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

of the colleges for appraisals by the Civil Service Commission and other federal agencies of the over-all professional competence of college-trained employees. In addition, colleges need information as to personnel requirements, including types of specialization, to guide them in curricula development and student counseling. A continuation of such a body as the Joint College-Federal Council was indicated to achieve this objective.

The committee recognized deficiencies in communication between the federal government and the colleges and universities in recruitment and recommended closer contact. It suggested that the Civil Service Commission and the other federal agencies appoint liaison representatives to supply students with information as to the personnel needs, qualifications, and entrance standards of federal agencies. These representatives could provide students with a broader knowledge of the federal career service and could give them an opportunity to discuss their postgraduate employment. It was recommended that the Civil Service Commission improve the schedule of its examinations for graduating seniors so that they could be offered employment near or at the time of graduation, that it make its recruitment literature more attractive, and that it provide more interim information to eligibles as to hiring possibilities.

The committee urged that the federal government make more effort to provide seasonal employment offerings so that the agencies and the potential employees might gain a knowledge of each other prior to the time of possible full-time employment. Internship programs for possible graduate work need to be integrated into the federal system to permit better career specialization and the advancement of individuals who must, for economic reasons, seek employment immediately upon graduation from college.

The committee recognized that in examining for certain specialized occupations the Civil Service Commission's boards of expert examiners sometimes have not been chosen to be representative of various points of view. In forestry, for example, the experts from different universities may represent different theoretical approaches and may also tend, because of geographical location, to emphasize or de-

emphasize certain field problems. Their theories and interests are mirrored in the examinations they write, and students who have not studied in these particular schools have been penalized. The committee recommended that the commission take steps to insure that such bias in examinations be eliminated.

The committee was as critical of other federal agencies as it was of the Civil Service Commission and of the colleges and universities. It suggested that orientation be improved to broaden the individual's knowledge of his job and of the relationship of his work to the total field. It suggested that the agencies undertake job rotation assignments and on-the-job training to increase individual proficiency and opportunities for advancement. It suggested that the colleges cooperate with agencies in offering specialized courses so that employees may study both in their technical fields and in subjects which will broaden their contributions to their agencies, and that the agencies take cognizance of such employee activities in making promotions.

Finally, the committee recognized that the federal government does not offer many of the career incentives which potentially exist in private industry, such as high salaries and individual professional recognition. To overcome this difficulty, the committee suggested a strengthening of the merit system; a well-defined promotion program within each agency; the provision of educational leave; the provision of agency seminars and conferences to help employees to keep abreast of developments in their subject matter field; and the giving of greater recognition to scientific study and investigation performed by individuals in connection with their work.

Physical Sciences Committee

A FIRST canvass of the scope of its work led the physical sciences committee to divide its investigations among three subcommittees: (1) education; (2) employment; and (3) civil service procedures. Each subcommittee studied its problem separately and wrote an independent report; these reports were then combined to constitute the total report of the physical sciences committee.

A major approach by the physical sciences committee was the use of a factual survey. A

questionnaire was directed to employees from the subprofessional through the highest professional grade (including operating as well as supervisory personnel) in the principal federal agencies having physical science personnel and also to a representative number of college faculty members. The scope of the inquiry covered educational preparation, employment, development by training and education, utilization and advancement of employees, and civil service procedures. Approximately 300 questionnaires were circulated, and major conclusions and recommendations were based on the information contained in the returns and on numerous discussions.

The physical sciences committee also found that contacts between the colleges and the federal agencies are inadequate. As a result, students do not receive sufficient information concerning possibilities in the federal service. The committee suggested liaison personnel, with federal representatives competent to inform colleges of employment opportunities and college representatives capable of planning action and requesting specific information from the government.

In considering applicants for positions federal agencies often make little attempt to appraise their qualifications carefully and misplacements result. The use of advanced methods of testing, such as aptitude and personality tests, might well be given consideration to determine professional competence.

The physical sciences committee also pointed to the delays in recruiting for the federal service under the civil service system, which delays place it at a disadvantage in comparison with private industry. Graduates are anxious to get on a job, and the Civil Service Commission might well give further study to its procedures in an effort to cut down the time required.

The committee found that agencies frequently contribute to delays in securing needed personnel by insisting on greater specialization than is necessary for actual performance on the job. It was suggested that agencies endeavor to minimize their requests for specialized personnel and place greater reliance on on-the-job training of individuals who have broad technical backgrounds. This might require further harmonizing of options used by the Civil Service Commission with

agency requisitions and a simplification of hiring procedures to permit greater leeway in selection by the using office.

The committee also found that the examination procedures of the Civil Service Commission do not adequately test applicants for qualifications other than technical ability. It suggested that the commission develop supplementary questions or tests leading to the determination of applicants' potentialities, such as alertness and initiative. It also suggested that oral examinations be used wherever possible. The committee recommended that nationwide examinations be used for the professional and scientific fields and that territorial restrictions on examinations and certification be eliminated wherever possible. It suggested the desirability of vacation or temporary employment of college students.

The committee recognized that induction and orientation programs of federal agencies are deficient, and it suggested that both be given careful consideration in order to make the federal government a more desirable employer. It stressed the need to utilize skills and to develop diversified work opportunities that will enable younger employees to gain pertinent varied experience in their service with an agency. Job training should be directed toward the preparation of the individual for increased responsibilities. It should include programs for developing administrative skills. The committee rejected the view that the employee alone is responsible for increasing his efficiency. The Civil Service Commission should stimulate an improvement in the promotion programs of the agencies.

The committee suggested that college guidance and counseling be directed toward recommending that students plan to continue their preparation beyond the undergraduate level. The committee discussed the possibility of requiring more than the usual four years for graduation in technical fields. It was felt that it is not possible in the ordinary four-year course to develop in the student over-all professional competence, although such a course provides adequate technical knowledge. An additional year is needed to round out his education. The committee strongly urged that colleges place more emphasis in their curricula on the skills of oral and written expression in

which physical scientists appear to be deficient. Finally, continued education is needed after entering on the job to intensify the specialization of technical employees in certain activities and to broaden the knowledge of those individuals who show aptitude and who will be needed for general administrative responsibilities.

Social Sciences Committee

THE social sciences committee recognized a situation relating to its occupational groups which does not exist in either the physical or the biological sciences—that social science positions exist in every agency in the government and that problems in this area are not limited to a particular type of professional training or skill. Economists, budget specialists, and personnel officers are located in the engineering and biological agencies, as well as in those that might be described as social service agencies.

In order to obtain information as to the type and kind of personnel being dealt with, the committee designed a questionnaire which was distributed at random to employees working in the various social science occupational groups without regard to the agency in which they worked. This questionnaire had two major parts. The first asked for factual data, such as entrance grade, present grade, occupational field, length of service, and number of different occupations in which employed. The second part asked the employee's opinion as to the college courses which had been of most and of least value in terms of his present employment, the training which he had received and its value, the training desired, and an indication as to which types of college experience were of the most value. From this random sample, the committee obtained some 1,246 replies which could be tabulated, correlated, and charted to serve as the basis of its report.

The social sciences committee concluded that in developing qualifications requirements for positions in the federal service, greater emphasis should be placed on native capacity and broad educational and administrative background and less on technical skills and knowledges. The committee expressed the view that in attempting to achieve their objective of making examinations practical, the Civil Serv-

ice Commission and the agencies have tended to develop specialized examination requirements for positions in the federal service. As a result those persons with specialized experience or training are apt to be most successful in obtaining federal employment.

The committee believed that there has been too much emphasis on developing career specialists and too little emphasis on developing career administrators, and that this constitutes a serious deficiency in the federal service. It recommended that a comprehensive study be made looking toward strengthening the present career system by encouraging the employment at the junior level of superior individuals with broad educational backgrounds. Such recruits would subsequently acquire the specific job knowledge required by particular agencies through such devices as in-service training, internship, and postgraduate college training. In effecting promotions, agencies should be encouraged to give greater consideration to employees who have demonstrated general administrative ability and, except with regard to purely technical positions, to place less emphasis on technical or specialized experience and training.

The committee also recommended various measures looking toward immediate improvement of the service. It suggested that the Civil Service Commission schedule examinations to take advantage of graduating senior classes and that student aid or summer employment be provided for students below the senior level to give both the student and the agency a trial period of employment. The commission was asked to provide more adequate information to the colleges on opportunities for federal employment; it was felt that the most important contribution which the commission might make would be to develop a manual or handbook of occupational opportunities and characteristics to serve study and counseling purposes in the colleges. It urged that the commission assume responsibility for the development of a systematic and selective promotion program for federal agencies. The commission should also take steps to insure that the agencies use such a program.

The social sciences committee pointed out the need for closer coordination between the commission and the universities in distribut-

ing examination announcements. It, too, suggested naming liaison representatives and the notification of students of applicable examinations announced in all sections of the United States. The committee commended the commission on decentralizing authority to the regions, and urged that the agencies do likewise so that personnel needs may be met at the field operating level.

The committee urged that the federal agencies give first attention to developing sound promotional programs, recognizing that no matter how good their recruitment techniques may be, total personnel policies of the agencies will determine whether college graduates will seek federal employment. The committee suggested that the agencies also de-emphasize pre-entry specialization for the lower grades of personnel and place more emphasis on training after employment. They were urged to develop more effective working organizations through better orientation methods, the establishment of training programs, and encouragement to employees to improve themselves by taking advantage of college or other specialized training facilities.

The committee recognized its inability to deal with the technical problems of college curricula, particularly in view of the number of different areas covered by the social sciences. It therefore urged the colleges to study the data the committee had assembled, particularly the tabulations of the types of courses which federal employees desire so that their training may be improved and their evaluations of the college courses they have taken. The colleges should study the civil service examination announcements to determine the types of requirements the commission has established for eligibility and should include in their curricula sufficient "tool courses" to enable graduating seniors to compete in civil service examinations. The colleges should give attention, too, to the fact that many employees view their extracurricular college activities as of great importance. They might well take steps to improve these activities and to increase student participation therein. Finally, the colleges need to carry on individual negotiations with federal agencies in order to develop internship or postgraduate training programs.

Concluding Statement

THE coordinating committee has studied the reports of the three working committees, and the Joint College-Federal Service Council of the Thirteenth Civil Service Region has published in booklet form the report of the co-ordinating committee to the Joint College-Federal Service Council and summaries of the reports of the three working committees³.

It is encouraging to reflect upon the spirit of this study of college-federal service relations. Virtually all of the time devoted to it both by federal representatives and by college people was given after working hours and on week ends. Enthusiasm and a high level of interest were in evidence throughout the study.

It is encouraging also that the Civil Service Commission has stimulated similar councils or conferences in its other regions. It must be remembered, however, that the program in Region 13 grew out of a recognized need and a voluntary desire to try to meet it; such voluntary action cannot be supplanted by directives and forced participation. If programs in other regions proceed with spontaneity and vigor, their conclusions will serve as a valuable check on the conclusions and recommendations of Region 13. One such check already exists: the report of the Princeton University Bicentennial Conference, *University Education and the Public Service*.⁴ In fact, the two sets of conclusions and recommendations are so similar that the Civil Service Commission might well give serious thought to immediate action on them.

The Civil Service Commission, although it is the central personnel agency for the government, does not at present have a specific directive to implement many of the proposals contained in the Region 13 study. There is no other agency, however, which is in any better position to take the study and produce results. The primary responsibility for implementing the suggested program rests with the Civil Service Commission.

³ *Improvement of Federal Service Personnel; A Study by the Joint College-Federal Service Council of the Thirteenth U. S. Civil Service Region* (Denver, Colorado, 1947) 39 pp.

⁴ (Princeton, New Jersey, 1946) variously paged.

A Review of the Controversy Over County Executives

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IN THE steadily growing literature on county government in this country the most frequently discussed proposal is that of a unified county executive. It therefore seems somewhat strange that the proponents of the plan have never attempted to give a satisfactory answer to the objections raised against it.

A survey of the literature of the field reveals general agreement on the desirability of county executives except for what might be termed the Kilpatrick and the Porter-Millspaugh-Lancaster schools of thought. Even within these schools some reorganization of county government is usually considered desirable, but not the establishment of full-fledged executives.

Although much research has been undertaken to discover whether a county executive is necessary or desirable, it has usually been of a general character. Where case studies have been made, the conclusions have frequently lacked a statistical basis. Where statistics have been employed, they have been limited almost entirely to before-and-after comparisons in counties adopting executive plans. While all of these practices have their justifications, opponents of executive plans have rightly pointed out that the argument for executives is hardly conclusive until personal observations are fortified with readily obtainable statistical data and until before-and-after comparisons in executive counties are supplemented with similar time comparisons in comparable nonexecutive counties. It should be added that the opponents are almost as guilty on this score as those favoring county executives.

In most instances the conclusions of the various research monographs have agreed; county executives should be created. The reasons put forth are largely twofold, although terminology differs. More effective coordination needs to be brought about. Lack of coordination has led to waste, inefficiency, confusion,

and expense. The lack of popular control over county government arises to a large degree from the present irresponsible type of structure. A county executive would help to restore popular interest in county government.

Opposition to County Executives

THE Porter-Millspaugh-Lancaster school of thought has never been convinced by the arguments for county executives. Porter has listed three executive functions, two of which he believes are not performed or needed in the usual sense in counties—representing a government and executing the law. The remaining function, supervising administration, can be carried on to the extent necessary in a county by the governing body.¹

Not only is a proper executive function lacking in counties, but an executive would interfere with desirable state-local relationships.

Objection to a full-fledged or genuine county manager lies in the fact that he would stand between the professional officer such as the county engineer, the health official, or the school superintendent, on the one hand, and the respective state departments with which they ought to be associated, on the other.²

Again, we read that the real obstacle to county reorganization is not constitutional but the state-local character of county functions. "No internal reorganization of the county can change the fact that the major public services are statewide and that functions are performed by a partnership between the state and its local units."³ Coordination of state and county

¹ Kirk H. Porter, *County and Township Government in the United States* (Macmillan, 1922), p. 158.

² Kirk H. Porter, "County Government and State Centralization," 21 *National Municipal Review* 492 (August, 1932).

³ Arthur C. Millspaugh, *Local Democracy and Crime Control* (Brookings Institution, Institute for Government Research, 1936), p. 148.

policy with regard to functions now shared would be increasingly difficult with a county manager and standards of service built up through cooperation between the two levels of government would be endangered.⁴ State administrative supervision would encounter greater obstacles. Furthermore, there is no need for county executives since the state integrates county activities.

The conditions of rural administration are not conducive to county executives, it is argued. The executive idea is adapted from city government and a county is fundamentally different from a city because of its artificial area and its primary characteristic of being an administrative subdivision of the state. No community identity exists, and unifying unrelated functions of an administrative subdivision will not bring efficiency. Lack of popular leadership, the small scale of operations, the amateur tradition, and the direct impact of popular ideas and prejudices on administration make counties unattractive to first-rate administrative talent and complicate the development of a permanent corps of civil servants. "Since a hierarchical organization of administration depends in the end upon the achievement of permanence and professionalism in the personnel, our failure to attain it is to be explained largely by the same set of rural attitudes towards the public business."⁵

It is felt that in a typical rural county an executive would not have enough to do to be justified. County functions are few, and the economies secured by means of a manager might not justify his salary. At least one observer has believed this to be true of most Maryland counties.⁶ The California Commission on County Home Rule concluded in 1930 that "many of the counties have so little business that a full time executive would be out of the question, and even a part time executive would be of but slight, if any value."⁷ Another conclusion is that a county executive would be "financially impossible, unnecessary, or unde-

sirable in from one-half to three-fourths of the counties in the United States."⁸

Dr. Wylie Kilpatrick has been responsible for a slightly different line of attack against county executives. Some arguments presented are the same as have been mentioned; for example, county managers are called "superfluous supernumeraries" because they would have little to do. The crux of Kilpatrick's position, however, lies elsewhere. He found in examining nine experiments with county executives in North Carolina and Virginia that "in each of the nine instances the objective has been to unify finance, secure a financial supervisor or executive agent, avoid centering all appointive power in one man, develop functional boards, and to coordinate effort with the state."⁹ This objective, it is argued, is sound. The state, however, should serve as the ultimate coordinator of functional policy and supervisor of functional administration; to the extent that such coordination and supervision need to be effected locally, the county governing body should exercise the power. The county governing body should also be vested with the power of appointment, although technical personnel and members of special function boards might well be selected jointly with the state. Beyond the governing body, a series of functional managers, headed by a chief financial officer, is envisaged. The duties of the financial director would be threefold: he would manage the business or housekeeping services for all departments; he would have inspectional and reporting duties and the power to make recommendations; and finally, in a few instances, he might direct and control one or more departments through a power to appoint the key officers. Health, welfare, school, and engineering managers are suggested as probably desirable. These officials would cooperate closely with the state, and frequently they would be responsible to a special-function board also.

The same type of recommendations were

⁴ Lane W. Lancaster, *Government in Rural America* (D. Van Nostrand, 1937), pp. 393-95.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁶ Howard M. Kline, "No Job for a County Manager," 28 *National Municipal Review* 358-64 (May, 1939).

⁷ *County Government in California* (California State Printing Office, 1931), p. 141.

⁸ Arthur C. Millspaugh, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁹ *County Management* (Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, University of Virginia, 1929), p. 44. Cf. his recent *Opportunities for Economy in County Government in Virginia* (Virginia State Chamber of Commerce, 1947), pp. 56-67, in which he places greater emphasis upon the position of the manager, the governing body, and its president and less upon the state.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

made in Colorado by a student of government.¹⁰ It was suggested that a fiscal manager, welfare director, and county engineer be appointed by governing bodies to relieve them of detailed administrative duties. The short ballot should be adopted. But even with structural reorganization, counties must look to the state for final unification of their policies while relying upon the local governing body for immediate unification.

Analysis of Opposing Arguments

THE opponents of county executives have made a contribution to political science. They have driven home the point that legal barriers to county reform are not the fundamental factor responsible for lack of adoptions of county executive plans. The fact is that most citizens as well as county officials do not want or are indifferent to such a change in county government structure. They have likewise stressed the state interest in many county functions.

Yet in each case these writers have failed to discriminate between the existence of facts and the consequences flowing from them. Believing that county reform cannot be achieved for other than legal reasons, they have confused that which is desirable with that which is possible. Believing that the state interest in many county functions is important, they have mistakenly concluded that the executive principle in counties is incompatible with this interest.

Almost all arguments against county executives are based upon the assumption that counties are performing and always will perform functions of a state-delegated character, and that this situation prevents full unification of policy and administration at the local level. Counties performed functions of a state-delegated character almost exclusively for many decades. There is growing evidence, however, that counties are not only performing more functions than ever before, but also are increasingly performing functions primarily local in nature.¹¹ To the extent that this trend

¹⁰ Henry C. Pepper, *County Government in Colorado* (Colorado Agricultural College, Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 413, 1934) pp. 6-11.

¹¹ Edward W. Weidner, *The American County—Patchwork of Boards* (New York: National Municipal League, 1946), pp. 15-17. Cf. the articles by Clyde F. Snider in

has progressed, the line of reasoning used by opponents of county executives has little cogency.

The plea that counties must look to the state for final unification of their policies is only half correct, for at present both states and counties must look to the federal government for any "final" unification of their policies. That there is a growing interdependence between federal, state, and local governments does not mean that state and local governments should not have unified executives.

If it were true that the state interest in county functions militated against the establishment of real county executives, one would expect to find all state officials opposed to county executive reorganization. The opposite is true. Governors have been conspicuous leaders of the council manager movement for counties. There is little or no evidence to support the idea that state functional officials were opposed to manager movements in the several states where they have existed. The reason the ideal form of the council manager plan has not been adopted in most instances lies not in the state delegated character of county activities but in local politics, tradition, and vested interests. State functional officials have promoted special function boards and commissions, however.

There is a state-delegated element in many county functions, but a similar situation exists in New England towns a number of which have adopted with success the manager form of government. In January, 1947, there were about 33 towns in Maine with populations under 2,500 that had installed managers. Half as many in the 2,500-10,000 population class had also done so. Several towns in Vermont, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have adopted managers.¹² There are very few authorities who would deny the usefulness and desirability of these town managers in rural areas. In the New England states towns are the principal administrative subdivisions of the state. To be sure, they also perform services of a local character, such as those for local highways;

each December issue of the *American Political Science Review*, and M. H. Satterfield, "The Growth of County Functions Since 1930," 3 *Journal of Politics* 76, 1941.

¹² See *Municipal Year Book, 1947* (International City Managers Association, 1947), city manager directory, pp. 484-96.

their activities in this regard are comparable to those of counties in southern and western and most northern states. It is true that the areas of New England towns correspond much more closely with communities than the boundaries of counties; but if they perform similar functions and have adequate resources, it is difficult to see why two units of government should require two different types of governmental structure merely because one of them represents a natural and the other an artificial community.

If the state interest in county functions prevents executives, one would expect to find no executives in many European units of government equivalent to the county because of the incomparably greater central supervision present in most of those countries. The opposite is the case. Before the Nazis came to power, Prussian units comparable to our counties had executives appointed by the local council. In Württemberg elected executives were the rule. The presence of strong executives did not prevent more extensive central supervision than is exercised anywhere in the United States. In France, a country that is also noted for its central supervision, the mayor of a commune is given rather complete powers of responsibility for the administration of the unit's affairs. In England, the trend is toward vesting more power in the hands of the county clerk. While the English county clerk may not be the equal of French or German local executives in terms of power, "it is also true that central administrative control has been far less satisfactory in England than in either Germany or France."¹³ It is a reflection upon the lack of use of the comparative method in political science that in the argument over the appropriateness of county executives in the United States only one writer has cited the experience of other countries, and he nineteen years ago in an article that was generally ignored.

It is noteworthy that the same people who argue that the amateur tradition in counties prevents professional executives or any executives at all hold that professional functional officials are desirable. They see an executive

disturbing state-county *professional* relationships. It would seem, however, that if the amateur tradition does not prevent professional functional officials, there is little reason to suppose that it would make impossible a county executive—even if a professional executive. In most rural areas the executive would have to double as a functional official as well.

Again, it is important to distinguish between administrative and political state-county relationships. County administrative officials tend to view the state-county relationship as cooperative, whereas county political officials see it as competitive. The difference is accentuated if the administrative personnel is professionalized. It is therefore probable that state agencies would find that a county executive would not only not interfere with desirable state-county relations, but would actually promote better relations.

There is an executive function to be performed in counties. Although ceremonial representation is not too important and the governing body can provide political leadership, in modern counties many contacts with other units of government on all levels are being made constantly and administrative supervision and law execution are necessities—unless the latter be given a very narrow definition. The many aspects of administrative management are problems confronting most counties in some degree at least, and are properly part of a chief executive's task.¹⁴

If rural citizens want to participate actively in their county's government, a unified county executive need not impair the fulfillment of their desire. Enlarging the size of the very small governing bodies in many states and the more extensive use of advisory committees might result in more citizen participation than the present system of many independently elected officials.

The contention that executives would not have enough to do in a small county is effectively refuted by the successful manager experience of Petroleum County, Montana, with its population of 1,000. The county has been able to employ a competent manager, pay his salary, and secure economies. In 1947 there

¹³ Rowland A. Egger, "The Manager Plan Appropriate for Counties," 18 *National Municipal Review* 239 (April, 1929).

¹⁴ See, for example, Leonard D. White, *Introduction to the Study of Public Administration* (Macmillan, 1939), pp. 54-60.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

were 138 units of government of less than 2,500 population that had managers. The trend toward more county functions should result in there being more, not less, for such an official to do. The following conclusion relates to Virginia:

It is quite possible that with the great demands being made on governments for certain social and economic services and the attempt of the state to make local units participate in the support of such services, the need of some administrative authority will become more apparent in order that the services may be coordinated locally and handled in a businesslike way, and the day may come when a change will be welcomed.¹⁵

There are many ways of improving county government besides creating county executives, but this does not detract from the desirability of effecting complete reform. As one writer has said: ". . . in the long run, economy must be achieved through changes in organization rather than through sporadic attempts to force economies on the existing organization."¹⁶ Half measures bring half results.

Even some staunch opponents of full county executives have agreed that at least limited executives for counties are desirable. The problem of proper over-all county organization thus becomes centered upon finding the kind of county executive that is best. Granted that some type of county executive is desirable, the alternatives that present themselves are several. An existing appointive or elective administrative official may be designated as the executive, the chairman of the governing body may be so designated, or the entire structure of government within a county may be reorganized to provide a single elective or appointive chief administrator. Although most of the discussion of county executives has centered around managers, most of the progress has been made within the traditional framework of county government. County government is not so headless as it at first appears.

¹⁵ Charles J. Calrow, "County Manager Government in Virginia," 27 *National Municipal Review*, 151 (March, 1938).

¹⁶ H. R. Moore, *Local Government in Two Rural Ohio Counties* (Ohio Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 597, 1938), p. 17.

Executives within the Existing Structure

IN MANY counties the chairman of the governing body—especially the probate judge when he occupies this position—the clerk, or the auditor exercises some managerial powers. As early as 1930 it was observed that "in some states the county clerk is tending to become the de facto chief executive officer of the county. . . ."¹⁷ In the same year it was remarked:

Counties everywhere feel the lack of a strong executive or chief administrative officer. As a result of this lack there has been a tendency to elevate some existing official to a commanding position, at least over financial matters. It may be the county auditor, or the county clerk, or the county judge, or the chairman of the board. . . . Necessity forces some co-ordination.¹⁸

In the intervening years many surveys of counties in particular states or localities have supported these conclusions. Several New York counties have appointed auditors who have become important fiscal officers; in other cases the clerk has performed auditing and purchasing functions.¹⁹ In Indiana the county auditor, because he serves as clerk to the governing body, "is playing an increasingly important role in county affairs throughout the state, and in many counties he is approaching the stature of a county executive."²⁰ In Illinois "to a considerable degree county government centers in the office of the clerk."²¹ Among his important duties are those of clerk to the governing body, elections officer, and custodian of records. "In Minnesota the county auditor stands out, as a rule, as an officer of considerable ability whose office could be developed into that of a chief business manager."²² Similarly in South Da-

¹⁷ John A. Fairlie and Charles M. Kneier, *County Government and Administration* (Century, 1930) p. 173.

¹⁸ Paul W. Wager, "The Case for the County Manager," 12 *Public Management* 80-81 (March, 1930).

¹⁹ T. N. Hurd, *Local Government in Tompkins County, New York* (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 657, 1936), p. 42; and O. H. White, *Receipts and Expenditures of Rural New York Counties* (Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 729, 1940), p. 21.

²⁰ Gail M. Morris in "County and Township" section, 30 *National Municipal Review* 304 (May, 1941).

²¹ Clyde F. Snider, *County Government in Illinois* (Illinois Tax Commission, 1943) pp. 62-63.

²² William Anderson, *Local Government and Finance in Minnesota* (University of Minnesota Press, 1935) p. 321.

kota: "The auditor is more closely associated with the county government than is any other county official, excluding the county commissioners."²³ In Missouri the county clerk "sometimes performs one or more functions of a county manager" such as preparing the budget, awarding contracts, purchasing office supplies, auditing claims, and making reports and settlements.²⁴ This has led one student to ask if it is possible that "the managerial concept possesses certain inherent qualities which cause it to take root even in unfertile ground."²⁵

In the West and South observers also note these trends. In Montana the office of clerk and recorder "is one of the most important offices in the county."²⁶ In Tennessee, Kentucky, and Alabama the county or probate judge, in Georgia the commissioners, and in Mississippi the chancery clerk have been vested with important managerial powers.²⁷ In North Carolina and Virginia the county clerk, accountant, or chairman of the governing body frequently performs executive functions.²⁸ The ordinary in Georgia and the supervisor in South Carolina also bring some coordination in county affairs.²⁹

In answer to a questionnaire in 1945, authorities on county government in the several states replied usually that some counties had administrative officials exercising some powers of supervision. In only 16 of the 41 states reporting did observers not find some official designated by a governing body "to act on its

behalf in performing duties or in supervising finances and functions."³⁰ There are exceptions to the pattern of limited executives, of course. In Texas the county judge has been called a figurehead.³¹ But in a majority of the states there is a tendency in a substantial number of counties (about 50 per cent in Wisconsin, for example) to make an appointive or elective administrative official or the chairman of the governing body at least a limited county executive. The trend affects very little the older and traditional officers; they remain, subject to some general supervision.

There would seem to be no doubt that an important improvement in county government can be brought about by means of revitalizing the present structure. A recent study in Wisconsin that included field work in every county in the state concluded that a "substantial integration of the administration of most counties can be achieved by encouraging, and perhaps institutionalizing, general managerial practices that are developing in the office of the county clerk."³² A second line of development in Wisconsin is indicated by a recommendation of the Interim Committee on County Government to the 1947 Legislature for the establishment of county fiscal officers. Financial centralization would bring many advantages, the committee found. The more general studies in many other states are in agreement with the findings in Wisconsin. Yet it is significant that their authors in a substantial majority of cases recommend full county executives as being, ideally, the desired goal.

Elective Executives

HERE are several patterns of elective county executive organization that have been tried in a few instances with varying degrees of success. Two or more counties in each of the states of North Carolina, Alabama, New Jersey, and Colorado have at one time or another tried variations of the city commission plan in which administrative duties are divided among

²³ University of South Dakota Government Research Bureau, *County Government* (Vermillion, 1940) p. 20.

²⁴ William L. Bradshaw, *The Missouri County Court* (University of Missouri, 1931) p. 203.

²⁵ William L. Bradshaw, "County Managerial Tendencies in Missouri," 25 *American Political Science Review* 1013 (November, 1931).

²⁶ Roland R. Renne, *Montana County Organization, Services and Costs* (Montana State College, Agricultural Experiment Station, Bulletin 298, 1935) p. 29.

²⁷ United States Tennessee Valley Authority, Department of Regional Studies, Government Research Division, *County Government and Administration in the Tennessee Valley States* (Government Printing Office, 1940) pp. 21-25.

²⁸ William L. Bradshaw, *Recent Experiments Affecting County Government in North Carolina and Virginia* (University of Missouri, 1938) pp. 5 and 21.

²⁹ Melvin Clyde Hughes, *County Government in Georgia* (University of Georgia Press, 1944) pp. 20-23; and Columbus Andrews, *Administrative County Government in South Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933), p. 47.

³⁰ Questionnaires of the Governments Division, United States Bureau of the Census.

³¹ Wallace C. Murphy, "County Managership Proposed in Texas," 25 *American Political Science Review* 1013-15 (November, 1931).

³² Lorentz H. Adolffson, "The County Clerk as 'Manager,'" 34 *National Municipal Review* 125 (March, 1945).

members of the governing body. A common division of work among those belonging to a three-membered body is finance, public works, and welfare. In some states this practice is extremely informal and subject to change. In Indiana in 1899 a special county board was established in addition to the traditional one to serve, in effect, as a plural-headed executive. Virtually nothing is known about the experience of the counties with the functional commission plan, but it may reasonably be expected that it has the same disadvantages in counties as it has in cities.

At least six counties in the United States have some approach to a strong elective executive, although limitations are present in every case. The county executives of Nassau and Westchester, New York, and San Mateo, California; the president of Cook, Illinois; and the supervisors of Hudson and Essex, New Jersey, are stronger than the usual county clerk or auditor. In Essex the supervisor is hampered by lack of adequate appointment, removal, directive, and budget powers, yet his limited veto power and his intimate knowledge of the affairs of the county make him a very real factor in county policy and administration. Although the supervisor system is a hybrid, "there is no denying . . . that it has been in fact a help to better government in Essex county."³³ Cook's office of president was established in 1893 for the purpose of obtaining more executive responsibility and effectiveness.

Nassau's new system, effected in 1938, resulted in substantial financial savings, over a million and a half dollars being trimmed off the 1938 budget that was already law before the new government took office. The 1940 budget represented nearly a million dollar reduction over that of 1939. The executive budget has brought many benefits, and the attractive annual reports of the county are noteworthy. The executive, who serves as presiding officer of the governing body, has appointment power subject to approval by that body. He also has a veto power over council action that can be overridden only by a two-thirds vote. The comptroller, clerk, attorney, and sheriff are still elected.

³³ Thomas H. Reed, *Twenty Years of Government in Essex County, New Jersey* (Appleton-Century, 1938), p. 37.

A substantial simplification of governmental organization was achieved in Westchester County through the adoption of its executive system. Although the sheriff, attorney, and clerk are still elected, the offices of treasurer, controller, and public welfare commissioner are filled by executive appointment subject to governing body approval. The executive also has a two-thirds veto power.

These unusual attempts at establishing elective county executives have not in every case brought good government. Certainly Cook and Hudson counties are not noted for their high quality of public service. In Westchester there were some charges of scandal in welfare administration, although a state investigation exonerated the county on most charges. Yet, as a whole, the quality of government improved in these counties at the time the elective executive systems were adopted.

The principal defects of the elective executive plan were illustrated by San Mateo County upon its adoption of the system. A professional politician was elected to the office of executive, and at the first meeting of the governing body the executive and the body came to an open break over a question of policy.³⁴ In addition to the executive, five other administrative officers are elected in this county. In any elected executive system, it is difficult to secure a qualified chief administrator, and conflict between the executive and governing body is not readily settled.

The Desirability of Managers in Counties

IN VIEW of the progress that has been and can be made in counties with non-manager executives, some observers have suggested that little more can be accomplished by a complete council manager system. As a matter of fact, there are very few complete council manager counties. Most of the fourteen counties coming closest to the manager plan have adopted their systems with reservations. Three officers are outside the authority of the county manager of Fulton County, Georgia. In Los Angeles County, California, the sheriff, district attorney, and assessor remain elective and the chief administrative officer does not have

³⁴ Robert C. Houston, "County Manager Government in California," 28 *National Municipal Review* 128-33 (February, 1939).

complete appointment power. In Albemarle, Henrico, and Warwick, Virginia, the clerk, sheriff, and commonwealth's attorney remain elective, but the treasurer and commissioner of revenue no longer are. It is also noteworthy that the education function is now under control of the governing body. In Arlington County, Virginia, all five elective officers have remained so under the county manager plan. The only elective office eliminated by the manager plan in Monroe, New York, was that of treasurer; the district attorney, sheriff, clerk, and coroners remain elective. Durham and Guilford counties, North Carolina, give their managers virtually no appointment power, while still electing five or more county officers. In Hamilton and McMinn Counties, Tennessee, the constitutional elective officers remain. The Hamilton manager can only recommend appointments or removals. Although four administrative officers are still elected in Sacramento County, California, the manager derives some control from the provision that makes any elective official guilty of misconduct in office if he fails to cooperate with the executive. The manager appoints many of the officials of the county subject to the approval of the governing body. The police and liquor license commissioners are not subject to the appointment or removal power of the Anne Arundel, Maryland, county manager.

Sweeping claims have been made that "despite the fact that what authorities consider the ideal set-up has as yet not been adopted by any county, substantial progress has clearly been made in all counties which have taken a part of the whole."³⁵ The Virginia Commission on County Government made an extensive investigation of the Henrico, Albemarle, and Arlington experiments in 1936. In Henrico it found that although expenditures increased \$35,000 in the first year of manager government, taxes were reduced 3 to 24 per cent in various county districts. "This apparent paradox is a reality and comes about through more efficient organization and improved methods of procedure in all the administrative departments of the county govern-

ment."³⁶ For example, the department of finance cost 20 per cent less than the former offices of treasurer and commissioner of revenue and gave better service. In Albemarle, a primarily rural county, the manager system resulted in a 30 per cent decrease in the cost of general county administration, a 45 per cent cut in the cost of the new department of finance, and a \$3,600 saving in the cost of the work taken over by the new department of records. By 1940 it was concluded that Albemarle had more efficient and responsible government at less cost than previously and that county offices and positions were not felt to be as much rewards for successful political activity as previously.³⁷ After six years of management, Arlington County was giving more service at less cost, with reduced water rates, low insurance rates, efficient financial procedures, and low tax rates.³⁸ Savings of \$23,000 were anticipated from the new department of finance in Warwick.³⁹

Similar results are reported in North Carolina, New York, and Tennessee.⁴⁰ Durham County expanded its services after adopting a county manager system. Improved financial practices helped reduce the bonded debt more than half and the tax rate from \$1.15 to \$0.55 per \$100 of full assessed valuation. Better services, improved planning, and reduced taxes resulted from the institution of the manager plan in Guilford. One of the most striking financial accomplishments of any county was made in Hamilton, Tennessee, after it adopted the council manager plan. In three years it changed a debt of \$150,000 into a surplus of \$640,600. Services were improved. Monroe, New York, adopted tightened financial procedures including a thorough budget system with a quarterly allotment plan.

California counties, too, have reaped benefits from council manager systems. As early as

³⁵ *A Further Report on Progress in County Government and County Consolidation* (Richmond: Division of Purchase and Printing, 1936) p. 7.

³⁶ Edward Overman, "Manager Government Boon to Virginia County," 29 *National Municipal Review* 549-52 (August, 1940).

³⁷ Cedric Larson, "Six Years of Management in Arlington County, Virginia," 26 *National Municipal Review* 531-37 (November, 1937).

³⁸ National Municipal League, *The County Manager Plan* (New York, 1945), p. 15.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17.

³⁵ Howard P. Jones, "The Record of the County Manager Plan," 25 *National Municipal Review* 559 (October, 1936).

1934 an authority saw "great improvement in operating technique and citizen morale" in San Mateo and Sacramento counties which had instituted council manager charters a year previously.⁴¹ Modern cost accounting methods were later installed in Sacramento County at an annual saving of \$50,000. In Los Angeles County, expenditures increased but the tax rate dropped after the adoption of the new system.⁴² Central controls over the budget and personnel were established and standards of public service bettered.

To date, the most careful and detailed study that has been made of any single council manager county is that of Petroleum, Montana, in which the ideal form of council manager plan is in operation.⁴³ The county, with a population of only 1,146, is entirely rural. It went heavily into debt in the 1920's to expand services to a farming and oil-producing constituency. The oil largely ran out in the 1930's and with the drought and depression much highly valued tillable land was returned to grazing use. The maximum levies of taxes possible under state law did not bring enough revenue to meet current expenditures, and by 1942 the situation was becoming desperate. In an attempt to maintain county services and yet not increase the county's indebtedness, the voters and governing body approved a council manager plan in 1942.

Services have been maintained, but what has happened to the county expenditures for general administration and the county debt is the most impressive aspect of the new system. Renne reports that during the first four years of its operation "the manager plan showed annual administrative costs reduced more than one-third."

It is significant that during the same four-year period administrative costs in the other 55 Montana

⁴¹ Edwin A. Cottrell, "The County Manager Plan Proves Itself: California," 23 *National Municipal Review* 505-8 (October, 1934).

⁴² John McDiarmid, "Streamlined County Government—Los Angeles Style," 28 *National Municipal Review* 757-69 (November, 1939); and Wayne Allen, "Los Angeles County Streamlined," 31 *National Municipal Review* 196-201 (April, 1942).

⁴³ Roland R. Renne, "Rural County Can Be Efficient," 33 *National Municipal Review* 448-51 (October, 1944); and Roland R. Renne, "Too Small to Be Efficient?" 36 *National Municipal Review* 78-82 (February, 1947). The district attorney, however, is elected.

counties, operating under the old system of administration, remained practically constant—in fact, increased slightly.⁴⁴

Petroleum has made an equally remarkable record with its debt program.

On June 30, 1942, before the manager plan went into effect, the county had \$20,705.99 of warrants and \$40,000 of bonds outstanding. On June 30, 1946, after three and a half years of manager plan operation, the county had only \$131.66 of warrants outstanding, no bonds outstanding, and a net credit balance of cash of nearly \$39,000. . . . This shift from a debtor to a creditor status represents a difference of nearly 100 mills to the good, in terms of tax levies; compared with a shift equivalent to only 12 mills for all Montana counties during the same years.⁴⁵

SOME of Petroleum's achievements are due to causes other than the manager plan, it is true. Largely because of the war, the county's taxable valuation increased nearly 22 per cent during the four-year period. Valuation in all Montana counties increased only 7 per cent during the same time. This made it possible for Petroleum to reduce debt considerably because the same tax rate produced more money. Furthermore, nearly all Montana counties succeeded in reducing their debt during this period. Thirty-one of the state's fifty-six counties were debt free on June 30, 1946, twenty having achieved this status between 1942 and 1946. Only seven counties increased their debt in this period. In total, Montana counties reduced their debt from \$3.9 to \$2.5 millions.

Yet the economies achieved because of the council manager plan have been no small factor in Petroleum's savings. In 1938 the county employed eleven persons in addition to the governing body. By 1942 the number had been reduced to eight as a result of certain consolidations of offices. With the adoption of the manager system, the number was further reduced to five. The savings in terms of salaries alone is thus substantial.

The Petroleum County, Montana, experience is conclusive on at least one score: there is enough for a manager to do in a very small

⁴⁴ Roland R. Renne, "Too Small to Be Efficient?" 36 *National Municipal Review* 80 (February, 1947).

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

county. It is also worth noting that an able man was available to be hired as the manager and that the county could afford to pay him an adequate salary and make savings in addition.

Although very few studies have been made of nonmanager counties, on the basis of information available it seems fairly certain that if services and other factors are kept constant the manager form of county government will cost the taxpayer less than other forms of government. Even though some of the claims for the manager plan are extreme and some of the good results are due to other factors, most of the eleven counties closely approaching the manager plan have records that a majority of other units could not match.

Some further observations may be made. The value to government of an alert citizenry is generally conceded. The council manager plan has succeeded in the few units that have adopted it in part because the citizens have become aroused relative to their government and have demanded a change. Usually a political "revolution" takes place, and a new administration takes office. Even if the manager plan were not the end in view, under such circumstances improved county government would probably be effected.

There are those who are skeptical of the chances of council manager government to improve county government because of the strength of political parties in the counties. They believe that the council manager plan would bring a change in form only and not in substance—that the management would be given to the county boss. In response, it may be said that if parties do not reform, at least everyone will know who is responsible for poor government—that in any event the change will not result in worsened conditions. On the other hand, there is nothing in the manager plan that makes it undesirable to have the county council controlled by the dominant political party of the area if that party has a sense of public responsibility.

One of the arguments frequently used against the council manager plan for populous units of government is that it does not provide adequate means for leadership in policy matters. It may be answered that since the smaller cities with council manager governments have not been handicapped by this type of inade-

quacy, most counties would not be either. A somewhat opposite argument has also been advanced against the plan, i.e., that it is dictatorial. While it may be difficult to prove to a layman that this is not so, political scientists and public administrators should be able to distinguish between dictatorship and democratic leadership and management.

Conclusion

THE council manager form of government is the best one thus far evolved for counties. Counties may institute reforms such as the merit system, centralized purchasing, adequate budget procedure, central road administration, and better organization of departments without adopting the county manager system. The county clerk may take on many of the attributes of a manager. These changes are good as far as they go, but they do not provide optimum conditions.

It seems probable that the tendency toward limited county executives will be augmented in the future, but it is doubtful whether this movement alone will ultimately lead to complete executives, especially appointive ones. The position of limited county executive has developed informally and gradually; it requires virtually an organized reform effort to establish a complete executive. Furthermore, county clerks, auditors, and the southern county judges are almost invariably elected. The conclusion of a study of questionnaires sent out by the Committee on County Government of the National Municipal League around 1930 was that "apparently, if we look to an elective or ex officio clerk, we shall look in vain, but an appointed clerk may evolve in some instances into a manager."⁴⁶ The county manager plan is a radical departure from traditional county organization, and it will be slow in coming. But that which is most desirable and that which is likely to be adopted in the near future should be distinguished.

A study was made in Montana some years ago to discover the principal determinants of efficiency in county government. It was concluded that training and experience of admin-

⁴⁶ Paul W. Wager and Howard P. Jones, "Signs of Progress in County Government," 19 *National Municipal Review* 542 (August, 1930).

istrative personnel and volume of work were the most important factors.⁴⁷ Training and experience of administrative personnel can be promoted in several ways besides adopting a manager plan. State minimum qualifications for elected and appointed personnel, state training programs and administrative supervision, and longer terms of office are some methods. The other factor, volume of work, can be

⁴⁷ Roland R. Renne, "Measuring the Efficiency of County Government," 24 *National Municipal Review* 162-69 (March, 1935).

achieved by county consolidation. The most practical method, however, is probably to eliminate the extreme departmentalization within counties. In small rural counties this objective can be achieved in one of three ways —by adopting a complete council manager system, by electing a single administrative official who serves as the county executive, or by having the governing body members, about three in number, serve also as administrative officials. Of these three methods, existing evidence clearly favors the council manager plan.

Community Action for Veterans' Housing

By H. DEWAYNE KREAGER

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THE Housing and Rent Act of 1947, which became law on July 1, 1947, repealed most of the provisions of the Veterans' Emergency Housing Act of 1946 and reduced the activities of the Office of the Housing Expediter in connection with the so-called veterans' housing program to four residual functions: (1) limited control over recreation and amusement construction, (2) enforcement of veterans' preference, (3) modified rent control, and (4) administration of existing premium payment plans and market guarantees for industrialized housing and new building materials. As a result of this action, the eight regional offices of the Housing Expediter and the 169 local offices were closed before the end of July, 1947, terminating the community service program of the agency through which the federal government provided direct advisory assistance to local communities in meeting local housing problems. Simultaneously the four Washington office service staffs—community action, land and public services, racial relations, and labor—were also discontinued.

The conclusion of the brief year and a half of these services did not bring to an end the results obtained. Despite the scarcity of some materials, rising construction costs, and spot shortages of skilled construction labor, thousands of good-quality relatively low-cost homes have been built for veterans in communities all over the country as a result of planned, responsible local action.

The focal point for coordination of local community action has been in mayors' emergency housing committees, of which more than 975 were organized between April 1, 1946, and July 31, 1947. Almost 80 per cent of the urban population of the country was covered by these committees. Although they came into being

primarily as a result of the urging of the Housing Expediter and the advisory services provided by his field staff, many of the committees have continued in operation despite the termination of the field service activities of that agency. Moreover, many of the most active local committees would have existed even if no federal program to promote them had been inaugurated. In some communities where mayors' committees are now inactive or nonexistent, the gap has been filled by local veterans' task committees and by other civic organizations.

Considerable criticism has been leveled at these committees, principally by the special interest real estate and builder groups which vigorously opposed the veterans' emergency housing program. Certainly at least half of the committees have existed primarily in name only. In such cases, however, the mere organization of the committee has served to point up through publicity the extent and nature of the local housing need. Furthermore, in many areas where committees have been inactive as a group, individual members have served independently as effective contact points for the field representatives of the federal housing agencies.

It is of great significance that in almost all communities where visible progress has been made in meeting veterans' housing needs effective mayors' emergency housing committees have been in operation. Notable among these communities are: Yakima, Washington; York, Pennsylvania; Rocky Mount, North Carolina; Memphis, Tennessee; Des Moines, Iowa; San Diego, California; Providence, Rhode Island; and Reading, Pennsylvania. Major credit for the success of the local action program for housing goes not to the federal sponsoring

agencies but to the individual private citizens, numbering more than 10,000, who have donated their time and efforts to the work of the mayors' committees. They have been the primary source of workable ideas and, above all, the focal point for constructive action.

In order that outstanding ideas for expediting the construction of homes for veterans, as originated through the ingenuity of citizen committees all over the country, would not be lost in the records of a liquidated federal agency, the community action advisory service of the Washington office of the Housing Expediter in June, 1947, issued a final bulletin, *Homes Can Be Built Now—Through Community Action*. This pamphlet, containing 75 examples drawn from 63 communities, includes the stories of what was done, how it was done, and the results achieved. The publication serves as a guide for any city that seeks ideas for meeting its local housing needs. The summary reveals significant achievement in the following activities:

1. Reduction of home construction costs through (a) civic cooperation with veterans' housing corporations in order to provide adequate building sites for home construction; (b) municipal appropriations for the financing of rental units; (c) the use of idle tax-delinquent lots to cut land costs; (d) civic cooperation with builders in the preparation of new streets and other public facilities for new housing subdivisions; (e) community nonprofit corporations for the erection of inexpensive emergency housing for veterans; (f) labor pools for more efficient use of the available local supply of skilled construction labor; (g) materials pools operated through cooperation of local builders and materials suppliers in order to make most effective use of scarce building materials.

2. Operation of local housing referral centers where all available housing accommodations, including new construction, can be listed for rapid referral to persons needing them.

3. Local programs for solving specific materials shortages, such as the Seattle plan for increasing local production of wall board and lath through (a) developing new sources of supply for basic raw materials, and (b) interesting new manufacturers in production of

needed materials and assisting in their marketing.

4. Provision of urgently needed rental housing through campaigns to convert existing structures into rental units. These campaigns have been particularly effective in the older cities of the North and East where large numbers of huge old houses lend themselves to conversion into apartments. Various methods have been developed. Reading, Pennsylvania, added 178 rental units through a community-wide campaign to get private citizens to convert their property, the mayor's committee providing special architectural and other advisory services. Salem, Massachusetts, appropriated \$140,000 to finance private conversions. Rochester, New York, added 149 apartments by city action in remodeling unused public buildings. In Meadville, Pennsylvania, local businessmen banded together to form a corporation to finance a rental housing project. In Rochester, New York, eight banks formed a nonprofit corporation which with city cooperation built 152 apartments for veterans at moderate rentals. Holyoke, Massachusetts, appropriated \$525,000 to erect factory built prefabricated homes in order to provide urgently needed rental housing for veterans.

5. Revision of building codes and zoning ordinances in order to eliminate delays in the issuance of building permits and to permit new types of home and apartment construction. In hundreds of cities mayors' committees have served as the focal point for bringing the attention of municipal officials to these problems.

6. Through the efforts of citizens' groups, encouragement to municipalities and counties within the same metropolitan area to provide uniform attention through planning to their mutual housing problems.

7. Assistance in solving labor shortages through securing cooperation within the community by builders and labor unions. In Des Moines, Iowa, the mayor's committee, composed entirely of veterans of World War II, came through with the Des Moines Plan for meeting local labor needs, a program of civic cooperation that has received national publicity. This plan included (1) creation of a labor pool to channel workers into projects where they are most needed and for the exact time that their services are required by an indi-

vidual builder; (2) priority consideration of the labor requirements of rental housing construction for veterans; (3) strengthening of apprentice training programs to provide a reserve of skilled workers; (4) adoption of a 40-hour week for all types of construction in order to eliminate overtime incentives of industrial jobs; (5) continuous cooperation toward increasing production, eliminating restrictive practices, and reducing construction costs through more efficient operations; and (6) consultation in disputes and wage negotiations and use of government conciliation services prior to any work stoppages.

The above seven examples are but a few of the solutions to problems related to home construction that can be secured only by local action. In addition the mayors' committees have been effective in (1) conducting local surveys to establish the extent, type, and location of the community's housing needs as a basis for future planning; (2) surveying and cataloging available building sites to assure efficient use of already improved interior building lots; (3) aiding minority groups in finding homes; (4) conducting publicity campaigns through the press and radio in order to obtain additional housing accommodations; (5) encouraging veterans housing cooperatives; (6) campaigning against the black market in building materials; (7) conducting community drives to collect scarce paper for use in the manufacture of gypsum board and lath. In all, 33 different successful local activities have been undertaken by these committees.

The administrative channels through which these committees functioned and through which contact was maintained with representatives of the federal government, at the same time insuring the complete independence of each local committee, provide an interesting study in federal-state-local relationships. The basic necessity for community action under the veterans' emergency housing program was apparent from the initiation of the program in January, 1946. Despite the sweeping character of the powers that accrued to the Housing Expediter, probably greater than any ever given to another civilian administrator in time of peace, progress could be made only through cooperation from local governments, builders, and home buyers. The powers of the Expe-

diter were primarily national in scope, limited to rent and construction controls and other actions designed to increase the nation-wide flow of building materials. Local action was required to make them effective in any given community. For example, the Expediter had the authority to guarantee a market for up to 200,000 prefabricated houses at any one time, but unless assistance at the local level was forthcoming in the form of building code and zoning ordinance revisions, over which the Expediter had no control whatsoever, his authority to guarantee markets was meaningless.

The program to encourage cooperation at the local level through mayors' emergency housing committees was started by Housing Expediter Wilson W. Wyatt in March, 1946, and continued by Frank R. Creedon after he succeeded Mr. Wyatt in December, 1946. Some community committees existed prior to the inauguration of the Wyatt program, largely as a continuation of war housing committees established through the National Housing Agency during the war years. Under the Wyatt program speed was of the essence in getting action started at the local level. Recognizing the preponderant need for action by municipal governments, Mr. Wyatt adopted a policy of appealing directly to the mayors of the major cities in the country. Undoubtedly Mr. Wyatt's background as a successful mayor of Louisville, Kentucky, and his national pre-eminence in the field of municipal government as a result of his leadership in the American Municipal Association, the United States Conference of Mayors, and the American Society of Planning Officials were important factors in securing the favorable response received from the overwhelming majority of the mayors contacted.

Beginning in March, 1946, and continuing through the summer, the well-known, five-page "Wyatt-to-Mayor letters" were mailed to the mayors of all cities of over 25,000 population and to many smaller cities. These letters stated frankly the housing problem that faced the nation, and listed fourteen specific responsibilities to be met by communities. In particular, the letters suggested the organization of mayors' emergency housing committees to serve as the focal points for local action. It was recommended that each committee include rep-

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

resentation from (a) local government, including local housing authorities; (b) the building industry, including one or more materials manufacturers and suppliers, home builders, real estate operators, and home financing institutions; (c) labor; (d) veterans' organizations; (e) civic business groups; and (f) special public interest groups, including minorities.

All letters were dispatched according to a carefully prearranged plan. Preceding the mailing of letters the regional expeditors of the national agency contacted each mayor in person or by telephone. They then wired the Washington office the name and exact title of the mayor to insure accuracy in addressing the letters. Within two weeks following the receipt of a letter, which was preceded by a telegram from Mr. Wyatt calling the mayor's attention to the forthcoming missive, the regional office made a direct personal contact with the mayor to advise with him and assist him in carrying out its suggested actions. The letters from Washington were individually drafted to fit the needs of the communities to which they were sent. Each letter was personally signed by the Housing Expediter. It was in no sense a form letter, and established the basis for the good public relationships that existed between the mayors' committees and the Housing Expediter and his representatives throughout the program.

The letter made it clear to each mayor and to the members of his committee that the committee was in no sense an instrument of the National Housing Agency or the Office of the Housing Expediter. Each committee was its own boss; it alone determined the extent of its responsibilities and the actions it could undertake. The independent nature of each committee was emphasized in order to forestall the antipathy toward "inspired programs from Washington, each requiring a new community committee" that had grown up during the war. On its part, the housing agency required its 169 locality expeditors to work exclusively through the mayors' committees, where they existed, in assisting communities with their housing programs.

On the whole, the results achieved by the mayors' committees are inspiring. These committees have made possible thousands of individual homes and rental developments that

could not have been built at prices veterans could afford to pay without community assistance. On the other hand, with the possible exception of the small cities of Yakima, Washington, and York, Pennsylvania, it is almost impossible to find any committee that has performed a comprehensive job covering the thirty or more specific activities that could be expedited through local action. However, most committees have been successful in some of their undertakings. A few committees were politically appointed in order to embarrass the program, and some others have been so dominated by builder interests as to be ineffective in assisting in the task of meeting the needs of veterans. Fortunately, as the program has progressed veterans groups have taken increasing interest in the activities of mayors' committees, and in some instances have actually dominated the work of those groups.

Some committees have employed full-time paid secretaries to implement their work, although most relied on the efforts of the federally employed locality housing expeditors. With rare exceptions, the mayors' committees have not been in themselves administrative agencies. They have been simply the focal point for public opinion that has uncovered the actions needed in the community and applied the necessary pressures on the proper authorities to secure them. For example, mayors' committees have not run apprentice training programs; rather, they have pointed up the need for such programs and secured the cooperation of local labor unions in providing them. Similarly, the committees have not revised building codes or zoning ordinances; they have prevailed upon municipal authorities to do the revisions.

To assist the committees in their work, the community action advisory service of the Office of the Housing Expediter prepared a series of nine Community Action Bulletins, each designed to provide assistance and guidance in meeting definite local responsibilities. They were not publicity materials and were distributed only to the committees. Their titles generally indicate the matters in which they were designed to provide assistance: *Community Goals for Emergency Housing; Building Sites for Veterans Housing; Labor Supply for Veterans Housing; Building Code Suggestions for*

VEHP; Conversions Provide Homes Faster; Subdivision Control and Veterans Housing; Operating a Housing Referral Center; Rental Housing in 1947, a guidebook for community programs; *Homes Can Be Built Now—Through Community Action*, a summary and outline of the best ideas that were developed and carried out by local groups.

In addition, the community action advisory service issued a biweekly, four-page multi-lithed *Community Action Report to Mayors' Emergency Housing Committees*, designed (1) to keep committee members informed as to action taken and progress made nationally in implementing the veterans' housing program, and (2) to serve as a clearing house for practical ideas developed in local communities. In the twenty-six issues of the *Report* twenty-four cities were "spotlighted" for effective local housing programs. Plans of twenty-three other cities for conducting conversion campaigns, promoting rental housing construction, and carrying on other housing activities received national publicity. Specific achievements in 302 different municipalities were mentioned.

As of July 31, 1947, the date of final liquidation of the community service activities of the Office of the Housing Expediter, 803 mayors'

emergency housing committees still existed, at least on paper. The majority were "going concerns" and had indicated their intention of continuing the local action fight on the nation's housing shortage. No better proof can be given of the extent to which the now defunct veterans' emergency housing program awakened the communities to an awareness of their important responsibilities in providing housing for their people. No longer is housing regarded as a matter of importance only to the man who wants a roof over his head and to the builder who is in business to provide it for him at a profit. The standards of housing construction and the civic plan for the location of new homes are matters of importance to every citizen. Good housing means good living, higher tax revenues for the city, better recreational and health facilities, and increased business activity. The fight for civic cooperation in planning, waged for so long as a bitter uphill battle by isolated planning groups, has now been taken up by thousands of laymen throughout the country, representatives of progressive citizens who are uniting their efforts through community housing committees in order to provide better homes, eventually at better prices.

Corporative Occupational Organization and Democracy in Germany

By JOHN B. HOLT

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AMERICAN Military Government in Germany has been charged with democratizing a totalitarian governmental structure. The particular brand of structure that developed in Germany under National Socialism and in Italy under Fascism has been termed the corporative state. The term was derived from the incorporation of occupational groups and their use as administrative agencies of government.

In the United States the code groups developed under the National Recovery Administration have been the closest approach to occupational corporations. These groups, though their membership was voluntary, were allowed to develop codes governing "fair practices" and price floors. The codes were valid for the members and were enforceable in administrative courts if approved by government. The code groups were abolished as a result of a Supreme Court decision.

More permanent have been the professional associations of lawyers, physicians, and the like. These associations, however, have refrained from fee regulation and have concentrated upon codes of ethical practices—codes not enforceable in government courts. The American Medical Association has been indicted for "restraint of trade" under the Sherman Antitrust Act when its regulations were deemed to have compulsory effect upon non-members.

In the case of Nazi Germany most occupational groups were organized by law into public corporations that were self-administrative in the sense that their heads, who were appointed by government, were responsible for administering to their membership the regu-

latory, service, financial, or other functions delegated to the occupational corporations by law or government decree. Such corporations were by law the sole representatives of occupations; no other occupational associations were permitted.

In Germany the occupational corporation has been regarded as analogous to the municipal and county corporations. Instead of being organized on a geographical basis, like a city or a county, the occupational corporation has been organized on the basis of occupation or industry. All persons engaged in a particular occupation by law have been members or subject to licensing as members of the official occupational corporation.

The bestowal of status as a public corporation made the occupational organization eligible to receive and to exercise government regulatory, tax, and service functions. Regulatory powers frequently included licensing, fixing of standards, allocation of raw materials and markets, and supervision of prices or fees. The taxing power included the assessment of membership dues or various fees. Service functions included auditing, legal, training and educational, promotional, government advisory, insurance, and other services. The power to establish administrative courts was also delegated to the corporations.

In short, the occupational corporations acted as a part of the governmental structure, performing certain functions of government for the government and exercising the governmental power of enforcement. In Germany the Reich Food Estate will serve as an example of the corporatively organized occupational group under the National Socialist regime.

I

THE Nazi regime exercised its totalitarian control over the agricultural and food economy through the Reich Food Estate. Any one who produced, dealt in, or processed food or other agricultural commodities was by law a member of this organization. All dealers and processors were "organized" as compulsory members in central commodity marketing unions. All farmers were "organized" in farmers associations. Totalitarian control consisted of (1) compulsory membership in and subjection to decrees of the Reich Food Estate; (2) the "leadership principle," i.e., appointment, determination of policy, and flow of command from the top down; and (3) elimination of free organizations for occupational representation and criticism of policy.

The Reich Food Estate exercised its powers through two main avenues of authority, the farmers associations and the marketing unions and associations. As branches of the Reich Food Estate there were farmers associations at the regional (state), county, and township levels. Marketing associations existed uniformly as branches of the central marketing unions at the regional level; some types of commodities dealers were organized also on a subregional or area basis.

The regional food office coordinated the whole food economy of its region. Division A, through the marketing associations, assigned marketing and processing quotas to the farm trade and production and delivery quotas and farm supplies and equipment to the counties and townships for allocation to the farmers. Division B of the food office fixed ration levels and consumer categories and distributed ration cards at the regional, county, and local levels. The regional farmers leader was automatically the chief of the regional food office and of Division A (production and marketing). He was appointed by the Reich farmers leader. Though subject to the farmers leader, the head of Division B was appointed by the appropriate regional government president, county commissioner, or mayor.

The so-called unions and associations of dealers, processors, and farmers were not associations in the usual sense. Rather, they were occupational categories of persons who by law were automatically subject to the regulations

and directives issued through the so-called presidents of the unions and the farmers leaders. The whole structure was merely a device for regulating occupational groups and through them the production, processing, and distribution of food. Advisory councils were provided by law. Although consultation was also required by law the role of these councils could not be said to have been decisive in determining the actions of the farmers leaders. Administrative courts, called corporation "honor courts," had the power to fine a farmer or to deprive him of his farm. Decisions could be appealed to ministerial courts within the government ministry supervising the occupational corporation.

II

FOR a year and a half, from the beginning of the occupation of the American Zone in the early summer of 1945 until the adoption of the German state constitutions in late 1946, American Military Government made clear to the German state governments its policy against the maintenance of occupational corporations exercising governmental powers, having compulsory membership, and enjoying the status of public corporations. Military Government directives and regulations concerning occupational associations were issued and underwent successive reformulations. They have, however, maintained the same basic principle throughout the period of occupation—that all regulatory and other public functions should be administered by government agencies staffed with government personnel. Powers and functions formerly exercised by occupational corporations should be transferred to the appropriate ministries and should not be delegated or re-assigned to self-governing occupational group associations incorporated under public law. The function of representing the vocations should be left entirely to voluntary occupational associations exercising no governmental powers or functions. Such associations should be allowed to organize freely, provided they adhered to democratic forms and procedures.

There was no place in American policy for either the fictitiously designated self-administrative occupational corporations of the Nazi regime or the quasi-governmental occupational corporations which had long been part of the

pre-Hitler German tradition. American policy decreed there should be only government on the one side and private voluntary occupational associations on the other—no quasi-governmental occupational chambers or other corporations administering government regulations or services and officially representing the vocations before the government and to the public. The regulation and administration of services requiring tax funds would be the responsibility of government agencies exclusively. Representation of occupational interests and provision of such services as would be financed and administered on a voluntary basis would be the province of voluntary non-governmental associations.

This policy was expressed in the Military Government Regulations of March, 1947, as follows:

Policy as to Business and Professional Associations. This paragraph does not apply to cooperative associations. . . . It is Military Government policy that persons and enterprises, including publicly owned establishments engaged in economic pursuits, be permitted to establish and maintain business and professional associations to promote the lawful interests of their members. In accordance with this policy, such associations, including trade associations, chambers of commerce, industry or handicrafts; guilds or professional societies; and other economic associations, may be established and maintained in accordance with the following principles:

- a. No limitation shall be permitted or imposed as to the number of associations authorized to represent any particular occupational group.
- b. Associations shall not be accorded the status of public law corporations (*Koerperschaften des oefentlichen Rechts*).
- c. Except in an advisory capacity, an association shall not participate in nor exercise governmental powers nor act as a means for the restriction or control of trade, including the regulation of distribution, sales, prices, rates, and charges, allocation of materials or fuels, licensing of businesses or persons, or assignment of production or delivery quotas. Associations are subject to all the provisions of Military Government Law No. 56 and Regulations issued thereunder prohibiting excessive concentration of economic power ["decartelization law"].
- d. Membership shall be voluntary and subject to no discriminatory restrictions. However, admission to membership will be governed by the provisions

of the . . . ["denazification law" and corresponding denazification provisions of labor laws].

e. Policies shall be determined and officials elected by democratic procedures, including majority rule, one vote and only one vote per member, secret ballot, delegation of authority to officials only within approved and defined limits, limited term of office, and accountability of officials for their actions and for the use of revenues and funds.

f. Dues, if levied, shall be levied only on members. . . .

h. The functional jurisdiction of an association shall, in general be limited to one major industry, trade, profession or other occupational group, but such limitation is not intended to preclude establishment of associations organized on a territorial basis, such as chambers of commerce or handicraft, which normally cover more than one trade or vocation.

i. Associations may establish employer representation to negotiate, on behalf of their members, contracts with trade unions and their representatives and to propose candidates for appointment to Land and local administrative and judicial agencies in the fields of labor and social insurance. In cases where the jurisdiction of a labor union extends beyond the jurisdiction of a particular association, the association may join together with one or more additional associations for the purpose of negotiating collective labor contracts and their execution with the corresponding labor union but for no other purposes.

Although the American antitrust ideology and program furnished some of the impetus to American policy concerning occupational organizations, this factor was only part of the traditional American thinking concerning the proper role of these organizations under democratic government. The ideology of this tradition was expressed to the German state governments in a communication of June 8, 1946, which dealt chiefly with organizations of farmers and farm commodity dealers, but which was applicable by analogy to all other occupational organizations.

It was stated therein that United States Military Government policy barred associations of private businesses from administering governmental regulatory powers because an interest group, as a self-governing association, would be in a position to compromise the execution of public policy when such policy was considered by the group as contrary to its interests. The power of such a group would be derived as much from its possession of the vital

information necessary for adequate supervision as from its position as an administrative agency. The argument that the occupational corporation would be the most effective means for representing the interests of the group was the most severe indictment of its use. The efforts of the occupational group to influence policy should be carried out through representatives acting in an advisory capacity only and through political pressure groups.

The communication cited four "pillars" for an occupational group in a democratic political-economic structure: (1) voting by members in general elections; (2) voluntary organizations to represent occupational interests before legislative bodies and to exert influence on political party programs; (3) advisory representation at various levels of government administration; and (4) cooperative organization for undertakings of mutual benefit, economic, technical, or other.

III

DURING the spring and summer of 1946 German state constitutional assemblies were elected and put to work drafting constitutions for the three states in the American Zone—Bavaria, Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden. The texts of the constitutions as finally approved by Military Government and ratified by the German state electorates show that corporative state ideology has not been eradicated in the American Zone, least of all in Bavaria.

Corporative state thinking permeates the Bavarian state constitution. Part III deals with the Senate, which "represents the social, economic, cultural and municipal corporations . . ." (Article 34). "The Senators are elected by their respective public or private law corporations . . ." (Article 36). Article 154 states: "Self-governing economic authorities elected by and from occupational groups participate in the solution of economic problems. The details are determined by law." Article 155 provides as follows: "For the purpose of satisfying the economic requirements of all the inhabitants as equally as possible and with due regard for the vital interests of the independent, productively active forces of the economy, special areas of supply may be designated by law for which public law corporations shall be established on a cooperative basis. Within the limits

of the laws, they have the right of self-government."

Article 164 of the Bavarian constitution is not clear on the matter of corporative organization. "An appropriate agricultural income shall be assured through a price and wage policy corresponding to general economic conditions and through market regulations. Agreements between organizations of producers, distributors and consumers shall be based on these considerations."

What Article 179, representing the comments of Military Government on the constitution, does to the principle of the corporative state as expressed in the foregoing articles is perhaps a problem for the ambitious constitutional lawyer. It reads as follows: "The corporations, economic administrative organizations and organizations of producers, retailers, and consumers (Arts. 34, 36, 154, 155, 164) are not public authorities and may not exercise any governmental functions. Compulsory membership therein is not permitted."

The Hessian constitution does not specifically mention occupational corporations.

It appears that the drafters of the Württemberg-Baden constitution were willing that the constitution allow compulsory corporative occupational organizations if they were urgently required for the common welfare or wherever an authorization by an administrative authority is required to carry on the occupation or profession (Article 15). In Article 25 it is not clear whether the constitution is speaking of government commissions or of occupational corporations: "To regulate economic matters, public bodies will be created in which employers and employees and, as far as necessary, producers and consumers, shall have an equal share."

On September 30, 1946, the deputy military governor defined the relationships between military and civil government in the United States Zone subsequent to the adoption of the German state constitutions (Bavaria, Hesse, and Württemberg-Baden). Although German self-government under these state constitutions was the objective of Military Government, certain restrictions upon autonomy were imposed, including the stipulation that governmental powers of the states may not be delegated to private or quasi-private economic bodies.

Because of the uncertainty of the safeguards in the state constitutions against the re-establishment of the occupational corporations along German traditional lines, the foregoing prohibition was included in the letter of September 30, and in March, 1947, the prohibition was further defined.¹

Under the reserved powers of Military Government as defined in the letter of September 30, the state offices of Military Government were directed to instruct the German governments to adhere to the principles set forth in Military Government Regulations 13-120.²

IV

THE attempt of American Military Government to eliminate the corporative tradition in the American Zone of Germany faces heavy odds. It is deeply rooted. To Germans the corporative system seems essentially "right." It is regarded as superior to the American system of government bureaus and voluntary occupational associations. Defenders of the corporative tradition in Germany feel that the democratization of the German governmental structure requires only the establishment of democratic procedures within the corporations and the general government. They tend to dissociate the corporative principles from National Socialism except as the Nazi regime developed the principles to an extreme and "co-ordinated" the corporations into a totalitarian governmental structure by abolishing internal democratic procedures and subjecting the corporations to the chain-of-command or "leadership principle."

The corporative principles of government structure are a German culture complex. The incorporation of the occupational group association as a public corporation, compulsory membership, and the delegation of governmental powers to tax and to administer government regulation and services are all interrelated and interdependent. Remove one and the complex disintegrates. Given the desire to regulate, serve, and tax the persons engaging in a particular occupation or profession

¹ OMGUS, AG, letter, dated March 19, 1947 to state and other offices of U. S. Military Government, Subject: Advance Amendment to Title 13, Trade and Commerce, Military Government Regulations.

² As revised in March, 1947, and quoted at considerable length in the earlier portion of this discussion.

through an occupational organization, membership in the organization must be mandatory. The organization must have the status of a public corporation so that governmental powers can be delegated to it and it can be subjected to governmental direction.

German defenders of the system argue that it provides far more efficient administration because the members, being taxed directly for and participating in this self-administering occupational organization, will be more intent upon its efficient functioning and in avoidance of bureaucracy than would voters or governmental personnel at large. Tax burdens are less and the total governmental bureaucracy is smaller when each occupational group is self-administering. Even in administering programs affecting the larger public, defenders argue that the public is guaranteed sufficient protection through legislation which can define narrowly the latitude of decision allowed the occupational organization and through the inclusion of governmental representatives on the board of directors. It is not impossible thus to solve the problem of control in a democratic society. Moreover, in the corporative system administration is carried on by "practical" and "experienced" men of the business or profession involved.

The American tradition is also a complex of integrated culture traits that include an impressive set of ideological "principles." American views have been stated in part in the early portion of this article. Briefly they are as follows: powers of compulsory membership, regulation, and taxation cannot be delegated to an occupational organization, particularly when such an organization administers programs affecting citizens outside the occupation and also when it is so organized as to be in a position to interfere with the execution of public policy concerning itself. It is frequently argued that the officials of the organization, if elected democratically by the membership, are accountable to the organization and cannot be at the same time responsible morally, and should not be made responsible legally, to the public or its government. Further, it is argued that the government is not in a position to supervise, for it lacks the control data generally available only through the agency itself, which collects, interprets, and presents the data to

the government. Moreover, the technical complexity of administering complicated programs makes difficult the enactment of detailed legislation and thereby gives the administrative agency undue latitude of decision, amounting almost to legislative power.

Americans look with suspicion upon compulsory membership in any organization other than government itself, although there appears some willingness to extend the concept of government to include such economic organizations as drainage and irrigation districts. The feeling against compulsory membership has been evidenced in the history of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration with its various devices for discouraging nonmembership, in the National Recovery Administration venture, and in the avoidance of legislation for compulsory union membership.

The extensive development of administrative courts is regarded with suspicion as a dangerous breach of the principle of separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers.

Another line of argument used in favor of the American tradition and against the corporative system includes two closely related points. The first holds that the establishment of strong occupational chambers creates not arms of government but the arms, head, trunk, and legs of a government body that will sap the strength of the party and legislative system with its control of cabinet and policy. The cabinet becomes a collection of ministers who are completely dependent upon the willingness of the corporations to administer their programs. The corporations are in a position where they can administer not only the program but also the minister. It is contended that the legislature is in danger of becoming an official debating society with only limited power in controlling economic policy. The minister-president, premier, or president may find it impossible to formulate and direct an integrated government policy.

The second charge is that the members of a corporatively organized society think of themselves too little as citizens at large, and are too little concerned with solving the many complex statewide problems through general political parties. The tendency is, rather, to think politically only with reference to occupational or vocational status. This is the criticism often

made of proposals for systems of guild socialism, such as that of Sidney and Beatrice Webb in their *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*. It is asserted that the German people are inclined to be organization and status minded, that they think not so much in terms of their general citizenship as in terms of their membership and status in an occupational group. This assertion is sometimes accompanied by the statement that the Prussians and Bavarians have never experienced the individualizing and "citizenizing" effects of the democratic and industrial revolutions in Western Europe.

The von Stein reforms of the early nineteenth century attempted to "free" enterprise. It is questioned whether they succeeded in breaking the holds of the guild tradition. The handicraft guilds were re-established in the second half of the last century. The chambers of agriculture were developed in Prussia a decade or so later and spread gradually throughout the rest of Germany, though in modified form. If the charges are valid, they indicate the depth of the roots of the tradition which Military Government is attempting to hack out. They elevate the issue of corporative occupational organization to the highest level of significance; it is either a barrier to an individual sense of broad political responsibility or a means, as the Germans contend, of achieving more responsible, more effective, and less bureaucratic government administration in economic matters.

The policy of American Military Government in Germany in trying to eliminate all vestiges of the corporative state throws into high relief the conflict between two distinct and strong traditions. The problem is not simplified by the presence of somewhat differing British, Soviet, and French traditions. It is possible that the American and German systems are definitely incompatible. It has been stated above that each forms a culture complex, the removal of one trait from which would lead to ineffectiveness of the others. It appears doubtful that they can be merged or mixed. The choice of Military Government to substitute the American for the German system has been a bold choice, in view of the deep roots of the German system and the wealth of arguments in its favor.

The problem is made more difficult because neither party can marshal conclusive proofs for the arguments as to the effects on democratic government of the system it supports. Students of public administration and of representative government both have an interest in the problem. There is need for an appraisal of the findings of research and for the planning and conduct of additional research as to the validity of charges and countercharges relating to corporative occupational organizations as representative and administrative devices in government. Quite possibly the findings might show that corporative occupational organization is good or bad only in the light of the powers delegated to it, its form of organization, the controls established about it, or even the cultural matrix within which it has to operate.

In examining the advantages and dangers of corporative occupational organizations it would probably be useful to consider such basic questions as the following:

1. Is there valid reason for denying to occupational groups privileges and responsibilities of self-administration accorded incorporated geographic areas such as municipalities?

2. Are there regulations, services, or other functions which can be administered more effectively by incorporated occupational groups than by government bureaus or privately organized voluntary associations?

3. Is it possible to establish, and if so in what form, controls over occupational corporations that will protect the public interest in programs and powers that they administer?

4. Does corporative occupational organization compartmentalize the thinking of members to the point that they exaggerate the importance of their special interest to the detriment of good citizenship? Does this type of organization accentuate occupational conflicts and make more difficult the formation of majority political parties?

5. Does corporative occupational organization facilitate or make more difficult legislative control over the administration of economic functions? Does it lead to demagoguery in government?

Can Work Measurement Be Applied to the Personnel Office?

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CAN work measurement¹ techniques be applied to establish staffing standards for the activities of the personnel office? Do variables such as population served, function of the agency or field office, and geographical distribution necessitate weighting to assure fairness in application? Will standards established through quantitative measurement be detrimental to quality of performance? These and similar questions have been asked and answered in the course of a staffing standards study recently completed in the War Department.

The traditional method of establishing staffing standards for personnel offices has been to use a ratio of perhaps 1 or 2 per cent of strength served. The War Department Manpower Board had used this method, but personnel offices had complained bitterly that it failed to take cognizance of their actual work load. Regular inspections seemed to indicate that some personnel offices were overstaffed, but these conclusions were purely subjective. Civilian personnel officers located at War Department installations throughout the country looked to the Civilian Personnel Division, Office of the Secretary of War, for guidance. The need for standards was urgent. An initial can-

vass of the possibility of developing staffing standards for personnel offices through the use of work measurement techniques revealed that this was virgin territory so far as the federal government was concerned. There had been a few sporadic attempts to use such techniques but none had been successfully completed. It seemed that an aura of sanctity enshrouded the personnel office, whose operations were regarded as too intangible and too elusive to be susceptible to work measurement. The staffing standards study was undertaken against this unpromising background.

The existence of several conditions in the personnel offices of the War Department, however, created a climate somewhat favorable to this study. In July, 1945, the department had established standard operating procedures to be applied by all civilian personnel offices in the continental United States.² These procedures were published in loose leaf form as *Civilian Personnel Procedures Manual 1* and became mandatory on January 1, 1946. All departmental personnel offices operated under complete delegation of authority to the installation level. A common code of regulations and a common framework of personnel policy governing action at all levels were other favorable factors. The flow of work and the steps involved were essentially the same in Seattle as in Miami, in a hospital as in an arsenal, in an airfield as in a port, in a depot as in an army headquarters. Classification analysts used standard forms and records and had been trained in

¹ The use of the management technique of work measurement is relatively new in government and there is no universally accepted definition of the term. However, the following definition seems most appropriate: Work measurement is a method for determining the relationship between the volume of work performed and the employee-time expended in performing that volume. It provides a basis for comparing quantitative performance in like operations performed at different locations and in the same operation at the same location over a period of time.

² This development is described in Jay G. Gentry, "Putting People on Paper," *9 Personnel Administration* 17 (1946).

the use of common techniques. Without this common foundation of standard procedures, it is safe to say that this study would never have been undertaken on a department-wide basis. A fundamental tenet of all measurement is that a standard, to be valid, must be derived from comparable sources.

Basic Hypotheses

BEFORE discussing the details of the study, the hypotheses which shaped it will be presented. The four basic hypotheses may be summarized as follows:

1. The preponderance of all work performed in a personnel office is subject to quantitative measurement. This assumption is contrary to that expressed by many personnel experts who regard their work as too intangible to be so measured.
2. An optimum work unit reflects the total work load of an activity; and the simpler and more inclusive the work unit, the more applicable and understandable the measurement standard will be. It is generally understood that the most desirable work unit is the end product of a series of operations.
3. Use of a representative sample will indicate whether the typical claim that an operation is different has validity.
4. To be effective management goals, standards must be established above the level of average performance. In this study it was agreed that standards should be established at the top quartile of quantitative performance unless the data were too widely dispersed. In this instance, it was agreed to establish the mean as the standard. Any standard that is established must be reasonably attainable and the final decision in setting up quantitative standards involves administrative discretion. It was the considered judgment of the persons responsible for the study that the upper quartile represented a reasonable standard.

Method

THE method that was employed in this study appears to have possibilities for wider application. All essential details are therefore included in the description here given. The steps taken from the initiation of the study to its completion are presented in chronological sequence.

The first step was to present the project to top management for approval. Top management gave immediate enthusiastic support and the study began to progress according to the plan presented in the project.

Participation of personnel technicians in the planning and developmental phases was indispensable to assure full cooperation in the areas of personnel administration which were considered to be most difficult to measure. The study involved all areas of personnel administration—placement, training, testing, employee relations, classification, wage administration, paper processing, and records—and a committee was therefore appointed to assure representation from the two major program branches of classification and wage administration and employee utilization (placement, training, and employee relations) and from the branch responsible for administration of personnel procedures and records and for development of staffing standards. Responsibility for execution of the study was vested in the committee chairman, who was a representative of the standards and procedures section.

Defining Operations and Work Units. The first step in measurement is the precise definition of boundaries. All work performed within the personnel office was therefore classified into activities, such as placement, classification and wage administration, processing (paper transactions and records), employee relations, and testing. Next, all of the components of each activity were analyzed and classified into operations. For example, some of the operations of the processing activity were processing individual personnel actions, processing efficiency ratings, maintaining service record card files, maintaining official personnel folders, and preparing reports. Tentative definitions of operations were then prepared and discussed informally by the committee and the various bureaus of the War Department. Definitions were revised and revised again until it appeared that each provided a clear statement of the elements of the particular operation. The following will serve as illustrations of definitions:

3. OPERATION: Maintenance of Service Record Card File

Definition: After establishment of the file, preparation and filing of new cards when required, the

posting in ink of (1) all personnel actions and changes of name from the WD Form 50, (2) efficiency ratings from appropriate forms, (3) other changes, such as disposition of old 201 file; flagging, coding, and refiling as required, the re-routing of the supporting document to its appropriate destination, and the furnishing of items of information verbally in response to proper inquiries.

Review of WD 76 for tickler items listed below, preparation of working lists for control use of the Civilian Personnel Office or installation, checking requests for personnel action against the WD Form 76, preparation of lists, giving information verbally or by memo to employee or operating official regarding these actions:

1. Efficiency ratings
2. Periodic Pay Increase
3. Service Awards
4. Expiration of temporary appointments.

8. OPERATION: Evaluation of Individual Positions

Definition: Receipt of Civilian Personnel Action Request, WD Form 72 and review to determine location and character of position; arrangement for investigation of position.

Analysis of position: (a) obtaining facts about position through interview of operating officials, supervisors, and employees; (b) describing position in writing; and (c) clearing position description with operating officials, supervisors, and employees.

Classification of position through comparison of description with established positions already classified, manuals of class descriptions, and job standards. Evaluation of jobs (classes, not positions) which is the determination of grades of new jobs through the comparison of their factors with those of established and previously graded jobs or classes.

Request for advisory opinions from higher echelon when the classification of a position or evaluation of a job is questionable.

18. OPERATION: Processing of Penalty Ratings

Definition: Consideration of "Fair" and "Unsatisfactory" rating cases, including discussion with operating officials as to penalty action to be taken, analysis of supervisor's statement of facts, decision that regulatory and installation policy requirements are met, preparation of notification to employee of proposed action, consideration of employee's reply, securing of approval of proposed action from Civil Service Commission, initiation of papers necessary to effect approved action.

Definitions of work units reflective of the work load of an operation were developed concomitantly with the development of definitions of operations. Wherever it appeared that

the use of one rather than several work units might jeopardize comparability, the single unit was divided into its components. In some cases, there were several work units involved in a single operation and in other instances one work unit was deemed to reflect the work load of one operation. The work units for the three operations defined above were as follows:

<i>Operation 3</i>	<i>Operation 8</i>	<i>Operation 18</i>
one post-	one action request reviewed	one pen-
ing to the	one interview	alty case
service rec-	one position described	handled
ord card	one position cleared	
	one position classified	
	one job evaluated	

After the committee had reached agreement on all of the definitions, a formal clearance meeting was held attended by the personnel directors of all the bureaus in the War Department. This meeting also provided an opportunity to describe the purpose of the study. Following the meeting, revisions in definitions were made.

Use of Standard Reporting Forms. Since work units and man hours were to be recorded and the data reported by personnel located at installations scattered over the country, it was imperative that the method of recording and the summary report form to be submitted to the committee by each installation each month be standardized. Forms for both purposes were developed, so designed that individual work sheets could be readily totaled to furnish entries for the summary report.

Selection of a Representative Sample. In consultation with the Air Forces, the Army areas, and the technical services, a representative sample of seventeen installations was selected, designed to provide a cross section, exclusive of extremes, by size, type, mission, geographical location, and quality of program. The distribution by type of installation and mission was as follows:

Type	Number	Mission
Air Forces	4	Area depot Specialized depot Airfield (Strategic Air Command) Airfield (Training Command)
Army area	1	Headquarters

Type	Number	Mission
Adjutant General	1	Civilian retirement accounts branch
Corps of Engineers	2	Division office District office
Ordnance depot	2	Arsenal Proving ground
Signal Corps	1	Signal depot
Surgeon General	2	Medical center Medical depot
Transportation Corps	1	Port of embarkation
Quartermaster General	2	General depot Quartermaster depot
Chemical Corps	1	Arsenal

Installations were located in the East, South, and Middle West.

A sample of seventeen over a three-month period provides a minimum sample of seventeen and a maximum sample of fifty-one, depending upon the extent to which the factors remain constant. If conditions at an installation change radically from month to month, the data secured over a three-month period may be equivalent to data from three different installations. For example, the size distribution of the sample installations varied over the three-month period as follows:

Strength of Installation	Number of Installations at Beginning of Study	Number of Installations at End of Study
under 500	1	3
500 - 750	2	2
750 - 1,000	5	3
1,000 - 2,000	3	5
2,000 - 3,000	2	1
3,000 and over	4	3

Every effort was made in selecting the sample to assure that quality of program was adequate or better than adequate. The size of the sample varied from 5 to 10 per cent as a minimum to 15 to 30 per cent as a maximum.³ The existence of standard procedures tended to dispel initial fears that a 5 per cent sample might be too small.

³This variation is attributable to two factors. First, the number of field installations of the War Department having personnel offices decreased considerably during the period involved. At the beginning of the study, the sample was approximately 5 per cent but by January 1, 1947, it was nearly 10 per cent. Second, the use of terms "minimum" and "maximum" reflects the fact that a sample taken over three months may be equivalent to three times the same sample taken in one month.

When the sample installations had been selected, the next step was to instruct their personnel as to definitions and procedures for recording man hours and work units.

Riding the Circuit. One of the strongest criticisms aimed at work measurement programs is that instructions frequently are distributed only in written form. This procedure hampers acceptance and opens the way to misunderstanding and, most important, to diverse interpretations. The result will then be reports of performance which are in no way comparable. It was therefore determined that before work measurement would begin each installation would be visited by a representative of the committee.

After standard reporting instructions were prepared, the committee scheduled a pilot visit to one of the sample installations located in the outskirts of Washington, D. C. The purpose and method of the study were discussed with the civilian personnel officer and his staff and each definition was then read and explained to the group. Comments were invited. As a result of this pilot visit, some definitions were revised and a supplement to the initial reporting instructions was published. This experience also enabled the committee to anticipate the types of inquiries which would be raised by personnel at the other installations.

The chairman briefed the representatives of the committee in the approach and method of presentation to be employed in visiting sample installations participating in the study, and early in October, 1946, the chairman and three representatives rode the circuit from Boston to Vicksburg, from St. Louis to Tampa. At each installation the pattern of instruction was the same. An initial meeting was held with the civilian personnel officer, his section chiefs, and their assistants. The purpose and method of the study were presented and the need for cooperation and accurate reporting was stressed. Copies of the instructions and definitions were distributed to everyone at the meeting and each definition was read aloud and explained. All suggestions for improvement or modification were discussed and those deemed desirable were noted by the representative for further consideration by the committee.

Frequently, programs requiring mass participation and uniform interpretation have

not achieved their objectives because instructions were furnished key personnel only. To avoid the danger of misinterpretation in transmission from supervisor to worker, a second meeting was held with all employees in the personnel office except the assistant section chiefs. They had already received instructions and were needed to provide skeleton coverage of their offices. The procedure at this second meeting paralleled that at the first, with even greater emphasis upon the need for complete cooperation and accuracy. It was pointed out that cooperation must come primarily from the group in attendance at this second meeting. In general, the personnel offices were found to be enthusiastic about the establishment of staffing standards based on work load.

Copies of instructions and definitions were distributed and each definition was read aloud, explained, and clarified where necessary. The report forms were discussed and all the personnel were instructed on how to record man hours and work units. Man hours were recorded whenever any part of the operation defined was performed; work units were recorded at the time each unit was completed.

Some of the suggestions received from personnel at the sample installations indicated the necessity for revision of definitions of operations or expansion of work units to assure more accurate measurement. These revisions were incorporated in a second supplement which modified instructions for the second and third months. As is usually the case, field participation resulted in an improved job.

Tabulating Performance. Reports were submitted monthly by each of the sample installations. These reports were reviewed and were acknowledged with comments designed to improve accuracy of reporting in succeeding months. The reports were tabulated each month on a master summary work sheet which permitted an across-the-board comparison of performance.

Establishment of Staffing Standards

IN THE process of establishing staffing standards based upon work load the first step was to divide the total man hours expended in an operation at an installation during a month by the work units completed. The results were then ranked from fewest to most and the

standard was established at the upper quartile. The study might have been concluded at this juncture with the establishment of a standard for each operation in the personnel office. The question was immediately raised, however, as to whether a focal (single) work unit and a single standard for the activity would be as representative of work load as standards for the component operations comprising the activity. The answer to this question proved to be the key to the study.

Obviously, dissimilar work units could not be added to reflect a common work load. However, multiplying the number of work units completed for each operation by the standard man hours per unit would give a product in terms of equivalent man hours of work load. The equivalent man hours for each of the component operations comprising an activity were added to furnish a sum of equivalent man hours required to process the work load for the activity at each installation.

The next step was to establish standard man hours per unit for the total activity as distinguished from standards for each operation. To do this, it was first necessary to select a focal work unit for the activity. For example, six work units are involved in the six operations comprising the activity Evaluation of Individual Positions. One of these work units, One Position Classified, was selected as the focal work unit. The establishment of standard man hours per unit for the total activity was accomplished by adding all of the man hours expended for each operation, dividing this total by the number of focal work units completed for the activity, and ranking the quotients of man hours per unit at each installation from the fewest to the most. Standards were again established at the upper quartile.

In order to compare the use of focal work units and individual work units, the focal work unit was multiplied by the standard obtained in the preceding paragraph to furnish equivalent man hours for the activity. Equivalent man hours merely represent the number of man hours which ought to be required to complete a given number of work units applying the standard. Thus, it is apparent that equivalent man hours reflect relative work load among installations.

The crucial question was whether the focal

work unit was as representative of work load for an activity as was the total of the individual work units for each operation comprising the activity. The final step was the determination of the rank order correlation between the equivalent man hours of work load at each of the 17 installations obtained by applying the standard for the focal work unit and the equivalent man hours of work load at each of the same 17 installations obtained by applying the individual standards for each of the several work units involved in the production of the focal work unit. The coefficient of correlation was +.79, which clearly demonstrated that the focal work unit was as reflective of work load as the total of the individual work units.

When the validity of using focal work units had been established, the next step was to convert standard man hours per unit into staffing standards. A fair staffing standard must take into consideration normal unproductive "lost" time. It was determined that 160 man hours per person per month were available. This figure was divided by the standard man hours per unit to furnish the number of work units which ought to be completed by one person in one month. For example, if standard man hours to classify a position are 3.088, the staffing standard for one analyst will be established at 52 positions per month.

The use of this technique resulted in the development of staffing standards for nearly all of the major activities of the personnel office. In the case of the employee utilization function, the staffing standard was based on employees served. A comprehensive staffing pattern for the personnel office was then established. This pattern provided for necessary overhead work and made an allowance of 10 per cent for leave.

Obviously, the simplest work unit is the end product of an activity. When the use of such a work unit is feasible, it permits the development of staffing standards which are based directly on work load. The standard then becomes the basis for determining staffing requirements for personnel offices, e.g., one person in the processing or records section for each 130 personnel actions per month. Application of such a staffing standard furnishes the personnel office with a criterion for expanding

or contracting staff on the basis of current and anticipated work load.

The study clearly disproved the validity of using a strength ratio as an accurate basis for determining personnel requirements for the performance of the total personnel job or individual personnel functions. Strength served, if carefully used, may be treated as a general guide in determining personnel requirements for the personnel office, but use of a strength ratio as the sole basis for staffing may be dangerously inaccurate. Frequently there is no absolute relationship between the factors of strength served and work load.⁴ Standards based on work load represent a stride forward toward accurate and equitable measurement.

In order to establish staffing standards for basic activities, it was first necessary to derive individual standards for each of the component parts of such activities. Those individual standards for each operation which met the test of reliability based upon a month-to-month comparison were published as performance guides. For example:

preparation of a personnel action (change)
—14 minutes per action,
maintenance of a service record card—5
minutes per posting,
preparation of a position description—46
minutes per position description,
location and screening of applicants—13
minutes per interview.

These data were furnished as guides only, with the understanding that they would be of material assistance to personnel officers in planning and scheduling work assignments.

Validity of Standards

IN THE final analysis, validity of a staffing standard is determined by the primary factor of reasonableness. Irrespective of the method employed, if a standard is not attainable it is

⁴ A simple chart was employed to analyze this relationship. With the "x" axis representing work load and the "y" axis strength served, a line of central tendency was drawn. The strength and work load of each installation were then plotted and a small circle was placed at the point of intersection. Although there was some clustering along the line of central tendency, there were many radical dispersions. The frequency and range of these dispersions clearly demonstrated the danger of assuming that there is an absolute relationship between strength served and work load.

not valid. Validity of standards was determined in three ways. First, there was the evidence that approximately 25 per cent of the installations were performing either equal to or better than a standard. Second, percentage of quartile deviation was applied to each standard to determine percentage of improvement to be demanded of the average installation to equal the standard. For example, in the classification of individual positions, the quartile deviation was slightly over 50 per cent. An installation classifying only 400 positions per year analyst would have to increase to 600, or less than one position per day per analyst. The quartile deviation for the processing or "paper pushing" activity was 100 per cent. It was the feeling of those most familiar with this activity that a requirement of 100 per cent improvement was not at all unreasonable. Third, draft copies of the standards were reviewed by a number of field installations which had not been included in the sample to determine whether the installation could meet the standards without curtailing the personnel program or diminishing the quality of performance. These installations, several of which were in the Southwest and Pacific Coast areas which were not included in the sample, indicated with a startling unanimity that the standards were reasonable and could be met.

Determination of the reliability of using the focal work unit rather than individual work units has already been discussed. Verification of reliability was obtained by a comparison of the month-to-month consistency of the upper quartile or standard and by determining the percentage of quartile deviation. In the classification of individual positions, the variation over the three-month period was less than one half of a man hour per position classified. The test of month-to-month consistency is akin to a split half reliability analysis. From the marked consistency evidenced, it would appear that results met the test of reliability.

Usually the first question that was raised by personnel technicians in discussing the results of the study was whether application of the staffing standards would lower the quality of work. It should be reemphasized that the representative quality of their personnel programs was one of the factors considered in selecting the sample installations. At the conclu-

sion of the study, a comparison was made between quality of program and quantitative effectiveness based on application of the standards. In the activities of processing and classification and wage administration, it was clearly indicated that high quality of program accompanied high quantitative effectiveness. There was no observable relationship between the two factors in the employee utilization activity. The conclusion of the committee was that quality of program was directly dependent upon quality of personnel and that the application of staffing standards would in no way interfere with the performance of a top quality personnel job.

Significance of the Study

THE War Department study demonstrated that personnel office operations are susceptible of work measurement. It also indicated that, in general, high quality of performance and effectiveness as determined by work measurement standards go together. It proved that the use of a percentage ratio of employees in personnel work to total strength of personnel served to determine personnel staffing requirements is a source of serious inaccuracies and severe inequities. The crowning achievement of the study was the establishment and issuance of staffing standards for the major activities of a personnel office and performance guides in terms of minutes per work unit for each of the component operations comprising major activities. The standards and the guides were derived from the use of work measurement techniques and data and were applicable throughout the War Department.

The method used is adaptable for use by other government agencies or by private industry. The basic elements of defining operations and work units, recording work units completed and man hours expended, and establishing standards at a predetermined level are generally applicable. Such elements as the representative sample, a one-time study, and the upper quartile as a standard might or might not fit into particular circumstances. Some may say that the War Department is "different" in that it operated under standard procedures. This fact was undeniably an advantage, and work measurement was the logical outgrowth of the orthodox management

approach. Operations are first analyzed to effect standardization where feasible, and the standardized procedures are then simplified. Work measurement may either accompany or follow standardization and simplification, although normally it should follow standardization to assure measurement of comparable operations and by comparable work units.

However, there is frequently need for an empirical approach to cope with the realities of a situation. For example, intransigency of bureaus or field offices may impede standardization and simplification of operations. In such cases the use of a continuing work measurement reporting system may be an appropriate technique to spot and highlight poor performance and to secure thorough management analysis and standardization. Although it takes longer to derive staffing standards in such circumstances, a work measurement program of this type is often the only way to reach the desired end.

The War Department is furnishing positive guidance to its commanding officers and civilian personnel officers throughout the country as to the maximum number of persons required to staff personnel offices in terms of work loads. The most important benefits are: (1) fostering maximum utilization of needed personnel; (2) furnishing incentives to improve performance; (3) providing a basis for planning staff in terms of work load requirements; (4) facilitating the planning and scheduling of work assignments; (5) saving millions of dollars annually through eliminating or preventing overstaffing; (6) facilitating development of realistic standards of performance which include quantitative performance as one of several factors; and (7) isolating activities or operations requiring study and assistance to meet the standards.

It has long been accepted as a truism of work measurement that the optimum work unit is reflective of total work load of an activity. How do we know that a work unit is, in fact, reflective of total work load? Hitherto, we have relied on judgment. This study has brought forth a technique which eliminates

the need for guesswork. Briefly, it requires a rank order correlation between the equivalent man hours of work load obtained by applying the standard for the focal work unit and the equivalent man hours of work load obtained by applying the individual standards for each of the several work units involved in the production of the focal work unit. Use of this technique assures selection of optimum work units and standards.

Control over performance is assured by making the standards available and placing responsibility for compliance with commanding officers. This control is buttressed by periodic inspections of personnel management, including inspection for proper staffing in accordance with standards. Naturally, simplification of operations or consolidation of functions will affect the standards. Whenever such an improvement or series of improvements affects the standard to the extent of one full-time person, the standard will be modified accordingly.

The question has often been raised as to whether unit costs can be applied to staffing the personnel office or to performance of activities and operations. Obviously, the answer is "yes." It is an elementary mathematical calculation to multiply standard man hours per unit by the rate of pay per hour to furnish the product of standard unit cost. It is dangerously misleading, however, to use such a unit cost as "standard." In the government service, rates of pay are governed by law which provides for mandatory periodic increments. Obviously, the fact that employees in one office have served sufficiently long in one grade to receive three mandatory increments does not mean that they are less efficient than employees at another installation none of whom has received such increments. Also, although the end product may be the same at two different installations, the level of difficulty may necessitate varying rates of pay. In such instances, it is clear that the installation having a higher unit cost is not necessarily the less efficient. Unit costs are meaningful criteria of efficiency only when rates of pay are comparable and controllable.

Reviews of Books and Documents

The Utility of the Future in the Present

By R. G. Tugwell, University of Chicago

THE PROCESS AND ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT PLANNING, by JOHN D. MILLETT, Columbia University Press, 1947. Pp. viii, 187. \$2.50.

CENTRAL PLANNING AND CONTROL IN WAR AND PEACE, by SIR OLIVER FRANKS, Harvard University Press, 1947. Pp. 61. \$75.

I

IN ONE of those casual encounters which sometimes happen in public conveyances, I once—it was, in fact, in 1935—met the late George F. Warren, so long the head of the Farm Management Department at Cornell University and convinced advocate of the weighted dollar. It was Warren, it will be recalled, who, curiously enough, became a President's adviser, not on his professional subject but on his avocation of currency reform. Our meeting occurred in a Pullman car which was progressing serenely through a snowy winter landscape between Washington and New York. He was smiling to himself as he mused over a bulky report of some sort. "What amuses you so?" I asked. "That looks like a pretty dry document." He leafed through the papers. "I'll tell you," he said. "I was checking up on an impression and I find that I was right. This is an almost verbatim report of a meeting of cooperative leaders at Cornell. Do you know they talked for a whole week and never once reminded each other that cooperation is a wonderful thing. They seem to have talked all the time about ways to cooperate successfully. I was just concluding as you came along that the movement must really be coming of age. When people like this can spend so long actually discussing the techniques of what they are doing and neglect to exhort each other, they are well past the beginning stages."

I speak of this remark of Professor Warren's

because I have been feeling that it has a certain applicability to a good many other developments. It has, in fact, a special applicability to planning, at least in the United States. Our planners seem not to be anywhere near through telling each other how wonderful planning is. And until they finish with that, not much can be expected from them in the way of theoretical or procedural advance.

As I recall, cooperation also suffered for some time from another failing among its practitioners. This was the tendency to explain too much to outsiders—the explanation often running off into protestations that no one could possibly be injured by it. These protestations probably never fooled anyone and they often made those who were in the movement seem to be excited about nothing. Cooperation, if it reached its intention, would drastically modify the profit system; and to pretend that no vested interests would be harmed in the process was more naive than useful.

It seems to be much the same with planning as it used to be with cooperation. Those of us who are engaged, in one way or another, in the profession could wish that we might pass the stage of dissimulation more quickly than we seem to be passing it. It is undoubtedly true that we have among us both those who are impressed by its wonders and those who feel it their mission to explain how harmless it is. It is particularly serious for planning to be lingering in the pre-dawn of half acceptance which occasions these attitudes. In the effort to be born against the will of its enemies, the whole body of techniques is being softened and warped until planning actually begins to resemble the harmless but useless amorphaousness which is described by its apologists.

My impression is that its enemies are not

much confused by all these protestations; they, at least, are able to think. And they are put in the position, whenever an issue comes up, of being able to choose definitions and descriptions, advanced by planners themselves, which serve as excuse for the shabbiest kind of treatment. An example of what is meant is furnished by the almost unanimous determination among practitioners to describe their activities as "advisory." This has been going on for some time now and it is not uninfluential in causing an advisory status to be reserved for planning in many new statutes or charters where it is obviously inappropriate.

The New York City charter of 1936 and the Puerto Rican Planning Act of 1942 are, up to now, perhaps the best illustrations of the opposite arrangement. They represent logical attempts to fit planning into going governmental systems. They are also, in practice, the most successful. But neither sets up an advisory agency, unless by those words something is meant which is quite foreign to ordinary usage. And no real good is done by elaborate attempts to make them appear harmless. They have real control within the governmental organisms of which they are the directional centers; and they have certain important effects on private enterprises which happen to be related to government activities. If they did not have these controls and effects they would not be useful for the purpose for which they were intended. It will undoubtedly be discovered, as time passes, that these are two examples of useful additions to American governmental machinery and they will be emulated. I, myself, do not consider it illogical or premature to consider their applicability to the federal system which, after all, is a government like any other, and actually, because of size and so on, suffers from the very disabilities central planning—if properly institutionalized and courageously administered—can go a long way toward curing.

Perhaps reasoning from British experience is less helpful than reasoning from home examples. The British government does not have that sharp separation—in theory or in practice—of executive, legislative, and judicial branches which is thought to be very precious in that of the United States. When, therefore, planning is introduced into government there,

certain problems of intrusion are not worried about as they seem to be worried about here. For this, among other reasons, there has been a much more rapid and fruitful development of planning techniques at all levels of British government. We catch glimpses of the contrast as we consider our own position and at the same time read such forthright discussions as that of Sir Oliver Frank's *Central Planning and Control in War and Peace*. He is, it is true, interested not so much in governmental theory as in the special situation of Britain in the postwar world; still, it is part of his concern that his countrymen should understand how necessary central planning is if the struggle of Britain for rehabilitation is to succeed. And it would be equally necessary if the overriding problem of the moment happened to be different. There need only be a situation in which the carelessness and wastes of undirected effort cannot be afforded. And that, now, is everywhere and all the time.

II

IT WOULD not be quite fair to say that Professor John D. Millett's book serves for illustration of the dissimulations so characteristic of American discussions of a similar sort, but it can hardly be denied that there is something of such an influence at work. He does seem to say that planners ought properly to be kept away from matters of policy: that they are only operational folk who carry out orders from their superiors who do determine policy—the President and the Congress. Their function would appear, from Mr. Millett's description, to be that of saving others from getting down in the muck and making things work, allowing them to stay aloof and think and not have to bother about detail. How officials on the higher level, who do make policy, are expected to make it wisely, is, inferentially, none of the planner's concern.

"Operational planning," Mr. Millett calls this activity. And he says that this is really the only legitimate kind of planning. Later on he has a whole chapter in which he discusses "central planning" in terms which seem to me to admit that his earlier distinction has either been less than forthright—for the purpose of dissimulation—or not quite fully considered. This has, however, as has been noted, become

pretty much a routine thing with American writers.

For some time I have found myself forced to find ways of explaining or of replying to those who advance such blurred distinctions in argument. I avoid, if I can, taking the case of federal planning at the outset and go, rather, to city planning. This I do because the ideological shivers with which Americans face orderly governmental procedures seem to be not nearly so prevalent when only municipalities are involved. Even this reasonableness is, of course, recent. Not so long ago municipally owned transportation and power facilities were regarded as dangerously socialistic. But both New York and Chicago have recently taken over their transit lines without a murmur of that sort. That could be because they were no longer profitable—it being somehow more wicked to conduct *profitable* enterprises publicly. But at any rate the change did occur. There is a similar reaction in the matter of planning, although I do not mean to imply any inevitable relationship between planning and public ownership. To make my point it is sometimes better, in fact, not to use a governmental illustration but to cite the acceptance of scientific management in industry—which, of course, if properly named would be called simply planning. This movement, thought to be so revolutionary by old rule-of-thumb managers, has now passed into daily technical uses.

When I point to existing governmental situations for illustration, however, it is usually to New York City. This is partly because it furnishes so recent a case; but also partly because New York somehow inherited the long tradition of developmental planning begun, actually, in Chicago at the time of the Fair and continued by Burnham and his associates. Mr. F. A. Delano and others, like most great industrialists of their time, eventually moved to New York, taking with them a special habit of civic concern. This resulted not only in the borough consolidation at the beginning of the century, but also in the monumental study, financed by the Russell Sage Foundation, called The Regional Plan of New York and Environs, which began then and continued intensively for many years. This regional plan organization has, in fact, never been allowed to die; and many of the names associated with

it at the beginning are still to be found on its board—not necessarily the same individuals but perhaps sons or other relatives, like Mr. Charles McKim Norton, the present executive director, whose father, Charles Dyer Norton, was the first chairman. I have before me, as I write, the edition of 1931, dedicated by his colleagues to that first Norton. To every American the names of those colleagues are familiar for civic leadership. Besides Mr. Delano, they are Robert W. de Forest, John H. Finley, John M. Glenn, Henry James, George McAneny, Dwight W. Morrow, Frank L. Polk, Frederic B. Pratt, and Lawson Purdy. The general director was Thomas Adams, and he was assisted by Harold M. Lewis and Lawrence M. Orton.

The connections here will be familiar to everyone with any knowledge of American social history. Not everyone will have known that one of the deepest interests of these prominent citizens was in city planning; but when this is pointed out, it will not be difficult to realize why city planning, at least, is respectable and why no apologies need be made for it. Nor does it seem strange that when it came to revising the city charter again in the 1930's, planning should come very close to occupying its logical place in government—nearer than in any other instance up to that time.

I point out habitually, then, to those who are fearsome about planning, the names associated with its development in New York. And then I ask them to note the duties, clearly laid out for the Planning Commission in the charter of 1936. These are:

1. To make and to approve or reject changes in a master plan for the city.
2. To make and to approve or reject changes in a six-year capital budget for the city.
3. To write and to administer the city's zoning resolution.
4. To make, to have custody of, and to administer changes in the official city map.
5. To pass on assessable improvements.

Those functions were given to the commission and, since 1938,¹ they have been performed by the commission—not to everyone's satisfaction, to be sure, and not without opposition from the vested interests affected, but

¹ The charter was approved in 1936 and went into effect January 1, 1938.

without any serious question involving authority or the propriety of the commission's position in the municipal scheme.² That position is a central one. The commission is obviously the agency of conjuncture. Its business is to point out the direction of development (in the master plan and in the capital budget) and to take part—along with the executive and legislative (through zoning, administering the city map, etc.)—in the decision-making and supervision which may keep that direction true. This responsibility extends in important ways to private as well as public enterprise: private developments must keep within the zoning restrictions and are dependent on the capital budget for such necessary facilities as streets, sewers, water supplies, and many others.³

III

IS IT so difficult to think of the federal government having a conjunctural agency of this kind? I do not see that it is. There is certainly no theoretical objection except that of modifying the independent three-branch system—which in any event is illusory so far as strict independence is concerned. The draft of the Puerto Rican statute of 1942 followed the New York pattern. Puerto Rico is not quite a state; but governmentally the differences are small and there the scheme has functioned with ex-

² Cf. R. G. Tugwell, "Implementing the General Interest," *1 Public Administration Review* 32-49 (Autumn, 1940).

³ Not to appear naive about this, I should point out that the Planning Commission has not nearly lived up to the expectation of those who were instrumental in creating it. La Guardia, as mayor, never quite understood it and was jealous of its potentialities; Mayor O'Dwyer has never been able to persuade his council to give it the financial support it needs to be effective. Mr. L. M. Orton, a member of the commission now and formerly a staff member of the regional plan organization, reminds me of this and suggests that this experience might well modify some conclusions later arrived at here. He thinks that possibly a legislative-executive entente is needed rather than independence for the planning agency in representative government. Argument on this point is needed and should go on among planners until some conclusion is reached. I have not found myself able to modify the conviction I have come to that independence is necessary. For one thing it seems unlikely that a legislative-executive entente will happen very often, politics being what they are. And the primary independence of each branch from the other certainly has become a cardinal principle of our representative form of government.

traordinary success.⁴ Neither a state nor a possession is quite analogous to the federal government; but all of them follow the tripartite, representative, republican form. And in any such governmental scheme a planning agency on the New York model is not unthinkable. No more powers would need to be gathered in from the states than have already been delegated or appropriated with judicial consent. And the controls over private industry need not inevitably exceed those already in use.

Emergency or other cause may change the accepted concept of relationships between private enterprise and the federal government; and if such a change takes place, national controls would extend more strictly to the enterprises affected. This would not be because there was planning, but simply because the change was necessary. The old *laissez faire* seems to have broken down—indeed it never existed in its pure form. The system of privately managed prices has by now modified it drastically; and the relations now taking shape are so different from classical competition as to be unrecognizable from the old descriptions. Industry and government have already become so close-woven a web that the establishment of central planning seems to be delayed only by stubborn refusal to recognize plain necessity.

As to this, Sir Oliver Franks says flatly that his reflections have led him "to conclude that some form of central planning and control is inevitable."⁵ He further explains that "the considerations which will determine policy arise from the national situation in such a way that any Government will have to make much the same decisions. The issue is not one of those matters which may be decided one way or the other according to the general political views of the party forming the Government." (p. 19.) And he goes on to consider the question whether this has anything to do with government ownership. He thinks not. The web of relationships is simply so interwoven that

⁴ By a new statute of 1946 Puerto Rico now elects a governor as well as a legislature. Only the Supreme Court and the auditor are still presidentially appointed.

⁵ It ought to be noted again that he was speaking of the special situation confronting Britain in the postwar world. But he was speaking of the supervision of economic processes by government, a matter as relevant to conditions here as to those in Britain.

no part of it can be thought of as "free." It is all, every part, of concern to national policy makers:

It might be thought that . . . everything will be publicly owned and controlled. . . . From the point of view from which I am speaking the issue between private ownership and public ownership is of secondary importance. . . . If there is central planning and control both private and public enterprise are equally affected; both have to conduct their business within the framework of the general programmes that may be adopted; both must be subject to controls . . . in carrying out the programmes. . . . Public ownership may indeed be a form of control and it may be argued whether as such it is good or bad. But this argument is irrelevant to the general thesis of the inevitability of planning and control by the State as generally directing the policies of industry and trade. It would be a very good thing if the main issue could be separated once and for all from the controversies which surround the topic of nationalization . . . (pp. 19-20).

Such a practical and common sense approach may be commended to two groups, particularly, among those who have engaged in the polemics of recent years. One is the appeasers or belittlers, especially among American planners; the other is that group which insists eternally on identifying planning with something called a "planned economy," but which they mean to identify as "totalitarian." The success of the latter group in confusing central planning with communism or national socialism is responsible, largely, for the cringing and withdrawing from responsibility of the former group. They are afraid of being thought "un-American"—that is, opposed to free enterprise.

To be a planner is, of course, necessarily to be against the kind of speculative ventures which incur great risks not only for their undertakers but for society generally. This does not mean that it is impossible to retain the genuine advantages of private enterprise if such ventures are carried out within an agreed, and commonly understood, framework established by the techniques of planning. Enterprises which are not speculative and venturesome to the degree of risking ruin for their undertakers and important losses for society have as much to gain in the long run as anyone else

from the establishment and maintenance of such a system. This is Sir Oliver Franks's conclusion. And the more reflective student of the American scene will perhaps agree with him.

IV

THE British way is somewhat different as it works in practice, and since it does work, who can say that it is not a better way? Its essential is this: that it has an institutional mind;⁶ but that it is not a separate mind; it is made up of cells drawn in from other parts of the organism. Mr. Herbert Morrison⁷ summarizes British practice:

. . . the central piece of machinery . . . is the Official Steering Committee representing the key economic Departments together with the Economic Section of the Cabinet Office, the Central Statistical Office and my own office. This Steering Committee forms the central economic team responsible for gathering and assessing economic intelligence, preparing forecasts, framing economic plans, advising Ministers on the advantages and disadvantages of these plans, and keeping under review the execution of plans when authorised and put into operation.

For this purpose the Steering Committee is assisted by a number of working parties. For instance one makes estimates of the total manpower available and of the forward distribution of manpower on various assumptions. Another assesses the forward demand for expenditure in the investment field and devises means, in times like these, of holding back investment which is inessential or can be deferred, while at the same time ensuring that a reserve of non-urgent investment projects is built up for rapid execution as opportunity arises. . . . Another working party watches over our import needs and the methods of paying our way by visible and invisible exports. [All this] is put together in the form of trial balance sheets of manpower, national income and expenditure, and overseas payments and receipts.

Mr. Morrison goes on to indicate that these balance sheets show the gap between demands and available resources. One of the differences, he says, between planning and *laissez faire* is that under *laissez faire* it is no one's business to forecast this gap. It is, in fact, left to close itself under the influence of that automatism

⁶ To which reference will again be made with a definition offered.

⁷ In his pamphlet *Economic Planning* (Institute of Public Administration, 1946) pp. 9-10.

which is supposed to govern unhindered economic forces. Planning, on the other hand, spotlights this gap and arranges to close it in the way most advantageous to the national interest by measures taken by the government or on government initiative.

It will perhaps be of interest to readers of the *Public Administration Review* that the correspondent to whom I am indebted for Mr. Morrison's several pronouncements is Mr. F. P. Bartlett, lately a member of the Council of the American Society for Public Administration and now a member of the Foreign Service attached to the United States Embassy in London. He remarked a little forlornly in his last letter (December 1, 1947), sending on the pamphlet from which I have quoted:

This is one of the few background statements which I have come across. I believe it presents succinctly and well the underlying principles behind the current British economic planning at the national level. I believe that you will not be surprised but perhaps sad to note that the Ministry of Town and Country Planning is not mentioned in Mr. Morrison's statement nor is it included among those agencies which one normally would place upon an organization chart for British central economic planning.

The fact is that, as Mr. Bartlett suggests, I was not surprised. One who appreciates the deep differences between responsible government, in which the Cabinet is a committee of Parliament and the whole executive merely an extension of the House of Commons, and our own tripartite form, in which the branches are supposed to check each other and do actually interfere with each other continuously and effectively, would not be either surprised or sad. The Ministry of Town and Country Planning is an agency of a specialized sort, another organ, not the institutional mind of the British Government. The British have fallen naturally into a merger of mind and over-all executive controls; and they will doubtless go on developing that way. We would find another way more appropriate, perhaps necessary. NRA had some characteristics the British would understand; it was rejected here fundamentally because it did blur the separation of powers: it was "delegation run riot." Unless executive and legislative in our system develop a wholly new entente, planning cannot develop as cen-

tral planning except as another independent agency.

Yet our governmental separation is undoubtedly anachronistic. All the developmental forces of technology are working for interpenetration, mutual influence, extended webs of relationship. And it is exactly as true to say of us as of Britain that governmental and industrial policies so affect each other that separation is impossible. A government cannot exist which does not accept responsibility for the social results of industry: unemployment, inflation, maldistributions of income—these are only a few of the politically potent results of laissez faire which are thrust into political discussions with or without the consent of politicians or officials.

Mr. Bartlett also transmits a copy of an address made by Mr. Morrison in November, 1947, at the Institute of Public Administration entitled "Government and Industry." As one reads it, the distinctions between American and British problems are seen to be extremely superficial. We have very different governments; we have contrasting public policies; but we have the same sort of economic problems to solve. Consider, for instance, this passage:

. . . I am convinced that there is no going back in these matters toward the conventions of Gladstone and Disraeli, but on the other hand I do not see the point of interfering in industry for the sake of interfering and I am worried about the risks of destroying the vigour and self-reliance of private enterprise.

Later on there are other passages which convey the same attitude:

. . . Economic efficiency and social utility must be the tests. I suggest that it is wrong to envisage government and industry as opposite interests one of which must push the other out. I think we are entering a period when *management* whether of privately owned or publicly owned industry is becoming more and more important, while at the same time the role of the State in relation to industry is becoming more important too. There is no incompatibility between the two. . . .

I think there is some parallel between this position of Ministers and the position of a manager of industry. In his own job and on his own ground he must take full responsibility, but he must take it within the framework of an acceptable relationship between the public interest and the interest of his

undertaking and with the help and guidance which will be given him . . . [by government].

In other words, industry can be free to operate within a framework of planning. And so long as government has any responsibility for unemployment, high cost of living, distribution of income, social security, and so on, how can it be otherwise? And if industries took over these responsibilities, somehow, jointly, that would be government. And the American situation in these respects does not differ from the British.

As Mr. Morrison explains it, or as we should practice it, this does not resemble the totalitarian horrors pictured by some of the more imaginative reactionaries.

V

THE worst offender among those who insist on confusing planning with something like the police state of Nazi or Fascist socialism; and one who attracted a large reactionary following, was, of course, Mr. Hayek.⁸ There is no need to dwell on his numerous offenses to clear thinking. They were adequately disposed of some time ago by Mr. Finer and Miss Wootton.⁹ But, as Mr. E. G. Nourse pointed out subsequently, neither substituted any very clear definition for the cloudy obscurantism of Mr. Hayek.¹⁰ They missed an opportunity which Mr. Nourse went some way to repair—as long a way as he could well go in a review. For the purpose he borrowed the terms "institutional" and "operational" from Mr. Lorwin.¹¹ "Institutional" planning, he thought, belonged properly to government. It was what was "universally conceded to or demanded of" government. As for "operational" planning: here, he said, governmental planning broke down into three parts, "financial," "plant," and "managerial"—and this was the area of genuine controversy. It was to be looked at realistically. "Government may, without 'taking

⁸ Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (University of Chicago Press, 1944).

⁹ Herman Finer, *Road to Reaction* (Atlantic Monthly Press, 1945) and Barbara Wootton, *Freedom Under Planning* (University of North Carolina Press, 1945).

¹⁰ "Serfdom, Utopia, or Democratic Opportunity?" 6 *Public Administration Review* 177-87 (Spring, 1946).

¹¹ Lewis L. Lorwin, *Time for Planning* (Harper & Bros., 1945).

over private business' or 'invading' its field, do a great many things toward activating enterprises that remain private as to their operative management." He went on to speak of intervention in the flow of national income as one example and of the extension of government credit as another. And, even in the area of managerial direction, "the broad outlook of centralized government policy is necessary to complement the more particularized outlooks of the several branches of private business, and even complementary activation is at crucial times and in strategic places needed to promote full resource use."

We do not have to adopt the terms or even the categories used by Mr. Nourse to understand that he was doing some rigorous thinking. To begin with, he separated in his mind, as Mr. Hayek, Mr. Finer, and Miss Wootton did not, "planfulness by government from scope of governmental action" and both of these from "implementation or execution of plans." And he was, consequently, equipped with a clearer concept to begin with.

If it is wondered why this blurring of concept is so generally true of those who write mostly from British experience, the suggestion may be ventured that it is because the British have characteristically blended their planning and executing mechanisms until they are actually indistinguishable. Perhaps that is how it would always be in any organism where the "institutional mind" possessed the logical integration and back-and-forth relationships with all the executing organs; yet, just as in the human organism the mind has at least a locus, so it is possible, I think, to distinguish the agency of institutional thought in the social organism. And, I believe, something is gained by holding on to this concept. Sir Oliver Franks does not quite make this distinction but he comes close when he says of the change from war to peace: "I think the essential elements are plans consisting of decisions of policy quantitatively expressed in the form of programmes and such measures as in particular circumstances may be necessary to ensure the performance of these programmes." (p. 17.)

No one, however, seems to me to have approached, so far, the comprehensiveness, and at the same time the conciseness, of the defini-

tion ventured by Mr. H. S. Person in a little-publicized address several years ago to the National Planning Association. It was never printed; and because it seems to me to supply that definition without which we may expect further blind ventures and beside-the-point discussions, I am constrained to quote it in full.

. . . Let us, with a large perspective, identify planning as the function of determining and defining the major and component objectives of an enterprise; discovering and evaluating factors conditioning their achievement; measuring and appraising the facilities available for achievement; and formulating the specifications of a series of predetermined executing acts that will effect achievement with maximum precision and a minimum expenditure of the energies utilized.

Used by those who are discussing planning in business enterprise or in public affairs the term planning has the technical meaning given to it by engineering and industry. Engineers in large-scale construction operations and managers of large-scale business enterprises have learned that a condition of success is a precise, coordinated, economical management of operations and that this condition can be met only by the creating of an institutional mind which has its power of perception in investigation and research, of memory in its records, of reasoning in its many-sided analyses, and of design in working out the specifications of a plan. Such an institutional mind is a composite of, yet is distinct from, the minds of the individuals of which it is composed, who as individuals may come and go. It has a continuing life coincident with the life of the enterprise. It can think and arrange affairs with the large perspective made possible only by such characteristics.

This capacity to think in terms of experience larger than that which comes to any individual, to define distant goals that are rational in terms of long-run controlling factors in the situation, to arrange highly efficient ways and means of attaining them, and to pursue these distant ends consistently, yet with a flexibility which permits adjustment to changing conditions; this many-sided ability is the dominant characteristic of institutional planning.¹²

If others are struck, as I have been struck, with the accuracy of the analogy Mr. Person

uses for definition, and wonder at its genesis, I would remind them of Mr. Person's long experience not only as an engineer but as the activating force in the Taylor Society. Planning has long been tortured into shapes congenial to those who will accept it if it promises not to interfere with their prerogatives; Mr. Person's definition is one worthy of Taylor himself in those early days when he was telling industrialists that their rule-of-thumb was an infantile and ruinous way of managing industry. There was, he said, a one-best-way and it could be discovered and applied if first there existed the honest will to do so. Planning is no more than scientific appraisal of resources and energies and evolution of a one-best-way which is embodied in a development plan and budget, together with an outline of ways to proceed. And the closer we keep to the rigorous concept of a social intelligence, unswayed by the blurrings and contortions of appeasement, the better off we shall be.

VI

DISCUSSIONS such as Mr. Millett offers us have their value even if it is largely negative. His book came out of a Washington experience which evidently was not a happy one—as whose, for that matter, ever is? He bites on the National Resources Planning Board repeatedly, as a sore tooth might be bitten on, without accomplishing more than exacerbation of the irritation. It is true that the career of the National Resources Planning Board was in many ways tragic; but the tragedy may well not have been the one conceived by Mr. Millett. That is to say, the board may not have been, as he suggests, cut off by the Congress in 1943 because all its reports were infused with intimations of government intervention; it may have been rather because the board, like some other New Deal and wartime agencies, made the Executive more effective. And this is something which it is just not in the nature of the Congress to tolerate. No one can say with finality that the motive I suggest is the right one; but to me, at least, it seems a more reasonable explanation of the malicious vigor with which the liquidation was carried out.

The National Resources Planning Board, as Mr. Millett himself acknowledges (p. 57), turned out essentially research reports. In

¹²This was not the first use of the locution "institutional mind." That, I am told by Mr. Person, was in *Report of the Mississippi Valley Committee of the Public Works Administration*, Book III, Section II, "Planning" (Government Printing Office, 1934), p. 222.

terms of rigorous definition it was not a planning body at all; its activities might more accurately be called "pre-planning." It was not an agency for conjuncture. And its reports were not intended to be put to the uses of central planning, but were rather intended to enhance the power and prestige of the President as the center and the manipulator of our governmental system.

This, also, Mr. Millett recognizes. The last paragraphs of his book are devoted to it:

As our federal government has expanded its work, we have long looked to the President to become in fact a "general manager" of that work. The present concern with national planning does not for one moment seek to alter that continuing trend. . . .

National planning is synonymous with Presidential management. The success which it achieves in preventing conflicting government activity and in realizing "maximum employment, production and purchasing power" depends upon the President. Yet central planning is a technical job which needs institutional recognition. The President needs to be informed of programs, their volume, timing, and effect. His must be the final decision about action. Planning as an organizational problem must be judged by how well the President is served (p. 180).

This is the framework for his criticism of the National Resources Planning Board. And he thinks that, measured by the opportunity, a poor job was done—so much so that finally the President paid but little attention to the board's work and certainly was not guided by its results. This is undoubtedly calculated to annoy the former members of the National Resources Planning Board and its staff. But it is a doubtful contribution to the theory of planning. Presidential advisers in the future may read his cautionary remarks for guidance, but future central planners will find them more or less irrelevant. For planning tied exclusively to the Chief Executive will never become central planning in any defensible definition of the term, and its effectiveness ought not to be judged by its "advice" any more than by its success in staying within the prejudice-range of congressmen.

VII

AT THIS point it seems relevant to point out the modifications evolved in the latest experimental approach to governmental plan-

ning. These efforts will undoubtedly succeed each other until the logical need for central planning is met; the present one is an advance over the National Resources Planning Board but it still does not, if prophesy may be ventured, possess very great survival value. And for the same reason. It is still vulnerable to its natural enemies and possesses no strength of its own. It is embodied in the Employment Act of 1946.¹³

Neither in its title nor anywhere in its text does this measure mention planning as a function to be carried out by the executive agency it establishes or by the joint committee of House and Senate it sets up. In the declaration of policy, plans are mentioned along with functions and resources as needing to be coordinated,¹⁴ but the act is tied to the prevalent negative fear of unemployment rather than to any positive hope for national progress. And, if the promotion of "free competitive enterprise" means what it seems to mean in the declaration of policy, it is also tied to a set of wholly contradictory aims. For "plans, functions, and resources" of industry, agriculture, and labor, as well as government, cannot be "coordinated and utilized" in a complete and literally free and competitive system of enterprise. This is a contradiction of terms. Either we are to have automatism and are really to "restore" freedom,¹⁵ or we are to admit that we have not and cannot have such a system and proceed to shape what we do have—which is very much mixed privately-and-publicly

¹³ Public Law 304, 79th Cong., 2d sess. "An Act to declare a national policy on employment, production, and purchasing power, and for other purposes."

¹⁴ Section 2 reads as follows:

"The Congress hereby declares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obligations and other essential considerations of national policy, with the assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, labor, and State and local governments, to coordinate and utilize all its plans, functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful employment opportunities, including self-employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote maximum employment, production, and purchasing power."

¹⁵ Even such a "restoration" would be found to involve extensive intervention, paradoxical as it may seem.

managed and regulated industry and commerce—more reflectively and systematically in the public interest.

The policy statement of the Employment Act is, in fact, a remarkable compendium of present-day confusions, fears, dissimulations, hypocrisies, contradictions and paradoxes. It is declared to be the purpose to bring order out of chaos without disturbing anyone's profitable bit of chaos; to promote the public welfare without disturbing anyone who is forthrightly engaged in exploiting the public; and to coordinate institutions which exist largely because they are not coordinated. Of course, we Americans are neither so confused nor so prejudiced as all this sounds. We would like to keep what we can of a technique which, although it is exploitative, yields the invaluable release of human energy which drives our industrial machine; even the most prejudiced of us see that there are wastes and duplications in all this and are willing to go some way toward their elimination—how far, not many of us have evidently decided for ourselves. Hence the apparent inability to be decisive and clear.

The truth is that no one is expected to take such a policy statement seriously. As with most of our social machinery, we expect a great deal to be determined about this device as it goes along; we shall see how it works and how it is accepted. Then we shall emphasize the phrase of the policy clause which permits coordination; or we shall point to that which declares so soundly for the promotion of "free competitive enterprise."

Much more significant is the fact that we are tentatively but persistently feeling toward an acceptable agency of conjuncture. The act sets up a council which has responsibilities to both the executive and the legislative branches, and this is an experiment we hitherto have not tried. Planning as an adjunct of the presidential office was killed.¹⁶ The Congress has never

even tried to do any planning; but it has always resented the power it gives the Executive to be so equipped. Now we shall see whether the two together can accomplish anything.

It is not too soon, I think, to guess that this device may not work. The act not only provided for a small agency under the President, a "Council of Economic Advisers," but it required of the President that he report to the Congress on future possibilities and plans; and it set up a joint committee of the House and Senate "on the Report." The idea was that out of this common concern for the future would come a presumably nonpartisan, legislative-executive economic and social policy to be implemented by legislation and carried out by the President. We have the word of one of the congressional committee members, perhaps the one most concerned that something of value shall be developed, that the council is not operating as contemplated.¹⁷

It appears that Mr. Nourse, appointed to be chairman of the Council of Advisers, found himself in a wholly impossible position; in the pull and haul of party politics he was caught between a President who intended to be a second-term candidate, and a Senator, as chairman of the Committee on the Economic Report, who regarded himself as a probable opposing candidate. The nation was in crisis; there were recriminations centering in the very field where the Council of Advisers must function. How could they be advisers to both President Truman and Senator Taft who were determined to develop wholly opposing policies? Mr. Nourse, being a man of sense, in effect withdrew from the congressional relationship and chose to be President's man. But it is quite obvious, as the joint committee begins to build up its case, that it will be a case rather than a development plan, and that it would always be that under such an arrangement. When this experiment is finally liquidated, we are likely

¹⁶This is not quite true: The National Resources Planning Board went; so did the Office of Economic Stabilization and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion; so did the War Production Board; but the Bureau of the Budget has survived since 1921. Of course, the Congress has never really accepted it. We do not, in the same sense as other nations do, have an executive budget. The Congress continues to duplicate much of the work of the Budget Bureau in making the

annual estimates and still writes its own budget instead of accepting or rejecting that of the Executive. Ours is the last government in the world to give up this dangerous and confusing procedure. But it has to be said that the President has been allowed to keep the bureau, however little it is respected by the Congress.

¹⁷This is Senator Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont, writing in *7 Public Administration Review* 221-27 (Autumn, 1947) under the title: "Administering the Employment Act—The First Year."

to have another negative experience to record. But we are not likely to be much further advanced in the development of central planning.

VIII

It is impossible not to point out how much more sensible and forthright the approach has been in Britain. Instead of all the nervous dissimulation, the trying of one timid experiment after another, which characterizes our attempts, the British have made and are making a bold, logical, and brave attempt to assess their resources and talents, to assort them for their best uses, to allocate resources and energies, to suppress unnecessary and competing efforts, to distribute sacrifices and goods with equal fairness, and to achieve, finally, national reconstruction. They have given up automatism as hopeless, and this is as true of Tory as of Laborite, who differ only in the degree and kind of controls thought to be appropriate in achieving what has been and is being agreed on as desirable. It is interesting that what is still a heated controversy in the United States, involving absolute values, has become in Britain a far more productive argument having to do with the utility of each contemplated step. Sir Oliver Franks is no convinced advocate of any ism. He was, in fact, drawn into the government service from outside—he is Provost of Queen's College, Oxford—and his views have been developed directly out of that service. When he speaks of what Britain must do, he speaks from the heart and from experience but not from theoretical commitment.

His feeling that a development plan envisaging the future is necessary, even if it has to be in the most general terms, is a direct negation of Mr. Millett's view that such policy determinations come from the executive or the legislature and are handed down to the planners. As a matter of fact, any such plan, which is genuinely operative, whether it be British or American, must have been the product of processes which are now beginning to be in themselves orthodox. The plan must have been developed by technicians who have first projected tendencies and trends into the future from the past; these must have been shaped into what is both possible and desirable by reflection, argument, compromise, policy determination, hearing,

modification, rearing, and final agreement of executive and legislature. This plan then becomes a not undemocratic directive for so many organs of the larger social organism as are vital to its general functioning—public or private. And since there will be check on faithfulness in compliance, eventually the kind of direction determined to be necessary for that particular organ will be adopted—or, if necessary, the organ will be brought more closely into the public ambient in a degree determined by necessity but not by morals.

This is central planning and it became inevitable when the techniques of social analysis and synthesis had advanced to the point at which a monistic conception of the future began to emerge as a possibility. The development plan is, in a way, the correspondent in social science of the unifying equations in natural science which are just now having such momentous results. That in the long run each social organism will discover the logic and utility of centering the administration of conjuncture in an agency of some sort seems as inevitable as that, in the processes of evolution, individual animals developed directing ganglia in a recognizable anterior with a higher metabolic rate and directing functions. Those organisms which do so will survive and get ahead in social evolution. Those which do not, or which do so ineffectually or slowly, will recede into insignificance.

The biologist has a special interest in borderline cases in animal organisms—such, for instance, as the starfish. So poorly specialized are the anterior directing ganglia of this animal that as an individual it cannot decide and carry out a line of action in which all the parts join the whole. Often an agitated starfish will leave parts of itself, detached because of opposition to the policy of the whole, as it progresses in response to stimulation across the glass of an aquarium. *Laissez faire* economies become more and more like the starfish; their moribund parts, torn from the whole because of moral dissent or inability to cooperate, are lying all about the economy today. Britain is rapidly developing an institutional mind and gathering purposive strength; the United States lingers, unfortunately, some way behind, still debating the wickedness of the inevitable.

A Closer View of Organization

By Fritz Morstein Marx, U. S. Bureau of the Budget

ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, by HERBERT A. SIMON. Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. xvi, 259. \$4.00.

I

CHESTER I. BARNARD, in his foreword to this book, draws our attention to the varieties of experience that lead to knowledge of organization. He speaks of three main levels of understanding, related to one another as a progression from the particular to the general, but each valuable for its specific insights. The primary level is one of greatest immediacy, typified by the individual's personal though limited share in the life of an organization. In order to comprehend the individuality of the organization as a whole we must ascend to another level—that of familiarity gained by observation from different strategic vantage points within. The third level, high above the two others, provides sufficient elevation for the generic consideration of organization. Here the particular shrinks into an expression of the general. This is the level on which Professor Simon proceeds in his investigation of administrative behavior.

Some readers may be convinced that in such heights of abstraction the air must be too thin for comfort. I can sympathize with this sentiment. It reminds me of the anguished reaction of a man from the plains who looked for the first time at the towering peaks of the Teton range. With a scowl for my rock-climbing companions he grumbled: "These mountains are much too high, and there's no sense in doing things the hard way." Yet altitude gives not only depth of perspective but also freedom of view—part of the freedom alluded to in West Virginia's official seal: "*Montani semper liberi.*" Hence we have persuasive reasons for following Professor Simon on his lofty venture. And even the hesitant may take heart at seeing so trusted a guide as Mr. Barnard nod vigorous encouragement. Indeed, Mr. Barnard suggests that excursions of this kind may furnish a firm foundation for his "belief that ab-

stract principles of structure may be discerned in organizations of great variety, and that ultimately it may be possible to state principles of general organization."

It will hardly occasion surprise that Professor Simon is far from dashing forth with any such general theory of his own making. As he says himself, "except for a few dicta offered by way of hypothesis, no principles of administration are laid down. If any 'theory' is involved, it is that decision-making is the heart of administration, and that the vocabulary of administrative theory must be derived from the logic and psychology of human choice." What he has attempted to do, then, is both more modest and less neck-breaking. He has seen his task in the construction of such a "vocabulary"—a set of working concepts suitable for a more precise description of administrative organization. But his book is not simply a glossary of relevant terms, or a mere frame of reference built upon carefully defined meanings. Professor Simon also tries to demonstrate how much a presentation of administrative knowledge gains in clarity and realism when based upon a terminology appropriate to the subject. Thus his efforts necessarily link up with the quest for a general theory, as an essential first step toward a still remote objective.

The general approach reflected in this study, though distinguished by freshness and independence of thought, has much in common with the broader tendencies that manifest themselves today in the analysis of administration. The point of departure is in current drifts of methodology and reflection. In the words of the author,

. . . If we study the chain of publications extending from Mooney and Reiley through Gulick, the President's Committee controversy, to Schuyler Wallace and Benson, we see a steady shift of emphasis from the "principles of administration" themselves to a study of the *conditions* under which competing principles are respectively applicable. We no longer say that organization should be by purpose, but rather that under such and such conditions purpose organization is desirable, but under such and such other conditions, process organization

is desirable. It is the central thesis of this study that an understanding of these underlying conditions for the applicability of administrative principles is to be obtained from an analysis of the administrative process in terms of decisions.

If this approach be taken, the rationality of decisions—that is, their appropriateness for the accomplishment of specified goals—becomes the central concern of administrative theory (p. 240).

Of course, such rationality does not merely consummate itself in each specific act of deciding. It must merge with the whole complex of relationships that make up formal structures of cooperative endeavor. We are being reminded quite properly

. . . that the administrative organization implies purposive behavior on the part of its participants. Hence the expectations of these participants will be a factor in determining their behavior. Further, part of their expectations will involve expectations as to the behavior of other members of the administrative organization (p. 252).

To achieve a climate of rationality appropriate to its ends is an integral purpose of all organization. It is therefore one of the foremost tasks of scientific inquiry to ascertain the factors that in their interplay control the development of this climate. We have learned to appreciate that quack prescriptions or quick treatments won't do. What is now needed is painstaking scrutiny of a great many variables with the help of refined techniques of investigation. No one will differ with Professor Simon when he declares:

. . . A valid approach to the study of administration requires that *all* the relevant diagnostic criteria be identified; that each administrative situation be analyzed in terms of the entire set of criteria; and that research be instituted to determine how weights can be assigned to the several criteria when they are, as they usually will be, mutually incompatible (p. 36).

II

BECAUSE his concern is with the rationality of decision-making in administrative organization, Professor Simon must devote much of his analytical skill to marking out the areas where objectivity appears attainable. This involves a laborious exercise in differentiation. Not only is it necessary to trace the precarious borderline that separates the objective and the

subjective, but there are also the related distinctions between fact and value and between empirical and ethical elements. It is one of the author's basic assumptions that the factual alone lends itself to scientific verification. In his own summary,

. . . To determine whether a proposition is correct, it must be compared directly with experience—with the facts—or it must lead by logical reasoning to other propositions that can be compared with experience. But factual propositions cannot be derived from ethical ones by any process of reasoning, nor can ethical propositions be compared directly with the facts—since they assert "oughts" rather than facts. Hence, there is no way in which the correctness of ethical propositions can be empirically or rationally tested (p. 46).

Or, expressed still more sharply,

The position to which the methodological assumptions of the present study lead us is this: The process of validating a factual proposition is quite distinct from the process of validating a value judgment. The former is validated by its agreement with the facts, the latter by human fiat (p. 56).

Even a categorical exclusion of value judgments would still leave us with our hands full. Common experience shows that propositions susceptible of validation on the basis of facts can be isolated throughout the whole range of the administrative process. They enter the picture with considerable persistency in policy planning and program development. They certainly occur no less often in the sphere of management in the more specific sense, especially in determining and appraising the utilization of resources to obtain the greatest return. Efficiency, thus defined, requires for its accomplishment a great deal of exact probing into the relation between effort and result.

Much of what Professor Simon has to say about the role of rationality in administration is pointed toward his concept of efficiency. He lays particular stress on standards of quantity and quality to provide objective guidance in allocating the resources of an organization to particular goals. To quote again,

It follows from the considerations which have been advanced that that portion of the decision-making process which is factual, which is amenable to scientific treatment, resolves itself into the determination of the production functions of adminis-

trative activities. This is a research task of the first magnitude, and one which as yet has hardly been touched (p. 188).

Few readers are likely to deny the need for greater accuracy in judging administrative performance. But many may find it rather hard to equal the author in keeping apart value and fact. Some will even consider the division artificial and fruitless, without being in the least inclined to shrug off the scientific approach. Was it not Durkheim who gave a whole chapter of his *Rules of Sociological Method* to figuring just what a social fact might be? And besides being pretty slippery things, facts, it has been asserted, "have no meaning except the meaning attached to them by a mind."¹ Perhaps, therefore, we should not read too much rigidity into the fact-value scheme, or fuss too long over Professor Simon's methodological school-tie.²

Moreover, having been ousted ceremoniously through the front door, the element of value soon comes back quietly through the side entrance. This happens, indeed, in response to the unblushing beckoning of the author himself. Says he very pertinently of the influence on administration of the wider social context,

When it is recognized that actual decisions must take place in some such institutional setting, it can be seen that the "correctness" of any particular decision may be judged from two different standpoints. In the broader sense it is "correct" if it is consistent with the general social value scale—if the consequences are socially desirable. In the narrower sense, it is "correct" if it is consistent with the frame of reference that has been organizationally assigned to the decider (p. 199).

Between these two value scales—that of the social order and that of a particular organization—there has to be a high degree of harmony, at least when the organization is designed to function as an agent of the social order. In

¹ Alexander Goldenweiser, *Robots or Gods* (Knopf, 1931), p. 86.

² Actually the author does not commit himself body and soul to any single school. It is very much to his credit to have buttressed his study with pertinent references drawn from various disciplines ranging from logic to psychology. But readers might have welcomed a fuller recognition of publications that have come out during more recent years. Many of the author's references give the book a dated appearance.

large part, then, the formulation of organizational aims is a derivative act. The general frame of social values occupies a position of primacy, inviting or even enforcing fundamental conformity. For practical purposes, however, fundamental conformity must be made articulate in specific terms. One cannot accuse Professor Simon of unwarranted overstatement when he puts the point strongly:

This is the basic task of administration—to provide each "operative" employee with an environment of decision of such a kind that behavior which is rational from the standpoint of this environment is also rational from the standpoint of the group values and the group situation (p. 243).

One corollary of such value orientation is that no individual function may legitimately withdraw into itself, staying aloof from the implications of broader social purpose. The author therefore has little patience with a narrow view of responsibility, especially with an attitude of indifference toward all but the most direct effects of administrative action.³ To this attitude he is quick to

. . . oppose the contrary opinion that the administrator, serving a public agency in a democratic state, must give a proper weight to *all* community values that are relevant to his activity, and that are reasonably ascertainable in relation thereto, and

³ Of course, the ripples of cause and effect may elude the untrained eye. As an illustration of "devious consequences" that "must of necessity be ignored" in the making of decisions, the author tells us that there is "a story to the effect that a statistician once found a very high correlation between the number of old maids and the size of the clover crop in different English counties. After puzzling over this relation for some time, he was able to trace what appeared to him to be the causal chain. Old maids, it appeared, kept cats; and cats ate mice. Field mice, however, were natural enemies of bumblebees, and these latter were, in turn, the chief agents in fertilizing the flowers of the clover plants. The implication, of course, is that the British Parliament should never legislate on the subject of marriage bonuses without first evaluating the effect upon the clover crop of reducing the spinster population" (p. 82). Who would suspect that this "story" is actually taken from the pages of Charles Darwin's *Origin of Species*? However, Darwin left the old maids out of the picture, and, though citing reputable authority of his day, wisely preferred conjecture to conclusion, pronouncing the inference of a cat-clover nexus merely "quite credible." For a reexamination of the proposition, see W. L. McAtee, "The Cats-to-Clover Chain," 65 *Scientific Monthly* 241 ff. (1947).

cannot restrict himself to values that happen to be his particular responsibility (p. 186).

Considerations like these place into focus the important problem of value relationships—clearly a field of examination germane to the study of administration. As soon as the order of values is acknowledged as a fit object of scientific inquiry we need no longer fear to get lost in an arid empiricism.⁴ Nor are we apt to find ourselves ultimately in the blind alley of a meaningless objectivity.⁵ But to this point I shall return later.

III

THE climate of rationality that should pervade all parts of an administrative organization, needless to say, would not automatically bar error in determinations. However, it would operate as a directive force, as a continuing pull toward the kind of action indicated in the institutional commitments of the organization. Professor Simon seems to go still a step further by explaining:

Once the system of values which is to govern an administrative choice has been specified, there is one and only one "best" decision, and this decision is determined by the organizational values and situation, and not by the personal motives of the member of the organization who makes the decision (p. 204).

We may leave aside entirely the magic by which a single best decision might cause all competing alternatives to vanish. Nevertheless it is quite obvious that the intellectual and moral agreements embodied in an organization ordinarily have a demonstrable bearing on the conduct of its members. It is these agreements that give the organization its spine and its vitality. Realistically speaking, there-

⁴ It deserves mention that the author's exposition has benefited throughout from an interspersing of helpful examples culled for the most part from different governmental jurisdictions. Perhaps these examples could have shown greater diversity. In one instance, a word-by-word repetition of the same exhibit (pp. 9-10 and 139) has sneaked into print.

⁵ As a student of the scientific approach has expressed it with respect to the difference between Bacon and Comte, "If the Baconian method of observation should bring complete objectivity, that objectivity would, in Comtean terms, come as near to idiocy as perfect subjectivity would to madness." Austin L. Porterfield, *Creative Factors in Scientific Research* (Durham, N. C., Duke University Press, 1941), p. 122.

fore, the structure of an organization is for the most part nothing but its doctrine—what its members think of the organization, how they see it, how far they identify themselves with its institutional aspirations. One important aspect of the connection between formal structure and cooperative understandings is brought to light in Professor Simon's shrewd comment:

Since the administrative theory is concerned with control of the nonrational, it follows that, the larger the area of rationality, the less important is the administrative organization (p. 244).

From this angle it is not astonishing that the author shows himself altogether unwilling to accord hierarchy authoritarian privileges. Although alive to the legal significance of authority, he rightly insists that the juridical concept is of limited value either as source or as sanction of rationality. He prefers a slant that conveys a good measure of relativity:

The relationship of authority can be defined . . . in purely objective and behavioristic terms. It involves behaviors on the part of both superior and subordinate. When, and only when, these behaviors occur does a relation of authority exist between the two persons involved. When the behaviors do not occur there is no authority, whatever may be the "paper" theory of organization (p. 125).

Recognition of the two poles in the relationship of authority introduces a factor of balance, usually overlooked in discussions of management. But the factor of balance does not carry with it the connotation of perpetual bargaining for relative strength. To be sure, an obscure type of negotiation—and sometimes explicit bickering—is likely to come about between superior and subordinate when changing conditions affect their respective spheres. Apart from such changes, however, the relationship of authority suggests a difference in reciprocal expectancies. Professor Simon has a good phrase for it:

The most striking characteristic of the "subordinate" role is that it establishes an area of acceptance in behavior within which the subordinate is willing to accept the decisions made for him by his superior (p. 133).

And here we come back again to the main theme. Of the factors that govern the scope of the subordinate's area of acceptance, none

stands out more conspicuously than the degree of rationality that prevails within the administrative organization. Conversely, authority meets acceptance most readily when it makes itself the voice of reason, when it reigns in alliance with objectivity of judgment. Where there is no climate of rationality, compliance with regulations and instructions may reduce itself to a solemn ritual of formalities or a candid game of "getting by," while authority turns melodramatic and pretentious.

In the nature of things, therefore, authority can ill afford to break away from its essential mandate, which is to give continuous and specific expression to the large consensus on values and facts compounded into the institutional purpose. As a consequence, authority has much to gain and nothing to lose by seeking widest participation in sustaining and construing this consensus. The more intelligibly authority speaks the collective mind of the whole organization, the less likely it is to repel by coercion.

How often does the exercise of authority in administrative organization approximate the one or the other alternative? We have no statistics to support an answer. It is cheering, however, to notice that an exceptionally well informed man of practical affairs like Mr. Barnard is willing to offer a guess. He thinks most people who talk about organization are clumsy with their words. We should therefore always bear in mind, he counsels,

that behavior is often inconsistent with the language used to describe it. . . . I believe that in most good organizations administrative behavior is consonant with the theory of authority as set forth by Professor Simon; but principles of authority as expressed in such organizations are usually rather legalistic and not consistent with the behavior (p. xi).

IV

THE preceding remarks may be adequate to indicate some of the main strands of analysis that run through this closely reasoned book. Its contribution to the "social science of formal organization and administration," as Mr. Barnard puts it, should be evident. Like any work of substance, it has illuminating effects even where it arouses mental reservations and more than casual doubts. The reviewer's

jottings on this score suffer from brevity and hardly suffice to outline an argument. But they may be presented as a list of propositions that arise in the wake of Professor Simon's thought.

In the first place, while the scientific approach is equally indispensable in the study and in the practice of management, the concept of rationality, employed as the pivot of decision-making in administrative organization, may divert attention from the nonrational and the irrational in their influence on formal structures of cooperation. These are areas of vast significance, and by no means inaccessible to systematic study.⁶ Behavior in such formal structures is the product of a diversity of influences. The compulsion of rationality is but one of them.

Second, Professor Simon makes it plain that he is eager to supply the bricks and straws from which one might one day erect a general theory of administration. I find it easy to see the common features of public and private management, but it seems to me that the nonrational factors that impinge on each are different in many ways. For one thing, the frame of values pertinent to public administration is more closely related to the fundamental theories that impress their characteristics on the political order. This is the reason why I think John Gaus is right when he urges the student of public management to accept the guidance of a "clearer theory of government."⁷ The point is not that private management is unaffected by the scheme of political values or the forces of politics. But its private character reserves for ordinary business organizations a high degree of immunity. The ethics of public office are not identical with the ethics of pri-

⁶ The conceivable variety of approach may be illustrated by reference to Max Weber's investigation of bureaucracy, now available also in the English edition of his essays by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford University Press, 1946); Charles-Jean Bonnin, *Principes d'Administration Publique* (3d ed., 3 vols., Paris, Renaudière, 1912), which Leonard D. White has recently restored to our recollection (see 5 *Public Administration Review* 271-74, 1945); Marshall E. Dimok and Howard K. Hyde, *Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations* (Government Printing Office, 1940); and J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy: An Interpretation of the British Civil Service* (Yellow Springs, Antioch Press, 1944).

⁷ *Reflections on Public Administration* (University of Alabama Press, 1947), p. 149.

vate enterprise. A general theory of administration must remain mindful of this distinction. On the other hand, students of public management too seldom have directed their attention to the crucial problems of administrative morality. Here is a field that begs for exploration.

Third, there is a related point that justifies separate statement. The most elementary measure of success for public administration is not so much a showing of efficiency in terms of measurable components of productivity as, rather, an assurance that the total flow of determinations reflects the general interest. This is a synthesizing task with great creative potentialities. The guarantees of status that surround the public service are not intended to operate merely as occupational inducements. Such guarantees are designed to equip governmental bodies for an independent examination of competing interests with an eye to evolving solutions that come as near as possible to a recognition of the common good. Specialized knowledge, exempt from the immediate claims of partisanship, is brought to bear on the conflicting contentions of pleading groups. One of the most pressing needs of public administration is to reenforce its dedi-

cation to its primary political role as an agency of unity and justice.

And fourth, if this be true, it may appear unlikely that a pure science of administration will emerge soon, if in fact there is a case for it. Readers of this *Review* remember that Professor Simon in a recent paper tried to ascertain the respective purposes of a pure and an applied science.⁸ He proposed that

a pure science of administration would attempt to answer such questions as: "What factors determine the degree of efficiency achieved by an organization?" "Under what circumstances is public responsibility secured in a governmental agency?" The answers to these questions do not depend upon the value system of the inquirer.

An applied science of administration would attempt to use the system of empirical propositions established by the pure science to work out an implementation for any particular (complete) system of values.

But, viewed in political terms, how can such concepts as efficiency and responsibility fail to absorb value judgments? One is hence left with the suspicion that the purer a science of administration, the less will it be socially relevant. Perhaps I am all wrong. Yet at the very least the proposition strikes me as far from being settled.

Fielder's Choice

By John D. Millett, Columbia University

METHODS AND APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING FIELD COORDINATION WITHIN THE FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, A REPORT BY A SURVEY COMMITTEE. Unpublished.

THE FEDERAL FIELD SERVICE: AN ANALYSIS WITH SUGGESTIONS FOR RESEARCH, by EARL LATHAM and others, Public Administration Service, 1947. Pp. 70. \$1.50.

FIELD ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR PRODUCTION BOARD AND PREDECESSOR AGENCIES, by CARROLL K. SHAW, Special Study No. 25 of the WPB Historical Reports on War Administration, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. 288.

FIELD ADMINISTRATION OF WARTIME RATIONING, by EMMETTE S. REDFORD, General Publication No. 4 of the OPA Historical Reports on War Administration, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. 196. \$0.40.

I

HERE are four very different kinds of publications, each concerned with the eternal organizational problem of field operations. Each in its own way reveals the infinite variation which may occur in organizational patterns. Three of these publications tell us about

⁸"A Comment on 'The Science of Public Administration,'" *7 Public Administration Review* 201 (1947).

experience in three distinct types of administrative agencies. They deserve special comment.

The report on field coordination within the Federal Security Administration well illustrates what I can only call in hackneyed words "the new realism" in organizational analysis. Some, I have no doubt, would find in it evidences of expediency. I prefer to think that the survey committee, consisting of Dean Snyder, Chairman, Elton Woolpert, and Harry Holland, in making this report had a fine perception for the bureau loyalties, accustomed modes of procedure, and other underlying complications which have sidetracked many an "improved" organization plan in the past.

The Federal Security Agency was created in 1939 by Reorganization Plan No. I. Subsequent reorganization plans in 1940 and 1945 added new units. The agency as thus created was one of the "holding company" devices for bringing various administrative bodies with some common purpose together under single administrative direction other than, but subordinate to, the President. The constituent elements, such as the Public Health Service, the Office of Education, the Social Security Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration, had their own field operating arrangements when they became a part of the FSA. Sooner or later, I should think, it was inevitable that the parent body should ask some questions about these field operations.

The survey committee was assigned "to study and appraise the possibilities of some form of field organization for the Federal Security Agency as a whole." But the committee quickly altered its terms of reference. It decided instead to study "methods and approaches for improving the coordination of constituent programs and activities in the field." Field organization thus became "only one of several means to the end of improved coordination." In addition, the committee saw that field coordination was part of a broader subject—the relationship of all constituent parts within the framework of the Federal Security Agency as a whole. Field operations had to be viewed, in the committee's eyes, in terms of their implications for headquarters organization as well.

Introducing its report, the committee makes

a confession which is of the very essence of this "new realism."

Early in the Committee's deliberations it became apparent that the answer to the problem of achieving effective field coordination could not be discovered by objective analysis alone. Rather, the Committee is convinced that, given the same set of facts, different persons will arrive at conflicting conclusions because of the differing subjective values which they assign to component factors.

The committee at once identifies "personal or institutional interests" as the basis of these "differing subjective values." The report suggests that the attitude of an individual toward a change in organizational pattern often depends upon his vantage point. "Thus the same official who sees obvious merit in arrangements to effect the coordination or even the outright consolidation of subordinate functions or units is often the most vigorous critic of establishing similar arrangements at some echelon higher than his own."

The committee then asks some embarrassing questions. Should the FSA be a "loose confederation of semi-independent constituents, or a closely-knit organization with central leadership and direction emanating from the Office of the Administrator?" Is there something in between? Second, if the FSA is to be more than a loose confederation, what are its objectives? Is its attention to be focused mainly on the formulation of policies and programs, on consistency in federal-state relations, or on efficiency of internal administration? And third, who bears the primary burden for inter-constituent coordination: the commissioners of the four major operating divisions of the agency or the bureau chiefs? Give us answers to these questions, says the committee in effect, and we will give you more definite answers about field structure.

With such an approach to its problem, the conclusions of the committee come as no surprise. First, the committee declares that "any Federal Security Agency field organization should be the product of progressive development." The committee report emphasizes that this development must be the product of joint effort by the Office of the Administrator and the constituent operating units, and that it must draw upon the experience and ideas of

field personnel as well. It appeals further for "open-mindedness" in exploring and evaluating organizational experiments.

Second, the report advocates that the first step toward coordination should be the correlation of regional boundaries and offices. It recommends not a common number of areas for all programs, but rather common boundaries for a varying number of areas. Thus, a Food and Drug district might have the same boundaries as three Public Health districts. Common headquarters cities would be used as far as could presently be arranged and justified. The report further urges the use of common buildings; it omits to mention the possibility of planning some future construction to achieve this end when federal public works are expanded.

In the third place, the report asks for the development and execution of agency-wide policies and programs. There can be no "over-all coordination," the committee insists, unless objectives are clarified. The report summarizes the possible objectives as it sees them: the promotion of internal administrative efficiency; greater attention to "customer" or clientele convenience; the prevention or resolution of inter-unit conflict; and the execution of general agency policies. The report then pleads for more constructive agency leadership in program development; at present the agency is an umpire of disputes or a restrictive force upon constituent desires. Neither promotes an agency viewpoint or agency loyalty. Some ideas as to what this agency leadership might consider are suggested. Leadership, not authority, is needed, says the committee. Accordingly, the report wants no regional FSA officers with authority over constituent programs. Rather, it seeks national coordination first; regional coordination would come more slowly and in pace with national program development. Certainly, there should be no "organized effort to improve field coordination" until headquarters is prepared positively to support that effort.

When it comes to specific action in the field, the survey committee outlines six "possible plans or patterns of field organization." These range from the existing situation to a completely regionalized FSA, with areas under a regional director embracing all phases of FSA

activities. In between are regional committee devices, under varying degrees of FSA sponsorship and direction. Five area boundary proposals are also presented, from no central control over the number and types of field organizations fixed by the constituent operating units to "standardized, coterminous regions" fixed by the FSA itself. The committee refuses to express its own preference, but the whole tone of the report is so conciliatory and experimental that obviously the committee itself does not favor the extremes of either set of alternatives.

II

BEFORE commenting further, let us look briefly at the other volumes under review. Mr. Shaw's lengthy account of field organization in the WPB focuses attention primarily upon two problems. The first was the constant struggle to set up and maintain an integrated field structure. The obstacles, or the villains, in this struggle were two. There were those in Washington who saw nothing for the field organization to do; they could and did centralize priority controls. The field enthusiasts were constantly in the position of trying to find something for the field offices to do. Then when a program with field needs did come along, such as that of the Smaller War Plants Corporation, the program head wanted his own separate field structure in order to "insure" the success of his effort. And in this instance he had his way. Second, the WPB was a long time in finding in Washington a workable point of supervision over the field offices. In the end, that point was the office of the chairman himself.

In telling his story Mr. Shaw's point of view is always Washington. The records he cites and quotes are memoranda coming in and going out of headquarters. How the field offices reacted we learn only as that information was passed on to Washington. He gives an extended discussion of his subject and no one will complain of lack of detail.

Professor Redford's account of OPA experience is both shorter and more comprehensive. He confines his subject to rationing; price control remains incidental. Here there was a different situation. The OPA had to decentralize if it was to ration. It had to deal with people

experience in three distinct types of administrative agencies. They deserve special comment.

The report on field coordination within the Federal Security Administration well illustrates what I can only call in hackneyed words "the new realism" in organizational analysis. Some, I have no doubt, would find in it evidences of expediency. I prefer to think that the survey committee, consisting of Dean Snyder, Chairman, Elton Woolpert, and Harry Holland, in making this report had a fine perception for the bureau loyalties, accustomed modes of procedure, and other underlying complications which have sidetracked many an "improved" organization plan in the past.

The Federal Security Agency was created in 1939 by Reorganization Plan No. I. Subsequent reorganization plans in 1940 and 1945 added new units. The agency as thus created was one of the "holding company" devices for bringing various administrative bodies with some common purpose together under single administrative direction other than, but subordinate to, the President. The constituent elements, such as the Public Health Service, the Office of Education, the Social Security Administration, and the Food and Drug Administration, had their own field operating arrangements when they became a part of the FSA. Sooner or later, I should think, it was inevitable that the parent body should ask some questions about these field operations.

The survey committee was assigned "to study and appraise the possibilities of some form of field organization for the Federal Security Agency as a whole." But the committee quickly altered its terms of reference. It decided instead to study "methods and approaches for improving the coordination of constituent programs and activities in the field." Field organization thus became "only one of several means to the end of improved coordination." In addition, the committee saw that field coordination was part of a broader subject—the relationship of all constituent parts within the framework of the Federal Security Agency as a whole. Field operations had to be viewed, in the committee's eyes, in terms of their implications for headquarters organization as well.

Introducing its report, the committee makes

a confession which is of the very essence of this "new realism."

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all over the nation, and the machinery devised had both to serve them and to satisfy them. This was no small order.

The OPA began by leaning heavily upon state assistance. Time probably permitted no other course, and Frank Bane personally greatly influenced the choice. Redford concludes that the distribution of war ration book I was generally well handled. But quickly the OPA moved to abandon a federal-state organizational pattern in favor of a nationalized field structure. Apparently this federal-state arrangement was never intended to be more than a temporary makeshift. As quickly as it could the OPA went about staffing its regional offices. On April 20, 1942, Leon Henderson informed the governors that while he intended to retain the states as administrative areas, he proposed to appoint state directors who would give full time to the OPA job and be responsible to him. He asked for recommendations of possible appointees. Between the autumn of 1942 and 1943 the "state" offices as such disappeared; the hierarchy now descended from the national office to regional offices, district offices, and local boards. In some instances district offices were the former state offices with only a changed designation.

The reasons for this changing organizational pattern are somewhat obscure. Redford reports that there were numerous complaints from Democratic members of Congress that rival political factions were obtaining federal jobs. Presumably, Henderson and the national office also had some doubts about the loyalty of the state-named administrators to the national rationing and price control program. The process of nationalization in any event brought personnel into OPA whom Redford describes as "unsympathetic." The author concludes: "Where there is doubt that the common purpose will exist in sufficient intensity, either as to program objectives or as to administrative techniques, the government responsible for results nationally will incur grave risks in delegating its responsibility to autonomous [i.e., state] authorities." (p. 28.)

The OPA confronted one problem similar to that of the WPB, and solved it much earlier. When Frank Bane retired in April, 1942, his recommendation that the field offices be placed under an executive director or general man-

ager for OPA was accepted. The senior deputy administrator became the link between the functional offices in Washington and the regional offices in the field.

"Administrative problem number one in field operations," Redford says, was defining lines of contact between field offices. From sheer necessity multiple lines of supervision developed at the beginning and continued throughout OPA's history. The OPA openly proclaimed "dual supervision." This seems to have been the major factor in preventing continued opposition in headquarters against an integrated field structure. A similar development in WPB might have prevented much grief.

One long chapter of Professor Redford's book describes the activities of the rationing division in the district office—trade relations, board supervision, contacts with other governmental agencies, the handling of appeals, and the operation of the specialized programs. Two chapters describe and evaluate the rationing work of the local boards. The author is both critical and laudatory. He thinks there was not enough OPA insistence upon disinterestedness as a qualification for local board membership. He concludes that the local boards were a "cross-section of American life," subject to personality, sectional, and opinion differences. He thinks the quota device as a limitation upon local board discretion proved a useful administrative tool.

Two chapters deal with "Communication and Control" as a formal means of channeling information, and with "Contacts with the Local Board" as the informal, personal means of supervision. Each is a valuable account of a major field organization problem. The discussion of work loads is suggestive but brief.

Altogether, Professor Redford's book is one of the most useful, valuable accounts of field organization problems in the literature of public administration.

In one sense, the research outline of Earl Latham and his associates is out of place in this company. It is a guide to the preparation of such studies as those of Shaw and Redford. It would be helpful, too, in the conduct of an organizational analysis such as that in the Federal Security Agency. There are, of course, points with which to quarrel. Why, for in-

stance, introduce two wholly new terms for organizational concepts when other terms have been previously proposed, first by Willoughby in 1927 and then by Macmahon and myself in 1941? At least the existence of these terms might be acknowledged. The point is trivial, but behind it lies a conflict in organizational history, if not in organizational theory. The outline, I believe, might well give more stress to the study of attempted reconciliations between the "rival claims of hierarchy and specialty." Have they ever been reconciled in an old established agency with a history of multiple field organization? Confronted currently with the threat of a legislative shotgun wedding, the Department of Agriculture for one would like to know something about that question.

I might quarrel with other terms and other points in the outline, such as omission of the term and concept of "regionalism" in the discussion of field areas. On the other hand, I cannot praise too highly the outline discussion of the problem of field communication.

III

WHAT I think is primarily impressive, however, is this. The survey report, the two organizational descriptions, and the research outline have an essential unity. They identify crucial issues of organization as it affects administrative behavior. They suggest patterns of stimulus and response.

The FSA is the holding company type of administrative agency, and it asks itself: if there is reason for coordination of these several op-

erating programs at the Washington level, what is happening in the field? But a theoretical concept of organizational efficiency cannot provide the answer. And the survey committee in its sophistication says so. The constituent units must be slowly and carefully won over to a new arrangement which cannot be prescribed but only evolved from experimentation subjectively evaluated. This is one pattern.

The WPB was an emergency, temporary agency without a long history. It built a field organization to provide information to business, and then to promote distribution of contracts. But these activities were tangential to the major emerging concern of the agency—the national division of economic resources among competing wartime claims. This task was performed centrally, and a field operation of substantial importance never entirely developed. This was a different pattern.

OPA had an immediate operating burden intimately and directly involving every single person in the United States. It, too, was an emergency, wartime agency without a prior history. It had divergent programs—rationing, price control, rent control—but it chose to establish an integrated field office structure. It then developed the ways to make that structure effective, through various means of communication and dual lines of supervision. Here is still a third pattern.

I wonder if there are not here the ingredients for some generalizations about field organization which will verify many of the hypotheses tentatively put forth by Latham and his associates.

Municipal Utilities Management

By William Sherman, Town of Greenwich, Connecticut

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL UTILITIES, by IRVING TENNER, Public Administration Service, 1947. Pp. xi, 152.

THIS book is concerned with the principles and procedures applicable to the financial administration of municipally owned utilities. The discussion of principles applies to municipal utilities generally; the discussion of finan-

cial procedures is more specifically directed toward municipal electric and water plants.

This work is a helpful addition to a surprisingly meager literature in this field, and is a welcome supplement to the material contained in a *Manual of Water Works Accounting*, published jointly in 1938 by the Municipal Finance Officers Association and the American

Water Works Association, in the preparation of which the author of the present volume participated. The present volume is not primarily a procedures manual, however. While it deals with procedures for budgeting, purchasing, inventory control, payrolls, general and cost accounting, and financial reporting, the treatment is more general and lacking in some of the detail that the more technical publication would provide.

The author also includes a discussion of financial organization and principles, presented in nontechnical language, which, together with the procedural discussions, should be of special assistance and value to those concerned with the management of utilities, particularly in small municipalities, as well as to the student of public administration and the general reader with an interest in this field.

The discussion of the various forms of organization which are possible for a municipal utility is rather disappointingly brief. While it is perhaps true that, as the author says, ". . . the form of organization is not so important as are the policies which it [a utility] adopts," the form of organization of a municipal utility often strongly affects its policies. In other words, we should not be surprised if "independent" boards tend to be independent—both in the formation of financial and other policies and in the financial procedures developed to carry out those policies. Naturally, such a course of action often results in a substantial lack of coordination between utility and over-all municipal fiscal policies and varying degrees of duplication of fiscal services. Mr. Tenner, of course, is well aware of the tendency in local government to take at face value the protestations of every special interest group that the activity which it is advocating as an essential *municipal* function (whether it be a utility or not) is not susceptible to either policy direction or management by the general municipal government because it is "different" and therefore requires different treatment from all other municipal activities. He cautions against this tendency in these words: "If one utility is already established, it might be well to have the same policy-forming body also act in that capacity for the new utility."

Today municipal governments, as well as

the states and the federal government to some degree, are performing business services in a number and variety undreamed of a few years ago. As the search for additional revenues to supplement the property tax goes on, as the demand of citizens for more and better services increases, the "municipal utility" is assuming a more and more important place in municipal government. Therefore, the impact of the financial policies and administration of these enterprises on over-all municipal policy and administration is becoming increasingly a matter of concern to the public generally, as well as to municipal officials. This being so, this reviewer would have been happy to see a considerably more exhaustive treatment of utility organization and financial policy than was possible in the few pages devoted to this subject.

The independent board form of organization has been widely accepted for the administration of municipal utility activities. It is natural perhaps that those who believe in "independence" also believe that this independence—called "freedom from political interference" in some quarters—is best maintained, and the efficient operation of a utility advanced, if the utility provides its own management services, such as budgeting, accounting, purchasing, and other elements of financial administration. Since the performance of central municipal staff services varies in efficiency, this argument has weight in some instances. The disadvantages of such a course, however—duplication of facilities, equipment, personnel, and effort—as well as the dangers (one specifically being the danger of lack of coordinated budget policy, execution, and control), might well be emphasized to a greater degree, not only in this work but in all discussions of utility financial policy and administration and utility municipal relations. Less than a page is devoted to the possible utilization of a municipality's management services by a utility, although this may have been deliberate because of the general and nontechnical nature of the work.

At the present stage of municipal utility development, there is need for an exhaustive study of the relation of utility financial administration to over-all municipal financial administration. A clear and complete exposition should be given of the need for and the public

interest in a coordinated municipal fiscal policy. The ways in which utility financial administration can be a part of an integrated over-all financial administration should be explored. Even where the form of utility organization follows traditional patterns, over-all coordination of financial policy and administration and an efficient utilization of existing municipal management services can be achieved.

Also needed is a manual of methodology. Most of us who are concerned with municipal administration need guidebooks which specifically indicate the "how" as well as the "why" of things. A detailed treatment of the possibilities inherent in centralization of housekeeping services, which shows specifically just how and to what degree a municipality's regular management services can be utilized by a utility and how coordination of financial policy can

be achieved, would be an invaluable aid both to the managers of municipal utilities and to municipal administrators generally.

Such an undertaking is not easy. The development and presentation of procedures whereby a municipal utility's budget can retain the flexibility needed for efficient administration and yet be a part of the over-all municipal budget and subject to some degree of municipal legislative and executive control is a challenging task. This is equally true with respect to the development of accounting procedures whereby the business type of "profit and loss" accounting, needed to reflect accurately the results of utility operation, can be coordinated with governmental appropriation accounting for purposes of over-all municipal financial planning and control. Both these jobs need doing. It is the hope of this reviewer that they will be done soon.

The Government and Research

By Dael Wolfle, American Psychological Association

ADMINISTRATION FOR RESEARCH: VOLUME THREE OF SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY. A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, by JOHN R. STEELMAN, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1947. Pp. iii, 324.

THE director of a scientific research program is as much an administrator as is the director of a business. He is responsible for establishing and maintaining suitable conditions for the productive work of the scientists on his staff. He is responsible for the efficient conduct of the research program and in large part for its success or failure. He must plan and schedule the work of his own agency and coordinate its efforts with those of related agencies. How the director of a research program can achieve these administrative virtues is the theme of *Administration for Research*.

From 1940 to 1947, the nation's total research and development budget rose from \$345 million to \$1,160 million. This rapidly expanding budget has made us much more keenly aware than we were a few years ago of the problems of administering large-scale re-

search activities. Government agencies in particular have had to think about research administration, for they are responsible for slightly over half of the 1947 expenditures. Government research is more diverse than that of any other agency. The unique position of the federal government puts its successes and its failures in a more prominent light than the successes or failures of any other agency. For these reasons, President Truman asked, in an Executive order of October 17, 1946, for a survey of administrative procedures in government agencies. *Administration for Research* is the report of that survey. In reporting how government research is administered, the volume also recommends how it *should be* administered.

One of the tasks of the research administrator is to provide a favorable climate in which the scientific staff can work. The report is very positive in stating that "it must be a primary purpose of public policy to provide such a climate," and in pointing out that the federal government has not succeeded very well in this

respect. A number of specific suggestions are made: The scientist "must, by the nature of things, be much less subject to the usual controls and regulations imposed in governmental administration than most other governmental employees." He must be given freedom to select his work and to pursue independent study. He must be provided with opportunities to do interesting and valuable work. He must have professional association and recognition, freedom from nonscientific work, good direction, and opportunity for growth and advancement. Civil service reforms, a higher ceiling on salaries, more money for official travel to scientific meetings, and freedom to publish research findings are specific ways in which working conditions can be made more attractive to scientists.

Some federal agencies provide some of these conditions, but throughout the government as a whole there is room for much improvement. "The Federal Government possesses the most varied and extensive research and development program of any single employer, a physical plant and equipment as modern as any, and a competitive salary scale. In fact, it has most of the elements deemed advantageous for employment. In spite of this, scientists hold the Federal Government in low esteem as an employer." A survey of scientists conducted by the board found 11 per cent favored government employment, 31 per cent favored industry, 48 per cent favored university employment, 10 per cent favored consulting work or some other activity.

The responsibility for providing a favorable climate for research falls upon the director of any research agency, governmental, industrial, or academic. In general, the directors of academic and industrial programs have solved this problem more satisfactorily than has the government administrator. But, the report adds, "many corrective measures are already under way to improve conditions."

The research director's responsibilities do not end with providing good conditions for his scientific staff. He must also provide them with efficient planning and a variety of staff services. The larger the organization, the more necessary it becomes to provide those aspects of administration which are called good organiza-

tion when they work well, and red tape when they become irritating.

Mr. Steelman recommends that much greater attention be paid than has been paid in the past to the scheduling and programming of research. The difficulty of predicting accurately the course of a fundamental research investigation and the inability to tell in advance either where it will lead or how long it will take is fully realized. But some scheduling of basic research studies is possible. Scheduling of developmental research is easier, for the goal is easier to see. The advantages of planning ahead are great enough to repay the effort required, for planning makes possible more efficient use of facilities, more timely procurement of additional personnel, better coordination of the various research programs and their requirements, and easier arrangement of finances. In order to secure these advantages, every research agency should establish a planning board which will attempt to schedule its research program.

A second recommendation is that greater use be made of administrative personnel and services. The prestige of a scientist may result in his appointment to be the administrative director of a research program. If he accepts this appointment, he may soon find that he no longer has time to be a scientist, that his time is all spent in dealing with procurement, budget, personnel, or other administrative problems in which he is not an expert. If, however, he is aided by a staff of experts in these matters, he can devote more of his own time and wisdom to the determination of research policies and to the scientific aspects of the program. It is quite possible that nine good scientists and one good administrator can accomplish more than ten good scientists.

Many scientists object to this kind of thinking on the ground that the professional administrator does not understand science and is almost by definition incapable of administering a research program. With equal lack of insight into what must necessarily be a cooperative relation, the administrator can retort that the scientist does not understand business or government policies, regulations, and problems. Ultimately, there may develop a group of specialists in research administration, persons with enough knowledge of science and its

peculiar problems to appreciate the scientists' point of view and with enough skill in finance, personnel, and other administrative details to permit the scientists to make fullest use of their scientific skill. Whether the scientific and administrative contributions to the success of a program are combined in the same person or not, both contributions are essential in a large research organization. The scientist must be there; after all, it is a scientific program. But the administrator must be there too, for many of the programs have outgrown the individual investigator in his laboratory as far as General Electric has outgrown Edison and his Menlo Park laboratory. Recognizing the extent to which proper use of administrative services can save the scientist's time and free him for more effective use of his talents, the report repeatedly emphasizes the importance of greater use of administrative staff services for any large research program.

The problems discussed above are problems of any research agency. The federal government has additional responsibilities for research. It shares with the foundations responsibility for supporting research in university and other nonprofit laboratories. It shares with universities responsibility for ensuring a future supply of scientific talent. And it alone can assume over-all responsibility for coordinating the total scientific effort of the country.

Private foundations have generally supported research through grants. The government, in contrast, has usually used contracts. During and since World War II, the amount of money spent on research and development contracts has grown to the point where, in 1947, \$425 out of a total budget of \$625 million for these purposes was allotted to industrial and university laboratories on contracts. Contracts are recommended for applied and developmental research, most of which should be placed with industrial laboratories. For basic research, most of which should be conducted in university laboratories, grants are recommended. Authority to make grants should be afforded to all of the major research agencies. These recommendations will be applauded by all universities which have had to contend with the provisions of a research contract patterned after the typical procurement contract.

Traditionally, the federal government has not engaged in any large-scale scholarship or fellowship programs. That is rapidly changing. Research fellowships are granted by several agencies. Training scholarships for prospective Navy officers are now available. The Veterans Administration and the United States Public Health Service are giving hundreds of training fellowships to students in psychiatry, psychology, and psychiatric nursing and social work. A prominent feature of the proposed national science foundation is its provision for scholarships. These are desirable trends, Steelman believes; "the Federal Government's entire research effort affords no programs of greater potential promise than this fellowship system"

The United States is almost the only major power which has failed to establish an effective means of determining broad scientific policy on a national basis. Four concrete recommendations are made to provide the over-all scientific leadership that only the government can give:

1. An interdepartmental committee on scientific research and development;
2. A special unit in the Bureau of the Budget to review federal scientific research and development programs;
3. Appointment by the President of a member of the White House staff for purposes of scientific liaison;
4. A national science foundation.

The discussion of these problems is a bit timid; the suggestions only partial solutions. Perhaps the controversial aspects of national science foundation legislation kept Mr. Steelman from writing a stronger discussion of this topic. For actually nothing short of a strong national science foundation can have the authority and the responsibility for reviewing the scientific programs of all government agencies and for directing (not in a coercive but in a farsighted planning sense) the scientific progress of the nation. Such a national science foundation would satisfy all four of the report's recommendations. It would include an interdepartmental committee on scientific research and development. It would require review of research and development budgets by

a special unit in the Bureau of the Budget. Its director would be the President's spokesman on matters of science and could make certain that proper liaison existed among the President, the Congress, and the several federal departments and bureaus. Such a foundation would experience, perhaps in larger measure than any other agency in the country, all of the problems of administering research that are discussed throughout the earlier paragraphs of this review, but it is the only agency that could solve the problem of top-level administration of the total research effort of the nation.

The research director is faced, finally, with a responsibility to those who support the research which he directs. When the government supports research, it does so as part of its responsibility to further the welfare of the 140 million citizens of the nation. This responsibility is assumed throughout the book, but not discussed.

Responsibility of the research director to his staff or of the government to its research agencies is only half the problem. What responsibility does an individual agency or director have to the government, or the government to the people? How can the government's scientific activities be responsive to the needs of the people without being subject to their whims?

What type of administrative organization will most surely avoid the narrowness that may follow upon too great specialization or too secure insulation from a knowledge of the requirements of the whole country? What kind of administration can best implement the democratic ideals of our government? Questions of this type are not asked, or answered, in this volume. They must be considered if the federal research program is to continue to hold and to deserve popular support.

Who ought to read this volume? Anyone who serves as the head of a research group or who wants to understand the problems that such a person faces. He will not find here answers to all his day-to-day problems. But he will learn what some of the government agencies have attempted in the way of solutions. He will find a list of the research and development units of the federal government, the detailed results of a survey of scientists about their work, and a selected and annotated bibliography of several hundred references from this and other countries on the administration of research. He will obtain a broader view of the principal problems than his own experience has given him. He may even get ideas that will help him contribute to a book that some day will be written on how large-scale research programs can best be administered.

News of the Society

ASPA Conference

March 12-14, 1948—Friday through Sunday

STATLER HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mrs. Hazel Jackson resigned as Secretary-Treasurer of the Society as of January 1, 1948, and Laverne Burchfield has been appointed to succeed her. In addition to her duties as Secretary-Treasurer, Miss Burchfield will continue as Managing Editor of *Public Administration Review*.

CHAPTER NEWS

Alabama

A dinner meeting of the Alabama Chapter was held in Reynolds Hall, Alabama College, Montevallo, on October 29. John T. Caldwell, the new president of Alabama College, spoke on "Administrative Principles and Military Government." Dr. Caldwell, a teacher and practitioner of public administration before becoming president at Montevallo, was actively engaged in the Navy's program of military government in the Pacific.

California—Southern California

General Wayne Allen, chief administrative officer of Los Angeles County, addressed the Southern California Chapter at a dinner meeting October 21 on "An Appraisal of the Profession of the Public Businessman."

At a meeting on December 17 the Honorable Fletcher Bowron, mayor of Los Angeles, and Dr. Edwin A. Cottrell, of Stanford University and the Haynes Foundation, discussed "The Problems of Metropolitan Government." This was the second in a series of five meetings which the chapter has scheduled.

On February 18 Dr. Edward K. Strong, Jr., of Stanford University addressed the chapter on "The Characteristics of a Good Administrator."

California—University of California (Berkeley)

The first meeting of this chapter was held on October 22. A constitution was adopted and officers were elected as follows: *President*—Stephen Keil; *Vice President*—Earl Segrest; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Elizabeth Ferina.

Directors—Harry Wolf, Margaret Wolff, Carol Davis, Karl Baldwin.

California—University of California at Los Angeles

The newly organized chapter of the University of California at Los Angeles adopted its constitution on November 17. Students elected as officers were: *President*—Ralph Donato Giovanniello; *Vice President*—Cecil Osoff; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Mrs. Iris Gorin; *Council Members*—W. Richard Bigger, Joe H. Bindley.

On November 24 about fifty persons attended a meeting to hear a panel discussion on the problems of students in making the transition from student to public life. Participating in the panel were Dr. Orme Phelps, professor of industrial relations, Claremont Graduate School; Heman G. Stark, chief of field services of the California Youth Authority; Harry Scoville, director, and Garrett R. Breckenridge, staff member, of the Bureau of Administrative Research of Los Angeles County.

California—University of Southern California

At a meeting of the University of Southern California Chapter on October 9, Garrett R. Breckenridge, chief research technician of the Los Angeles County Bureau of Administrative Research and a director of the Southern California Chapter, was the speaker. Over thirty members and guests heard Mr. Breckenridge discuss the "Internship Program of Los Angeles County."

On December 10 the chapter heard a panel discussion of "Entry into the Public Service," followed by discussion from the floor. Members of the panel were William G. Sharp, deputy county clerk of Los Angeles; Mrs. Pat Livingston, examining division, Los Angeles City Civil Service Commission; and Dr. Bernard Hyink, professor of economics and government, University of Redlands.

Representatives-at-large on the board of directors chosen at this meeting are Edwin L. Hoyt, Franklyn N. Vogel, and Forrest B. Powell.

Colorado—Denver

On January 15 some 55 persons met to organize a Denver chapter of the Society. C. L. Edwards, regional director for the U. S. Civil Service Commission was named chairman of an organizational committee, and Wallace Vawter, chief field representative, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, was appointed chairman of the program committee.

Connecticut

At its meeting on December 16, the Connecticut Chapter elected the following officers: *President*—Carter W. Atkins, executive director, Connecticut Public Expenditure Council, Inc.; *Vice President*—John DeWitt Norton, chairman, The Connecticut Committee, Inc.; *Secretary-Treasurer*—H. Stone, research assistant, Connecticut Public Expenditure Council, Inc.

District of Columbia

On November 12 members and guests of the Washington, D. C. Chapter heard Paul H. Appleby, dean of the Maxwell Graduate School

of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, speak on "A Reappraisal of the Federal Service as a Career."

A round table discussion of the new relations between scientists and administrators in government followed the dinner meeting on December 10. The round table included Carroll L. Wilson, general manager of the Atomic Energy Commission; P. V. Cardon, Agricultural Research Administration; L. R. Hafstad, Executive Officers Research and Development Board of the National Military Establishment; and F. N. Woodward, British Scientific Mission.

At a meeting on January 14 the following participants offered "A Reappraisal of the Congressional Reorganization Act": James Rowe, Jr., member of the Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government; Robert Heller, chairman of the National Committee for Strengthening the Congress; Honorable Mike Monroney, representative from Oklahoma; and Honorable Estes Kefauver, representative from Tennessee.

Illinois—Chicago

Leonard D. White, president of the Society, addressed the Chicago Chapter on November 25 on "The Role of the Society in the Public Administration Profession." Officers elected for the ensuing year were: *President*—L. C. Gibson, chief field representative, U. S. Bureau of the Budget, Chicago; *Vice President*—Herbert A. Simon, chairman, department of political science, Illinois Institute of Technology; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Kendall Lingle, acting director, Citizens Civil Service Association of Illinois.

Illinois—Roosevelt College

At the November 26 meeting of the Roosevelt College Chapter, Alderman Robert E. Merriam spoke on "The Administration of City Government," centering his remarks on the fiscal situation, overlapping governmental services, human relations, and housing in Chicago.

Illinois—University of Chicago

The speaker at the November 12 meeting of the chapter was Herbert Simon, professor of

political science at the Illinois Institute of Technology, who talked on "Proverbs of Administration." Dr. Simon's article of this title in the Winter, 1946, *Public Administration Review* has caused debate among students of public administration and this meeting gave an opportunity for further discussion.

On December 9, Frank Bane, executive director of the Council of State Governments, discussed with the chapter the question "Should There be Increased Reliance on States for the Administration of Federal Programs?"

The topic for the January 27 meeting was "The Congressman vs. the Bureaucrat." Roy Blough, formerly director of tax research, U. S. Department of the Treasury, and at present professor of economics and political science, University of Chicago, represented the "bureaucrats." The congressman who was scheduled for the meeting could not appear, so Leonard D. White, professor of public administration, University of Chicago, characterized the attitude of the congressman toward the administrator.

Indiana—Indiana University

The first meeting of the Indiana University Chapter was held on November 11 with about fifty members and guests present to hear President White welcome the chapter into the Society and speak on "Character and Loyalty in the Public Service."

Kentucky

A panel discussion of general administrative problems and the business administration of the University of Kentucky constituted the program of the November 12 meeting of the Kentucky Chapter. Leo Chamberlain, vice president, William S. Taylor, dean of the College of Education, and Frank D. Peterson, comptroller, all of the University of Kentucky, were members of the panel.

The January 14 meeting of the Kentucky Chapter centered around a panel discussion of federal-state-local administration of the Agricultural Extension Service. Participants were Thomson R. Bryant, director of extension

service, University of Kentucky, and Bob Heath, county agent of Franklin County.

On February 11 the chapter heard a discussion of new developments and current problems in the field of property assessment by P. Miles, State Department of Revenue, E. H. Dieruf, director of finance of Louisville, and F. J. Benckart, director of finance of Lexington.

Miss Gladys Kammerer is the new president of the Kentucky chapter.

Massachusetts

Henry Parkman, recently returned from Germany as governmental affairs adviser to USMG, addressed the Massachusetts Chapter October 23 on "Military Government in Germany—Problems of Administration." At the business session, officers were elected as follows: *President*—Henry L. Shattuck, Massachusetts General Court; *Vice President*—Don B. Leiffer, Bureau of Public Administration, Boston University; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Richard A. Atkins, Boston Municipal Research Bureau; *Council Members*—Thomas H. Buckley, Massachusetts Commission on Administration and Finance; Thomas J. Greehan, Massachusetts Director of Civil Service; Julius E. Kellner, consultant, Kellner Service; Morris B. Lambie, professor of government, Harvard University; Thomas F. Sullivan, Boston Police Commissioner; John R. Campbell, Jr., regional representative, Federal Security Agency.

Michigan—University of Michigan

The first meeting of the University of Michigan Chapter was held October 16. John A. Perkins, state budget director, discussed some of the problems encountered by a state budget director.

On January 12 the chapter elected new officers as follows: *President*—Paul H. Wileden, research associate, Bureau of Government; *Vice President*—Betty Lou Bidwell, student; *Secretary*—Jack Edward Jordan, research assistant, Bureau of Government; *Treasurer*—Alberta Brown, research assistant, Bureau of Government.

The chapter was very active during the fall term under the direction of G. Homer Skarin,

at present assistant to Representative Engel of the House Appropriations Committee. Occasional dinners and teas were held for faculty-student gatherings. Guest speakers during the fall term were: Loren B. Miller, director, Bureau of Governmental Research in Detroit; John A. Perkins, Michigan State Budget director; George E. Bean, City Manager of Pontiac; Herbert Emmerich, director, Public Administration Clearing House.

Minnesota

The Minnesota Chapter has elected new officers as follows: *President*—Victor Christgau, director, Division of Employment and Security; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Louis Dorweiler, director of research for the Minnesota Legislative Research Committee.

New Jersey—Princeton University

At the first program meeting of the Princeton University Chapter, November 19, Governor Alfred E. Driscoll gave an off-the-record talk on "The Reorganization of New Jersey State Government," discussing particularly the opportunities in the fields of the judiciary, executive departments, and fiscal affairs. Chapter officers were elected as follows: *President*—Joseph E. McLean, Princeton Surveys; *Vice President*—Sanford Bates, state commissioner of institutions and agencies; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Harry H. Ransom, department of politics, Princeton University; *Directors*—Chester I. Barnard, president of New Jersey Bell Telephone Company; Charles Yard, State Civil Service Commission.

New York—Capital District

"Coordination of State Services at the Regional Level" was the topic for discussion at the opening meeting of the chapter on October 14. The speakers were J. Harold DeNike, New York Department of Commerce, and George W. Chesboro, New York Department of Social Welfare. John Daniels, Jr., New York Division of the Budget, acted as moderator.

On November 18 an audience of some sixty persons heard a discussion of "Legislative Review of Administration," by Charles Locke,

secretary of Ways and Means Committee of the Assembly, and Fred R. Spreeman, secretary of the Finance Committee of the Senate, with the moderator Donald Axelrod of the Joint Legislative Committee on Legislative Procedure and Expenditure.

The December 16 meeting, attended by 110 members and guests, was devoted to a consideration of administrative adjudication. Speakers at the meeting were Robert M. Benjamin, member of the Board of Regents Sub-Committee on Professional Discipline, and Philip Halpern, counsel to the Public Service Commission and dean, School of Law, Buffalo University. John C. Crary, Jr., assistant attorney general, served as chairman of the meeting.

The committee on professional training submitted a report on the progress of the public administration training program. The program, headed by Dr. Lynton K. Caldwell, now has an enrollment of 81.

New York—Metropolitan Area

On November 5 about 100 members and guests heard the Honorable William Reid, chairman of the Mayor's Executive Committee on Administration and newly appointed chairman of the Board of Transportation, discuss "Current Trends in New York City Administration," particularly the creation of a division of analysis in the office of the director of the budget. The College of the City of New York is now providing special training in various phases of administrative analysis for the budget office staff and hopes eventually to make this training available to employees of other city agencies.

Oregon

Members of the Oregon Chapter heard a panel discussion of "Higher Education and Government Cooperation in Public Service Training in Oregon" at a dinner meeting on January 22.

Pennsylvania—Philadelphia Regional Chapter

On December 2, John D. Gill, economist and director of the Atlantic Refining Company in Philadelphia, addressed the chapter

on "Compensation Schedules: How to Adjust Them to Unsettled Economic Conditions."

At the January meeting Bennet F. Schauffler, regional director, National Labor Relations Board, talked on "Grievances and Employee Organizations: How to Deal with Them."

Puerto Rico—University of Puerto Rico

Students of the public administration program of the University of Puerto Rico called a meeting October 17 to plan a University of Puerto Rico Chapter of the Society. A constitution was adopted at a meeting November 7 and officers were elected as follows: *President*—Jesus Morales-Castro; *Vice President*—Maria Rosario-Hernandez; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Luis Astolfo Rodriguez; *Directors*—Manual E. Moreno-D'Andrade and Lillian D. de Duprey. A program for the year was discussed at a meeting November 11.

Tennessee

A meeting was held in Nashville November 13 to organize the Tennessee Chapter of the Society. Lee S. Greene of the University of Tennessee Bureau of Public Administration stated that the bureau would be able to furnish secretariat services if the chapter so desired and that publication of a periodic newsletter would be feasible. It was suggested that sectional meetings of the Tennessee Chapter would probably be necessary because of the almost equal distribution of members between Knoxville and Nashville. Members appointed to the Organizing Committee include Robert Avery, Bureau of Public Administration, University of Tennessee; Lawrence Durisch, Tennessee Valley Authority; Henry Williams, Vanderbilt University; Wesley Cook, Tennessee Taxpayers Association; and Frank Prescott, University of Chattanooga. The committee will draw up a constitution and nominate officers, canvassing the membership by mail.

Washington

At its November 10 meeting the Washington State Chapter adopted its constitution and named Stanley Erickson as president pro tem. About thirty persons were present for the

panel discussion of "Problems of Public Administration in the Pacific Northwest," which covered an evaluation of accomplishments and needs at all levels of government in this region. Irving Smith, Veterans Administration, Dr. Harold Lang, State Personnel Board, and Al Rochester, councilman of the City of Seattle, composed the panel.

At a meeting on January 12 there was a panel discussion of "Improvement of Public Administration," with the following participants: George Shipman, University of Washington; Gilbert Rolfe, chief of the procedural section, War Assets Administration; and Stanley Erickson, management analyst, Puget Sound Navy Yard. Officers were elected as follows: *President*—George Shipman; *Vice President*—Stanley Erickson; *Secretary-Treasurer*, Donald C. Sampson, Bureau of the Governmental Research and Services, University of Washington; *Trustees*—Harold Lang, supervisor, Washington State Personnel Board; Carl Crosser, executive secretary, Municipal League; Frank Laube, city councilman, Seattle; Irving Smith, personnel division, Veterans' Administration; Marion Wold, Department of Public Welfare, Olympia.

Wisconsin—Madison

The program topic for the chapter meeting October 30 was "The Veterans Housing Program." Professor Richard Ratcliff of the School of Commerce, University of Wisconsin, and secretary of the Wisconsin Veterans Housing Authority, presented the new state veterans program. Horace Wilkie, chairman of the Madison Housing Authority and Conference of Wisconsin Housing Authorities, set forth the proposal for a veterans housing project in Madison.

At the business meeting following the program, chapter officers were elected as follows: *President*—Philip H. Falk, city superintendent of schools, Madison; *Vice President*—Charles K. Alexander, research director, Wisconsin Taxpayers Alliance; *Secretary-Treasurer*—Jane Lester, research associate, Legislative Reference Library; *Council Members*—William W. Mitchell, Forest Products Laboratory; Russell L. Hibbard, unemployment compensation division, Industrial Commission; Max S. Linde-

mann, personnel officer, City of Madison; Richard C. Dubielzig, Dane County Board; Helen I. Clarke, professor of sociology, University of Wisconsin; Horace W. Wilkie, chairman, Madison Housing Authority.

On November 20 about forty members held a dinner meeting which was followed by a

panel discussion on "Retirement Systems for Public Employees," by William W. Mitchell, U. S. Forest Products Laboratory; F. M. MacMillan, director, Wisconsin Retirement Fund; and James R. Wedlake, assistant attorney general. Russell L. Hibbard was chairman of the panel.

ELEMENTS of PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By F. MORSTEIN MARX, Editor; James W. Fesler, George A. Graham, V. O. Key, Jr., Avery Leiserson, Milton M. Mandell, Harvey C. Mansfield, John D. Milllett, Don K. Price, Henry Reining, Jr., Wallace S. Sayre, Donald C. Stone, John A. Viegl, and Dwight Waldo.

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